Cairn: coding agents automate web exploitation
Exposed operator panels revealed coding agents repeatedly attempting known web exploits against commerce and payment sites. Success was reported for roughly 10% of tasks.
What happened
Operators run open-source Cairn harnesses that loop AI coding agents toward intrusion goals (unauthenticated RCE, uploader shells). Panels ship with no login and Compose binds 0.0.0.0:8000, so NorForge and scanners could read task text, tooling, and secrets. AI did not invent new exploits; it made patient web exploitation cheap (~10% success, ~23h to goal). Oct 26 update: NorForge discovered threat actors AIA0009/AIA0010 hijacking exposed Cairn panels themselves, harvesting SSH keys and operator secrets from compromised panels, deploying Poseidon RAT to take over panel infrastructure and pivot to operators' own systems.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Operator assigns an intrusion goal
Cairn workers receive tasks against web, commerce and payment sites.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Coding agents plan and retry
The harness loops Claude Code or other agent backends toward the goal.
Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Existing exploitation tools run
Workers attempt web RCE, upload and related exploitation chains.
Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Some tasks obtain access
The research reports roughly 10% success; exposed harness panels also revealed operator tasks and secrets.
Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Unauthenticated web RCE / upload / deserialization / SQLi-to-RCE chains against e-commerce and payment sites (task-driven); CVE-2026-75650 Magento lab tooling observed on workers. Reported impact: The research reports roughly 10% success; exposed harness panels also revealed operator tasks and secrets; reported targets include E-commerce / payment / merchant sites; AIA0001 mostly US, Japan, Australia; AIA0002 merchant/gray-market/pharma and some African commerce; Reuters-reported one operator into 100+ sites; using the named AI products does not by itself establish exposure.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Default-deny / GTFOBins-style block of nmap, python, php, openssl on web servers that do not need them; scan agent skills before load (LOLSkills); do not expose harness panels
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
02Coding agents plan and retryProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft
The harness loops Claude Code or other agent backends toward the goal.
What to look for
A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
Visibility: Provider / operator records
Required logs
- Provider-owned account / request audit
- Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
- Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- model.request
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
03Existing exploitation tools runWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft
Workers attempt web RCE, upload and related exploitation chains.
What to look for
Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
- Server process and file events
- Outbound DNS / proxy records
Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- web.exploit_candidate
- web.upload
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
04Some tasks obtain accessWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft
The research reports roughly 10% success; exposed harness panels also revealed operator tasks and secrets.
What to look for
Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
Success is reported in aggregate. Confirm a host-side effect for an individual task before treating a probe as successful access.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
- Server process and file events
- Outbound DNS / proxy records
Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- web.exploit_candidate
- web.upload
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI as operator
- Offensive frameworks
- Cairn
- Initial access
- Unauthenticated web RCE / upload / deserialization / SQLi-to-RCE chains against e-commerce and payment sites (task-driven); CVE-2026-75650 Magento lab tooling observed on workers
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Cairn (open source AI harness)
- Claude Code CLI via ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to DeepSeek
- Worker label claudecode_deepseek-v4.1-flash (AIA0001)
- pi_openrouter_deepseek (AIA0002)
- --dangerously-skip-permissions
- Agent skill .agents/skills/tsec-actions/SKILL.md (CTF leftover)
Other tooling
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- E-commerce / payment / merchant sites; AIA0001 mostly US, Japan, Australia; AIA0002 merchant/gray-market/pharma and some African commerce; Reuters-reported one operator into 100+ sites
- Reported scale / exposure
- 20+ malicious exposed panels; AIA0001 1,100+ projects across 14 panels; ~10% success; ~<$5/task estimate; <23h start-to-goal; TruffleHog hundreds of secrets (11% verified); Censys: 24 stock Cairn panel hosts
- Target geography
- United States · Japan · Australia
Reported target geography includes the United States, Japan and Australia. Canada appeared in task text and African commerce was suggested by hints; those unconfirmed locations are excluded from country counts.
Reported attribution
NorForge AIA0001 (Chinese language, CGI Global Limited / AS56594, high confidence), AIA0002 (English, Vultr/AS20473, high), AIA0003 (AlexHost, low). Financially motivated.
Structured attribution
- Actor
- NorForge AIA0001 (AIA0001)
- Country
- China
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- NorForge
- Attribution confidence
- high
Detection rules
- Detect unexpected binaries on web serversGUIDANCE
Monitor execution of nmap, python, php, openssl, and other recon/development tools on web servers that typically serve HTTP/HTTPS only. Default-deny or application control policies are recommended.
- Detect agent harness panel exposureGUIDANCE
Scan for exposed Cairn or similar AI agent harness panels (default port 8000, no auth). Look for /api/*, /tasks, or panel-specific endpoints accessible without authentication.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-01
- Last updated
- 2026-11-05
Updates
- 2026-10-19 — NorForge
Initial disclosure of exposed Cairn panels AIA0001-AIA0003; operators using AI agents for web exploitation
- 2026-10-26 — NorForge
AIA0009/AIA0010 discovered hijacking exposed Cairn panels; harvesting SSH keys, deploying Poseidon RAT to compromise panel operators
Linked threat actors
- NorForge AIA0001 — China
Linked tools
- Cairn — agentic-offensive-framework
Source defensive notes
Default-deny / GTFOBins-style block of nmap, python, php, openssl on web servers that do not need them; scan agent skills before load (LOLSkills); do not expose harness panels
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
The supplied source explicitly describes generative-model tooling assisting the reported activity; this mapping does not establish additional autonomy or victim impact. Source
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Snorre Fagerland · NorForge
- NorForge: Inside Cairn - Exposed AI Agent Panels (AIA0001-AIA0003) norforge.com
- NorForge: Cairn Panels Hijacked - AIA0009/AIA0010 Deploy Poseidon RAT norforge.com
Jose post credits Reuters for the 100+ sites figure; exact Reuters article URL not captured in Typefully text.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Cairn exposed panels / AIA0001–AIA0003
- Entry ID
- cairn-norforge-2026-10
- Catalog review
- November 5, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed