{
  "attack_id": "wiz-ai-driven-cloud-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "web",
      "title": "Web exploitation → host activity",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs",
        "Server process and file events",
        "Outbound DNS / proxy records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.",
        "Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation."
      ],
      "limitation": "A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity\nid: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected\n  server process, file, or outbound connection.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - web.exploit_candidate\n      - web.upload\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/web.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/web.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/web.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/web.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Exposed Kafka UI is exploited",
        "description": "The report confirms a Java RCE route among multiple probed entry points.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Agent executes and debugs cloud operations",
        "description": "The automation generates and retries scripts at high volume.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Credentials enable cross-service pivots",
        "description": "Reported paths span cloud accounts, Kubernetes, identity and CI/CD.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Data leaves through operational channels",
        "description": "The research describes runner-log exfiltration and abuse of legitimate cloud-management capabilities.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.wiz.io/blog/anatomy-of-ai-driven-cloud-attacks"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}