Detection queries Not classified

Email prompt injection against mail AI assistants (Sublime, Barracuda)

Sublime Security (Harley Halsey, Brandon Murphy, Randy Pargman) primary research documents invoice fraud campaign hiding forward this email with its PDF to ap.confirm+<controller>@<target> instructions in…

What happened

Sublime Security (Harley Halsey, Brandon Murphy, Randy Pargman) primary research documents invoice fraud campaign hiding forward this email with its PDF to ap.confirm+<controller>@<target> instructions in zero-size HTML span elements and Unicode Tag characters invisible to humans. Barracuda (Merium Khalid, Nov 7) via Cybersecurity Insiders reports recruiting email hiding HTML playbook telling assistant to forward to all-staff mailing lists for self-propagation and search mailbox for seed phrases, private keys, wallet data to exfiltrate to outside Gmail accounts. Both campaigns target email AI assistants reading/processing messages on behalf of users. Unattributed actors; confirmed in wild by Sublime and Barracuda independently.

Email AI assistants manipulated via hidden HTML prompt injection to forward emails, search mailboxes for sensitive data, and self-propagate across organization

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Phishing Has a New Target - The AI Assistant Reading Your Email

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Craft hidden prompt injection

    Attacker embeds instructions in zero-size HTML spans and Unicode Tag characters invisible to users

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Deliver phishing email

    Invoice fraud or recruiting email delivered to target organization

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Email AI assistant processes message

    AI assistant reads email including hidden instructions

    Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

    Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · AI forwards email or searches mailbox

    Assistant follows hidden instructions to forward email with PDF to attacker-controlled address or search for sensitive data

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Self-propagate via all-staff forwards

    Barracuda case: AI forwards to all-staff lists for organizational spread

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Phishing emails with hidden HTML prompt injection targeting email AI assistants. Reported impact: Barracuda case: AI forwards to all-staff lists for organizational spread; reported targets include Organizations using email AI assistants; finance teams (invoice fraud); general workforce (recruiting fraud); applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Strip hidden HTML elements from emails before AI processing; sanitize Unicode Tag characters; implement AI assistant output validation; restrict AI assistant forwarding capabilities; require human approval for bulk forwards; monitor for unusual mailbox search patterns; educate users on prompt injection risks; implement strict email content security policies

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Craft hidden prompt injectionLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Attacker embeds instructions in zero-size HTML spans and Unicode Tag characters invisible to users

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02Deliver phishing emailLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Invoice fraud or recruiting email delivered to target organization

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Email AI assistant processes messageUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft

AI assistant reads email including hidden instructions

What to look for

An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

Visibility: Application / agent audit records

Required logs

  • Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
  • Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
  • Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions

Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
  task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.input.ingest
      - agent.session.resume
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
  2. Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
04AI forwards email or searches mailboxUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

Assistant follows hidden instructions to forward email with PDF to attacker-controlled address or search for sensitive data

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
05Self-propagate via all-staff forwardsSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

Barracuda case: AI forwards to all-staff lists for organizational spread

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
Phishing emails with hidden HTML prompt injection targeting email AI assistants

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Email AI assistants (unspecified vendors)
  • Mailbox automation agents

Other tooling

  • Zero-size HTML span elements
  • Unicode Tag characters
  • HTML playbook instructions

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Organizations using email AI assistants; finance teams (invoice fraud); general workforce (recruiting fraud)
Reported scale / exposure
Active Nov 2026; confirmed by two independent security vendors
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unattributed campaigns; confirmed active in wild Nov 2026 by Sublime and Barracuda

Structured attribution

Actor
Unattributed campaigns
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Sublime Security / Barracuda
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Email AI assistant security controlsGUIDANCE

    Strip zero-size HTML elements before AI processing; sanitize Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000–U+E007F); detect hidden text with display:none, font-size:0, opacity:0; validate AI assistant actions (forwards, searches); require human approval for bulk operations; monitor for ap.confirm+ email patterns; alert on mailbox searches for seed phrase, private key, wallet; log all AI assistant forwarding actions; implement AI output validation

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-11-01
Last updated
2026-11-07

Updates

  • 2026-11-06 — Sublime Security

    Sublime reports invoice fraud campaign using zero-size HTML spans and Unicode Tag characters to inject hidden instructions targeting email AI assistants

  • 2026-11-07 — Barracuda / Cybersecurity Insiders

    Barracuda documents recruiting email hiding HTML playbook for all-staff self-propagation and mailbox search for cryptocurrency data

Source defensive notes

Strip hidden HTML elements from emails before AI processing; sanitize Unicode Tag characters; implement AI assistant output validation; restrict AI assistant forwarding capabilities; require human approval for bulk forwards; monitor for unusual mailbox search patterns; educate users on prompt injection risks; implement strict email content security policies

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0051LLM Prompt Injection

Hidden HTML instructions inject prompts into email AI assistant processing Source

AML.T0053AI Agent Tool Invocation

Email AI assistants manipulated to forward emails and search mailboxes without user awareness Source

AML.T0086Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation

AI assistants instructed to exfiltrate seed phrases, private keys, and wallet data Source

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by Harley Halsey, Brandon Murphy, Randy Pargman (Sublime); Merium Khalid (Barracuda) · Sublime Security, Barracuda Networks

  1. Sublime: Invoice Fraud Campaign Adds Prompt Injection Aimed at Email AI Agents sublime.security
  2. Phishing Has a New Target - The AI Assistant Reading Your Email www.cybersecurity-insiders.com

Sublime Security blog (primary source) documents invoice fraud campaign with zero-size span and Unicode Tag injection; Barracuda report via Cybersecurity Insiders adds recruiting fraud with all-staff self-propagation and mailbox search for crypto data; both confirm active attacks Nov 2026

Record & downloads
Source record name
Email prompt injection against mail AI assistants (Sublime, Barracuda)
Entry ID
email-prompt-injection-ai-assistants-2026-11
Catalog review
November 10, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed