Detection queries Not classified

Eye Security ARTEX intrusion from a PHP webshell to GitOps and CI runners

Eye Security (Bas van den Berg, Nov 12, 2026) describes a multi-day ARTEX intrusion that started at a vulnerable custom PHP upload function. Uploads were extension-fuzzed (.phtml, .php5, .php7, .phar, .inc,…

What happened

Eye Security (Bas van den Berg, Nov 12, 2026) describes a multi-day ARTEX intrusion that started at a vulnerable custom PHP upload function. Uploads were extension-fuzzed (.phtml, .php5, .php7, .phar, .inc, .PHP) into webshells such as artx_s5.php and zzartx0000.php. The shell accepted header X-ARTX-KEY or parameter k, used key k=x9f3c2b7e, and returned ### ARTX-AGENT. Environment variables on the pod leaked API keys, and the first call with a stolen key landed within minutes. When a rate limiter engaged, the agents rewrote their client in about three minutes to rotate a spoofed client-IP header and peaked at over 9,000 requests a minute. After that path was blocked they used a pool of more than 17,000 residential proxies. They pulled Neo-reGeorg (https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg) and changed it to keep state in the internal cache so it worked across load-balanced pods. Its default user agent is Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0. With an engineer's Git hosting identity they changed the deployment repo so GitOps deployed attacker pods, including artx-pod and a privileged pod on a staging host. Deleting the pod brought it back within a second. From the privileged pod they broke out to the node with nsenter. Separately, Eye counted thirteen logins in under three minutes, one socket per login, asking a file-transfer server to forward Docker, containerd, CRI-O, lightweight Kubernetes, the system bus, the PHP worker pool, the process supervisor, and sshd. The server refused every one of those forwards. A CI app key from the secret store was used to register self-hosted GitHub runners named sink-*, re-registered about every eight minutes through the night. Backdoor admins looked like QA or audit accounts (qa_probe_*, qa.audit29a). In phpMyAdmin they used LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE into databases named artx_* and INTO OUTFILE write tests at /tmp/x.php5. The operators went after gift-card codes. Eye also publishes OSINT infrastructure from similar ARTEX activity: 207.5.195.93, artex.lol, staging.artex.lol, artex.tokena2b.top, artex.ok7777.eu.cc, artex.noog2infra.site, images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex, and callbacks on dnslog.cn, oast.me, and webhook.site. Data markers include ARTEX_WRITE_PROBE, ARTEX-PROBE-0001, ARTX_PERSIST_OK, and artex_control_marker_zz9q. Link srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11, datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11, arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11, microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11, and badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11.

Eye Security recovered ARTEX markers in pod names, files, data probes, and user agents during a multi-day incident at a payment and gift-card company. The agents adapted a rate-limit bypass in about three minutes.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · PHP upload becomes a webshell

    Extension-fuzzed uploads such as artx_s5.php and zzartx0000.php accept X-ARTX-KEY and return ### ARTX-AGENT.

    Hunt: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.

    Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Pod secrets used within minutes

    Environment variables and the secret store yield API keys. A rate limiter is bypassed in about three minutes.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Neo-reGeorg across pods

    Neo-reGeorg is modified to keep state in the internal cache so the tunnel survives load-balanced pods.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · GitOps restores the attacker pod

    A deployment-repo change creates artx-pod. Deleting it brings the pod back within a second.

    Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

    Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Privileged pod to the node

    A privileged staging pod is used with nsenter to reach the host node.

    Hunt: A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.

    Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Self-hosted runners named sink-*

    A CI app key registers self-hosted GitHub runners that are re-registered through the night.

    Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

    Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

    Source for step 6

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Vulnerable custom PHP upload function, then extension-fuzzed webshells. Reported impact: A deployment-repo change creates artx-pod. Deleting it brings the pod back within a second; A CI app key registers self-hosted GitHub runners that are re-registered through the night; reported targets include A company running payment and gift-card services. Eye did not name the company; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Block the published webshell names and the X-ARTX-KEY header. Alert on php-fpm or the web server spawning a shell, nsenter into the host PID namespace, a privileged pod, and a new self-hosted GitHub runner such as sink-*. Treat GitOps reconciliation as a persistence path: a deleted artx-pod that returns immediately is the deployment repo, not a restart.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01PHP upload becomes a webshellLinux web worker → shell / interpreterNative logs · Draft

Extension-fuzzed uploads such as artx_s5.php and zzartx0000.php accept X-ARTX-KEY and return ### ARTX-AGENT.

What to look for

A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields)
  • PHP / web access logs
  • File changes to web roots and PHP configuration

Coverage limit. Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.

linux process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux web worker → shell / interpreter
id: 068e005a-876e-4ba3-a414-791f9a1c2330
status: experimental
description: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or
  reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - /sh
      - /bash
      - /python
      - /python3
      - /curl
      - /wget
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - /php-fpm
      - /php-fpm8.2
      - /apache2
      - /httpd
      - /nginx
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "python", "python3", "curl", "wget")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("php-fpm", "php-fpm8.2", "apache2", "httpd", "nginx")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/sh", "*/bash", "*/python", "*/python3", "*/curl", "*/wget")
ParentImage IN ("*/php-fpm", "*/php-fpm8.2", "*/apache2", "*/httpd", "*/nginx")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.
  2. Review auto_prepend_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them.
02Pod secrets used within minutesSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Environment variables and the secret store yield API keys. A rate limiter is bypassed in about three minutes.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
04GitOps restores the attacker podPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft

A deployment-repo change creates artx-pod. Deleting it brings the pod back within a second.

What to look for

A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
  • Repository and token permission inventory
  • Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records

Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - repository.public.write
      - repository.visibility.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
  2. Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
05Privileged pod to the nodePrivileged container or pod with host accessNative logs · Draft

A privileged staging pod is used with nsenter to reach the host node.

What to look for

A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.

Visibility: Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected

Required logs

  • Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events
  • Container runtime process and mount telemetry
  • Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions

Coverage limit. Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.

Kubernetes audit candidates for privileged pods or hostPath volumes. The KQL and SPL examples need the respective Kubernetes audit sources and local field extraction.

MCP reference matches: Privileged Container Deployed (SigmaHQ), Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Privileged Kubernetes Pod or Host Mount
id: 5a3e19f4-3f1f-46e9-974f-4985b4692d30
status: experimental
description: Detects pod creation requests containing privileged containers or hostPath volumes.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml
falsepositives:
  - Approved infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads
level: high
logsource:
  category: application
  product: kubernetes
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_create:
    verb: create
    objectRef.resource: pods
  selection_privileged:
    requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged: true
  selection_hostpath:
    requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path|startswith: /
  condition: selection_create and 1 of selection_privileged, selection_hostpath
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
AzureDiagnostics
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where Category in ("kube-audit", "kube-audit-admin")
| where log_s has '"verb":"create"' and log_s has '"resource":"pods"'
| where log_s has '"privileged":true' or log_s has '"hostPath"'
| project TimeGenerated, Resource, ResourceGroup, SubscriptionId, log_s
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="kube:apiserver-audit" verb=create objectRef.resource=pods
(requestObject.spec.containers{}.securityContext.privileged=true
  OR requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path="*")
| table _time user.username sourceIPs{} objectRef.namespace objectRef.name
    requestObject.spec.containers{}.image requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.
  2. Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials.
06Self-hosted runners named sink-*Private access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft

A CI app key registers self-hosted GitHub runners that are re-registered through the night.

What to look for

A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
  • Repository and token permission inventory
  • Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records

Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - repository.public.write
      - repository.visibility.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
  2. Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Initial access
Vulnerable custom PHP upload function, then extension-fuzzed webshells

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • ARTEX (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.

Other tooling

  • Neo-reGeorg (https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg)
  • nsenter container breakout
  • Self-hosted GitHub Actions runners

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
A company running payment and gift-card services. Eye did not name the company.
Reported scale / exposure
Peak over 9,000 requests a minute. More than 17,000 residential proxy addresses. Thirteen socket-forward logins in under three minutes, all refused by the server. GitOps recreated a deleted attacker pod within a second. Runners were re-registered about every eight minutes.

Eye did not name the victim's country. Infrastructure countries are not recorded as victim regions.

Reported attribution

Unnamed. Eye ties one address to public ARTEX reporting on payment-API abuse. No country is given.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed ARTEX operators
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Eye Security
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Linux Webshell IndicatorsSIGMAView rule

    Linux process creation. A web server parent spawning a shell utility. Parent images in the rule include httpd, nginx, and apache2. php-fpm is not in that parent list, so a shell whose parent is only php-fpm will not match.

  • Potential Docker Escape via NsenterELASTICView rule

    Linux endpoint. nsenter changing into another namespace, including the host breakout Eye saw from the privileged pod.

  • Kubernetes Privileged Pod CreatedELASTICView rule

    Kubernetes audit. Creation of a privileged pod. Matches the staging pod used before nsenter.

  • Remote GitHub Actions Runner RegistrationELASTICView rule

    Endpoint, cross-platform. Runner.Listener registering a self-hosted runner. Matches the sink-* runners.

  • New GitHub Self Hosted Action RunnerELASTICView rule

    GitHub audit log. A new self-hosted runner registered on a repository.

  • ARTEX shell key and Neo-reGeorg user agentGUIDANCE

    No cited rule contains X-ARTX-KEY, k=x9f3c2b7e, ### ARTX-AGENT, artx_s5.php, or the Firefox/38.0 Neo-reGeorg agent. The Sigma ReGeorg web-log rule requires a null user agent, so it misses this tunnel.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-11-12
Last updated
2026-11-12

Updates

  • 2026-11-12 — Eye Security

    Eye publishes the incident: PHP webshells, a three-minute rate-limit bypass, Neo-reGeorg, GitOps pod restoration, nsenter, and sink-* GitHub runners.

Source defensive notes

Block the published webshell names and the X-ARTX-KEY header. Alert on php-fpm or the web server spawning a shell, nsenter into the host PID namespace, a privileged pod, and a new self-hosted GitHub runner such as sink-*. Treat GitOps reconciliation as a persistence path: a deleted artx-pod that returns immediately is the deployment repo, not a restart.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016Obtain Capabilities

The operators deployed the ARTEX agent framework and Neo-reGeorg. Source

AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing Application

Initial access was a vulnerable PHP upload function turned into webshells. Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

Pod environment variables and the cloud secret store exposed API keys and a CI app key. Source

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

Stolen keys and an engineer's Git hosting identity were reused for API calls, GitOps, and runner registration. Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • artex.lol
  • staging.artex.lol
  • artex.tokena2b.top
  • artex.ok7777.eu.cc
  • artex.noog2infra.site
  • webhook.site

ips

  • 207.5.195.93

hashes

    urls

      Sources & research credit

      1 source

      Research by Bas van den Berg · Eye Security

      1. Machine speed: how we defended against an AI-driven attack labs.eye.security

      File names, the shell key, the request peak, the proxy count, the GitHub runner names, and the nsenter breakout are from the Eye Security incident write-up. 207.5.195.93 and the artex.* domains are in Eye's OSINT infrastructure list for similar ARTEX activity, not described as addresses observed inside this victim. Neo-reGeorg is tracked by LOTTunnels at https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/neo-regeorg/. The Sigma ReGeorg web-log rule requires a null user agent, and this tunnel used Firefox/38.0, so that rule is not cited.

      Record & downloads
      Source record name
      Eye Security ARTEX intrusion from a PHP webshell to GitOps and CI runners
      Entry ID
      eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11
      Catalog review
      November 15, 2026
      Category
      adversary-use-of-ai
      AI involvement confidence
      confirmed