{
  "attack_id": "unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "provider",
      "title": "Provider-side abuse investigation",
      "hypothesis": "A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.",
      "visibility": "Provider / operator records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Provider-owned account / request audit",
        "Abuse-review findings and linked-account context",
        "Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.",
        "For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.",
      "note": "Keep the separately described development and impersonation capabilities distinct; do not invent a combined victim chain.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation\nid: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,\n  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator\n  sessions.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.request\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.request\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.request\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/provider.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/provider.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/provider.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/provider.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "provider",
      "title": "Provider-side abuse investigation",
      "hypothesis": "A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.",
      "visibility": "Provider / operator records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Provider-owned account / request audit",
        "Abuse-review findings and linked-account context",
        "Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.",
        "For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation\nid: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,\n  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator\n  sessions.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.request\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.request\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.request\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/provider.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/provider.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/provider.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/provider.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "note": "Confirm the payload platform and delivery branch from original reporting before choosing endpoint-specific rules. No Windows policy coverage is assumed here.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Actor prepares cryptocurrency operations",
        "description": "The report describes two related capability areas without proving a single combined chain.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Gemini assists research and lure text",
        "description": "Requests cover cryptocurrency reconnaissance, wallet paths and Spanish-language messages.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Separate deepfake Zoom lure",
        "description": "Deepfake images or video impersonate cryptocurrency industry figures.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Malicious Zoom SDK delivers BIGMACHO",
        "description": "The separately reported social-engineering branch leads to a backdoor download.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2",
        "label": "Model assistance"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-3",
        "label": "Separate reported lure"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}