Detection queries Qualified report

ChatGPT Lockdown Mode bypass - HTML preview sandbox escape (Check Point)

Check Point researcher Alexey Bukhteyev disclosed ChatGPT Lockdown Mode bypass allowing HTML preview sandbox escape via contentWindow.open from nested iframe. Attack vectors: (1) zero-click desktop chat…

What happened

Check Point researcher Alexey Bukhteyev disclosed ChatGPT Lockdown Mode bypass allowing HTML preview sandbox escape via contentWindow.open from nested iframe. Attack vectors: (1) zero-click desktop chat history theft, (2) fake-update malware delivery pages, (3) credential phishing via malicious prompts, custom GPTs, or shared chat links. OpenAI patched vulnerability Sept 18, 2026. No evidence of in-the-wild exploitation; marked borderline as researcher disclosure only.

HTML preview sandbox allowed popups; nested iframe contentWindow.open escaped sandbox; enabled chat history theft, fake-update malware, credential phishing via malicious prompts/GPTs/shared chats

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsResearch / qualified account
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Researcher disclosure; OpenAI fixed Sept 18, 2026; no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation

  1. 01 · Craft HTML preview exploit

    Attacker creates malicious prompt/GPT/shared chat with nested iframe contentWindow.open escape

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 03 · Escape HTML preview sandbox

    Nested iframe contentWindow.open escapes Lockdown Mode sandbox

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 3
  3. 04 · Chat history theft or credential phishing

    Zero-click chat history exfiltration (desktop) or credential phishing popup

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Malicious prompt, custom GPT, or shared chat link with HTML preview exploit. Reported impact: Zero-click chat history exfiltration (desktop) or credential phishing popup; reported targets include ChatGPT users; theoretical risk only (fixed before in-wild use); applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

OpenAI patched Sept 18, 2026; users should update ChatGPT Desktop; avoid untrusted shared chat links; review custom GPT permissions; implement sandbox escape monitoring

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Craft HTML preview exploitLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Attacker creates malicious prompt/GPT/shared chat with nested iframe contentWindow.open escape

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Escape HTML preview sandboxWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

Nested iframe contentWindow.open escapes Lockdown Mode sandbox

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
04Chat history theft or credential phishingSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

Zero-click chat history exfiltration (desktop) or credential phishing popup

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
Malicious prompt, custom GPT, or shared chat link with HTML preview exploit

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • HTML preview sandbox
  • Nested iframe escape

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
ChatGPT users; theoretical risk only (fixed before in-wild use)
Reported scale / exposure
PoC only; patched Sept 18, 2026; no in-wild exploitation documented

Reported attribution

Researcher disclosure (Alexey Bukhteyev, Check Point); no threat actor; OpenAI patched Sept 18

Structured attribution

Actor
Researcher disclosure only
Country
Unknown
Motivation
unknown
Attributed by
Check Point
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • ChatGPT security monitoringGUIDANCE

    Update ChatGPT Desktop to post-Sept-18-2026 version; monitor for sandbox escape attempts; review shared chat links before opening; audit custom GPT permissions; implement popup blocker; detect contentWindow.open from nested iframes; educate users on malicious prompt/GPT risks

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-09-18
Last updated
2026-09-18

Updates

  • 2026-09-18 — Check Point / OpenAI

    Alexey Bukhteyev discloses Lockdown Mode bypass; OpenAI patches same day; no in-wild exploitation documented

Source defensive notes

OpenAI patched Sept 18, 2026; users should update ChatGPT Desktop; avoid untrusted shared chat links; review custom GPT permissions; implement sandbox escape monitoring

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0051LLM Prompt Injection

Malicious prompts/GPTs/shared chats could deliver HTML preview exploits Source

AML.T0077LLM Response Rendering

Sandbox escape enabled chat history theft (zero-click desktop) Source

AML.T0057LLM Data Leakage

Credential phishing via escaped sandbox popup windows Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Alexey Bukhteyev · Check Point Research

  1. Check Point: ChatGPT Lockdown Mode Bypass - Phishing, Malware Delivery and Silent Data Exfiltration research.checkpoint.com

Check Point blog; researcher disclosure only; OpenAI fixed Sept 18, 2026; no threat actor or in-wild exploitation documented

Record & downloads
Source record name
ChatGPT Lockdown Mode bypass - HTML preview sandbox escape (Check Point)
Entry ID
chatgpt-lockdown-mode-bypass-checkpoint-2026-09
Catalog review
November 10, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed