Yoba campaign - fake GPT-6/Claude desktop apps via DLL sideloading
Campaign creates fake GitHub projects (gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop, gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io, opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io) with GitHub.io pages impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, and Claude Opus…
What happened
Campaign creates fake GitHub projects (gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop, gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io, opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io) with GitHub.io pages impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, and Claude Opus desktop apps. ZIP installers contain legitimate signed OpenAI and Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper/YobaLoader DLLs. Uses DLL sideloading (T1574.002) to load malware indirectly from signed binaries. No fake engagement (stars/forks) but ranks highly via SEO poisoning on Google. Malware avoids dedicated C2 infrastructure, uses Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS. Russian-origin indicators; operates UTC-4 time zone. Releases Aug-Sep 2026, low detection rate, no password protection on ZIPs.
Fake GitHub projects impersonate GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus desktop applications to distribute malware via DLL sideloading
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · SEO poisoning and fake repositories
Created fake GitHub repositories impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus; GitHub.io pages with download links; no fake engagement but ranks highly on Google via SEO poisoning
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 1 - 02 · User downloads fake installer
Victim searches for AI desktop apps, finds malicious GitHub repositories via Google; downloads ZIP from GitHub releases (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip)
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 2 - 03 · DLL sideloading from signed binaries
ZIP contains legitimate signed OpenAI/Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper DLL; when legitimate signed binary runs, it loads malicious DLL via DLL search order hijacking
Hunt: A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.
Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.
Source for step 3 - 04 · YobaDropper deploys YobaLoader
YobaDropper executes, deploys YobaLoader component; anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques; no password protection needed due to low detection
Hunt: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
Source for step 4 - 05 · C2 via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DoH
YobaLoader contacts attacker infrastructure via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS; no dedicated C2 infrastructure for strong OPSEC; fetches final payload
Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Source for step 5 - 06 · Final payload execution
YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source
Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Source for step 6
Why it matters
Reported entry point: SEO-poisoned search results leading to malicious GitHub repositories and GitHub.io pages; users download fake installer ZIPs from GitHub releases. Reported impact: YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source; reported targets include AI tool users searching for ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Verify official AI tool sources; DLL sideloading detection; monitor GitHub releases for fake AI projects; SEO poisoning awareness; C2 infrastructure monitoring (Telegram, Tor, DNS over HTTPS)
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01SEO poisoning and fake repositoriesLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
Created fake GitHub repositories impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus; GitHub.io pages with download links; no fake engagement but ranks highly on Google via SEO poisoning
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02User downloads fake installerLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
Victim searches for AI desktop apps, finds malicious GitHub repositories via Google; downloads ZIP from GitHub releases (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip)
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03DLL sideloading from signed binariesDLL loaded from a user-writable locationNative logs · Draft
ZIP contains legitimate signed OpenAI/Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper DLL; when legitimate signed binary runs, it loads malicious DLL via DLL search order hijacking
What to look for
A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.
Visibility: Windows image-load telemetry where collected
Required logs
- Windows image-load events such as Sysmon Event 7 or EDR equivalents
- File provenance, signature, and process ancestry
- Subsequent network and payload activity
Coverage limit. Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.
DLL image loads from common user-writable paths. Confirm the initiating executable is trusted and the loaded module is unexpected before treating the event as sideloading.
MCP reference matches: Microsoft Defender Blocked from Loading Unsigned DLL (SigmaHQ). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - DLL Load From User-Writable Location
id: a5e6a4a2-be30-4a0a-8559-5f9a2623403e
status: experimental
description: Detects DLL image loads from common user-writable Windows paths.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
falsepositives:
- Portable, development, and self-updating applications
level: medium
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_path:
ImageLoaded|contains:
- \Downloads\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \Windows\Temp\
- \Users\Public\
selection_dll:
ImageLoaded|endswith: .dll
condition: all of selection_*
KQL
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName endswith ".dll"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\", "\\Windows\\Temp\\", "\\Users\\Public\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7
ImageLoaded="*.dll"
(ImageLoaded="*\\Downloads\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*"
OR ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\Users\\Public\\*")
| table _time host User Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus Hashes ProcessGuid
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Verify the executable and DLL signatures, original archive or installer, hashes, and load path.
- Compare the DLL name/location with the vendor's expected installation and correlate child activity.
04YobaDropper deploys YobaLoaderUnapproved Windows program executionNative logs · Draft
YobaDropper executes, deploys YobaLoader component; anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques; no password protection needed due to low detection
What to look for
A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation
- Download provenance and file hashes
- File certificate information and application-control audit / block events
Coverage limit. Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution
id: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1
status: experimental
description: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable
location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains:
- \Downloads\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \AppData\Roaming\
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "\\Downloads\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
- Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
05C2 via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DoHUnexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft
YobaLoader contacts attacker infrastructure via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS; no dedicated C2 infrastructure for strong OPSEC; fetches final payload
What to look for
A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
Correlate the loader process with Telegram, Tor, Catbox, or DoH activity; those services are not malicious by themselves.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Platform-specific process and file provenance
- Signer / hash and software inventory
- Per-process network and remote-session records
Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- process.unapproved.exec
- remote.session.start
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
06Final payload executionUnexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft
YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source
What to look for
A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Platform-specific process and file provenance
- Signer / hash and software inventory
- Per-process network and remote-session records
Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- process.unapproved.exec
- remote.session.start
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
Technical detailsTooling, impact
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI tool as lure
- Initial access
- SEO-poisoned search results leading to malicious GitHub repositories and GitHub.io pages; users download fake installer ZIPs from GitHub releases
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- GPT-5.6 Sol (fake)
- GPT-6 Astra (fake)
- Claude Opus (fake)
Other tooling
- YobaDropper
- YobaLoader
- Legitimate signed OpenAI executables
- Legitimate signed Anthropic executables
- DLL sideloading
- Telegram for C2
- Tor
- Catbox
- DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- AI tool users searching for ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications
- Reported scale / exposure
- 3 fake GitHub repositories created Jul-Sep 2026; first malicious releases uploaded Aug 30, 2026; 3 ZIP installers (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip); low VirusTotal detection rates
Reported attribution
Yoba campaign; Russian-origin indicators (language, time zone); operates primarily UTC-4 time zone; different email addresses per repository suggest OPSEC to obscure true operational timezone
Source defensive notes
Verify official AI tool sources; DLL sideloading detection; monitor GitHub releases for fake AI projects; SEO poisoning awareness; C2 infrastructure monitoring (Telegram, Tor, DNS over HTTPS)
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
hashes
urls
https://github.com/gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktophttps://github.com/gpt-5-6/gpt-5-6.github.iohttps://github.com/opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.iohttps://github.com/gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Check Point Research · Check Point
Check Point Research tracked campaign over two months; no password protection on ZIPs unlike typical malicious archives; low detection due to anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Yoba campaign - fake GPT-6/Claude desktop apps via DLL sideloading
- Entry ID
- checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10
- Catalog review
- November 4, 2026