Cursor CurXecute code execution (CVE-2025-54135)
A Cursor IDE flaw in AI and MCP handling enabled code execution. It was fixed alongside MCPoison in the Cursor 1.3.x line.
What happened
Cursor IDE vulnerability tracked as CurXecute (CVE-2025-54135) enabling code execution paths via AI IDE/MCP handling; fixed alongside MCPoison in Cursor 1.3.x line. Public FAQ groups it with MCP trust issues in Cursor.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Trigger details are not in the seed
The supplied record does not describe a complete exploit delivery chain.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Cursor AI / MCP handling is affected
CurXecute concerns an execution path in the AI IDE and MCP handling.
Hunt: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Code-execution vulnerability reported
CVE-2025-54135 was addressed in the Cursor 1.3.x release line.
Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
Source for step 3
Why it matters
Reported impact: CVE-2025-54135 was addressed in the Cursor 1.3.x release line.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The report concerns code execution in Cursor AI / MCP handling.
Conditions to check- Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
- Review the source for the affected AI / MCP handling path; ordinary product use alone does not establish exposure.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Check the vendor advisory and review which project content and MCP configurations the IDE trusts.
Upgrade Cursor; least privilege for IDE agent tools
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
02Cursor AI / MCP handling is affectedAgent trust / configuration changesCustom schema · Draft
CurXecute concerns an execution path in the AI IDE and MCP handling.
What to look for
A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration
- Repository audit / pull-request history
- Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
Coverage limit. A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Agent trust / configuration changes
id: 2dfc8034-d66b-42a7-a699-a76b2ef872ac
status: experimental
description: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands,
automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before
new execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.config.write
- agent.approval.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.config.write", "agent.approval.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.config.write", "agent.approval.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
03Code-execution vulnerability reportedUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft
CVE-2025-54135 was addressed in the Cursor 1.3.x release line.
What to look for
Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
The seed does not supply a full trigger chain; child-process review is a broad hunt, not a CVE-specific signature.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
- Tool-definition and approval changes
- Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.tool.call
- agent.tool.definition.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
Technical detailsTooling, impact
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
Targets and reported impact
- Reported scale / exposure
- Fixed Cursor 1.3.9 / 1.3 per Tenable FAQ
Source defensive notes
Upgrade Cursor; least privilege for IDE agent tools
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Tenable / Check Point (paired disclosure) · Tenable / Check Point
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Cursor CurXecute (CVE-2025-54135)
- Entry ID
- cursor-curxecute-cve-2025-54135
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed