Not classified

InstallFix fake Claude Code installation pages

Mar 6, 2026: Push Security identified 'InstallFix' campaign: 120+ fake websites impersonating official Claude Code installation pages (claude-code-download[.]com, get-claude-code[.]net, etc.). Sites rank…

What happened

Mar 6, 2026: Push Security identified 'InstallFix' campaign: 120+ fake websites impersonating official Claude Code installation pages (claude-code-download[.]com, get-claude-code[.]net, etc.). Sites rank highly in search results via SEO poisoning (typosquat domains, keyword stuffing, fake reviews). Offer trojanized Claude Code installers for Windows/macOS/Linux. Windows: NSIS installer bundles Claude Code with AMOS infostealer. macOS: DMG contains Claude Code.app + hidden LaunchAgent installing Atomic Stealer. Linux: .deb/.rpm with postinstall script deploying XMRig miner + credential harvester. All variants harvest: Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, crypto wallets, browser cookies, SSH keys. Push Security tracked 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026. Average user dwell time before detection: 23 days. Detection: verify Claude Code install source (official anthropic.com only); check installer signatures; monitor for unexpected LaunchAgents (macOS) or startup tasks (Windows); scan for AMOS/Atomic Stealer/XMRig indicators.

InstallFix campaign creates fake Claude Code installation pages via SEO poisoning to distribute trojanized installers and credential stealers

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Create fake install sites with SEO

    Adversary creates 120+ fake Claude Code installation websites (claude-code-download[.]com, get-claude-code[.]net, etc.); uses SEO poisoning (typosquats, keyword stuffing, fake reviews) to rank highly in search results for 'download Claude Code'

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · User downloads trojanized installer

    User searches for Claude Code, finds fake site, downloads installer; sites appear legitimate with screenshots, documentation, fake testimonials; multi-platform support (Windows NSIS, macOS DMG, Linux deb/rpm)

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Install malware with legitimate app

    Installer deploys functional Claude Code plus malware: Windows (AMOS infostealer), macOS (LaunchAgent → Atomic Stealer), Linux (postinstall → XMRig + harvester). Malware harvests Anthropic keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS creds, crypto wallets, SSH keys

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Credential theft and crypto mining

    Malware exfiltrates credentials to attacker C2; XMRig mines Monero on Linux systems; persistence via LaunchAgents/startup tasks; 8,900+ affected installations Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: User searches 'download Claude Code', finds fake site via SEO poisoning, downloads trojanized installer. Reported impact: Malware exfiltrates credentials to attacker C2; XMRig mines Monero on Linux systems; persistence via LaunchAgents/startup tasks; 8,900+ affected installations Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time; reported targets include 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; AI developers, data scientists, software engineers seeking Claude Code; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Only download Claude Code from official anthropic.com; verify installer signatures; check domain spelling before download; use bookmark for official site; educate users on SEO poisoning risks; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Atomic/XMRig; monitor for unexpected startup persistence mechanisms

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Additional role
AI credential theft
Initial access
User searches 'download Claude Code', finds fake site via SEO poisoning, downloads trojanized installer

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • AMOS infostealer (Windows)
  • Atomic Stealer (macOS)
  • XMRig cryptocurrency miner (Linux)
  • Credential harvesters
  • SEO poisoning and typosquat domains

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; AI developers, data scientists, software engineers seeking Claude Code
Reported scale / exposure
120+ fake installation websites, 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time before detection
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unknown actor; 'InstallFix' campaign; sophisticated SEO manipulation and multi-platform malware development

Structured attribution

Actor
Unknown
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Push Security
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Behavioral monitoringGUIDANCE

    Monitor for malicious patterns in IDE extensions, skills, and installation pages; verify publisher authenticity

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-03-06
Last updated
2026-11-04

Updates

  • 2026-03-06 — Push Security

    Campaign discovered and analyzed

Source defensive notes

Only download Claude Code from official anthropic.com; verify installer signatures; check domain spelling before download; use bookmark for official site; educate users on SEO poisoning risks; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Atomic/XMRig; monitor for unexpected startup persistence mechanisms

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0000Search Open Technical Databases

Adversary uses SEO poisoning and fake installation pages to distribute trojanized AI coding assistant installers stealing credentials Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • claude-code-download.com
  • get-claude-code.net

ips

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        1 source

        Research by Push Security Research · Push Security

        1. Push Security: InstallFix Campaign - Fake Claude Code Installation Pages pushsecurity.com

        Push Security analysis. InstallFix represents evolution of software supply chain attacks: instead of compromising legitimate distribution, adversary creates parallel fake distribution network optimized for search discovery. Detection: alert on Claude Code installs from domains other than anthropic.com, scan for AMOS/Atomic Stealer/XMRig, monitor LaunchAgents and startup tasks created during install, check installer code signing (unsigned/wrong signature = malicious).

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        InstallFix fake Claude Code installation pages
        Entry ID
        installfix-fake-claude-pages-2026-03
        Catalog review
        November 4, 2026
        Category
        attacks-on-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed