Detection queries Not classifiedCyberStrikeAI

CyberStrikeAI attacks against schools in Africa and Latin America

Financially motivated attacks against schools in Africa and Latin America used the open-source CyberStrikeAI implant. Initial access was through a compromised SQL Server. A C2-side LLM using MCP tools…

What happened

Financially motivated attacks against schools in Africa and Latin America used the open-source CyberStrikeAI implant. Initial access was through a compromised SQL Server. A C2-side LLM using MCP tools selected attack commands and achieved domain administrator privileges in three to four days. Techniques included a SystemUpdate scheduled task, certutil downloads, comsvcs.dll LSASS memory dumping, DCSync, and Golden Ticket generation.

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · SQL Server compromised

    Attacker gained initial access through compromised SQL Server

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · CyberStrikeAI implant deployed

    Open-source CyberStrikeAI implant installed with C2 connection to fastcdn.bar and 185.186.245.144

    Hunt: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

    Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · LLM selects attack commands

    C2-side LLM using MCP tools autonomously chooses and executes attack techniques

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · SystemUpdate task and credential dumping

    SystemUpdate scheduled task created; certutil used for downloads; comsvcs.dll dumps LSASS memory

    Hunt: A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.

    Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Domain admin achieved via DCSync and Golden Ticket

    DCSync extracts domain credentials; Golden Ticket generated for persistence; domain admin achieved in 3-4 days

    Hunt: A non-domain-controller or non-machine account requests directory replication rights consistent with DCSync, enabling extraction of domain credential material.

    Event 4662 is high-volume and requires appropriate SACL/audit configuration. Backup, identity, migration, and synchronization products can legitimately use replication rights.

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Compromised SQL Server. Reported impact: DCSync extracts domain credentials; Golden Ticket generated for persistence; domain admin achieved in 3-4 days; reported targets include Schools in Africa and Latin America; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Harden SQL Server; monitor for CyberStrikeAI indicators; detect SystemUpdate scheduled task creation; alert on certutil downloads; monitor comsvcs.dll LSASS dumps; detect DCSync activity; hunt for Golden Ticket use; block C2 infrastructure; review LOLBAS execution (certutil, comsvcs)

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

02CyberStrikeAI implant deployedUnapproved Windows program executionNative logs · Draft

Open-source CyberStrikeAI implant installed with C2 connection to fastcdn.bar and 185.186.245.144

What to look for

A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation
  • Download provenance and file hashes
  • File certificate information and application-control audit / block events

Coverage limit. Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution
id: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1
status: experimental
description: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable
  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|contains:
      - \Downloads\
      - \AppData\Local\Temp\
      - \AppData\Roaming\
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "\\Downloads\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
  2. Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
04SystemUpdate task and credential dumpingWindows credential dumping with system utilitiesNative logs · Draft

SystemUpdate scheduled task created; certutil used for downloads; comsvcs.dll dumps LSASS memory

What to look for

A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.

This query covers the reported comsvcs.dll LSASS dump. The scheduled task and certutil branches require their own correlation.

Visibility: Windows process and process-access telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation with complete command lines
  • Process-access telemetry for LSASS
  • Authentication and lateral-movement logs

Coverage limit. Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.

Windows rundll32/comsvcs MiniDump command candidates. Correlate with process-access telemetry and confirm the target PID belongs to LSASS.

MCP reference matches: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL (SigmaHQ), Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Process Dump Via Comsvcs DLL
id: 1c658574-7d21-4fc8-b272-d6b1508d0aad
status: experimental
description: Detects rundll32 invoking the comsvcs MiniDump export.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml
falsepositives:
  - Authorized diagnostics or incident-response collection
level: high
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
  selection_command:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - comsvcs.dll
      - MiniDump
  condition: all of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "comsvcs.dll" and ProcessCommandLine contains "MiniDump"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\rundll32.exe" CommandLine="*comsvcs.dll*" CommandLine="*MiniDump*"
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine ProcessGuid
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Recover the dump path, process ancestry, account, and initiating remote session or scheduled task.
  2. Correlate the event with new logons, DCSync, ticket creation, and credential use from other hosts.
05Domain admin achieved via DCSync and Golden TicketActive Directory replication from an unexpected accountNative logs · Draft

DCSync extracts domain credentials; Golden Ticket generated for persistence; domain admin achieved in 3-4 days

What to look for

A non-domain-controller or non-machine account requests directory replication rights consistent with DCSync, enabling extraction of domain credential material.

Visibility: Domain-controller Security logs where configured

Required logs

  • Domain-controller Security Event 4662 with Directory Service Access auditing
  • Identity and endpoint telemetry for the requesting account and source host
  • Kerberos ticket and subsequent authentication activity

Coverage limit. Event 4662 is high-volume and requires appropriate SACL/audit configuration. Backup, identity, migration, and synchronization products can legitimately use replication rights.

Security Event 4662 candidates containing directory-replication extended-right GUIDs and a non-machine subject account. Tune approved synchronization identities.

MCP reference matches: Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account - DcSync Indicator (SigmaHQ), First Time Seen Account Performing DCSync (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Directory Replication From Non-Machine Account
id: cc0c6803-2f24-420f-b206-f0b081bb6f9d
status: experimental
description: Detects Directory Service Access events with replication-right GUIDs from a non-machine account.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
falsepositives:
  - Approved directory synchronization, backup, migration, and identity services
level: high
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4662
    Properties|contains:
      - 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
      - 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
      - 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c
  filter_machine:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: $
  condition: selection and not filter_machine
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventID == 4662
| where Properties has_any ("1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2",
    "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2", "89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c")
| where Account !endswith "$"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectAccount, ObjectName, Properties, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4662
(Properties="*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*"
  OR Properties="*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*"
  OR Properties="*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
NOT SubjectUserName="*$"
| table _time host SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName ObjectName Properties
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Confirm the subject account, source workstation, object, and replication-right GUIDs.
  2. Compare with approved directory synchronization, then rotate exposed credentials and inspect ticket use.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Offensive frameworks
CyberStrikeAI
Initial access
Compromised SQL Server

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • CyberStrikeAI (https://github.com/CyberStrikeAI/CyberStrikeAI)
  • LLM-driven C2 with MCP tools

Other tooling

  • SystemUpdate scheduled task
  • certutil (LOLBAS)
  • comsvcs.dll LSASS dump (LOLBAS)
  • DCSync
  • Golden Ticket
  • Compromised SQL Server

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Schools in Africa and Latin America
Reported scale / exposure
Domain admin achieved in 3-4 days; multiple schools targeted
Target geography
Africa · South America

Africa and South America reflect targeted school systems in these regions

Reported attribution

Unnamed. Kaspersky could not link the activity to a known group. Chinese-language script comments and UTC+8 control-server restarts suggest a Chinese-speaking operator.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed operators
Country
Unknown
Motivation
unknown
Attributed by
Kaspersky
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Suspicious Child Process Of SQL ServerSIGMAView rule

    Matched sqlservr with security-detections-mcp. Kaspersky says the first commands in these incidents ran as children of sqlservr.exe.

  • Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXESIGMAView rule

    Matched schtasks with security-detections-mcp. The implant's first persistence step was a scheduled task named SystemUpdate.

  • File Decoded From Base64/Hex Via Certutil.EXESIGMAView rule

    Matched certutil decode with security-detections-mcp. Kaspersky says certutil decoded the assembled payload. The direct-IP download rule previously noted on this entry does not match that command.

  • Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLLSIGMAView rule

    Matched comsvcs with security-detections-mcp. The agent dumped lsass with comsvcs.dll MiniDump, passing the PID rather than the process name.

  • First Time Seen Account Performing DCSyncELASTICView rule

    Matched DCSync with security-detections-mcp. After the domain administrator account was taken, the agent ran DCSync.

  • Renamed Mimikatz and the implant tokenGUIDANCE

    security-detections-mcp's Mimikatz hits key on the binary name or command line. Kaspersky says this activity used a renamed Mimikatz for DCSync and a Golden Ticket, so those name-based rules do not fit. No Sigma, Splunk, or Elastic rule encodes the X-Implant-Token header or the CyberStrikeAI certificate issuer.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-10-01
Last updated
2026-11-15

Updates

  • 2026-10-23 — Trend Micro

    TrendAI reports CyberStrikeAI campaign by Chinese-language operators targeting Japan

  • 2026-11-04 — Kaspersky

    CyberStrikeAI attacks against schools in Africa and Latin America disclosed

  • 2026-11-15 — OpenAttacks

    Tagged CyberStrikeAI and backfilled category, attribution, AI-involvement confidence, detections, and this timeline note from the cited Securelist report. Kaspersky does not name a group, country, or motive.

Source defensive notes

Harden SQL Server; monitor for CyberStrikeAI indicators; detect SystemUpdate scheduled task creation; alert on certutil downloads; monitor comsvcs.dll LSASS dumps; detect DCSync activity; hunt for Golden Ticket use; block C2 infrastructure; review LOLBAS execution (certutil, comsvcs)

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

C2-side LLM with MCP tools autonomously executed attack operations Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • fastcdn.bar

ips

  • 185.186.245.144

hashes

    urls

      Sources & research credit

      1 source

      Research by Kirill Antonov, Vladislav Vlasov, Dmitry Chizhmak · Kaspersky

      1. CyberStrikeAI attacks securelist.com

      Relevant detection rules: - Sigma: Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_creation.yml) - Sigma: Suspicious File Downloaded From Direct IP Via Certutil (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_direct_ip.yml) - Sigma: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL (LSASS dump) (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml) - Sigma: Suspicious LSASS Process Access (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_procdump_lsass.yml) - Sigma: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml) - Sigma: DCSync Attack Detection via RPC Firewall (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_dcsync_attack.yml) - Sigma: PowerShell Malicious Cmdlets (covers Mimikatz/DCSync) (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_malicious_cmdlets.yml) - LOLBAS references: certutil (https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/), comsvcs.dll (https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Comsvcs/), schtasks (https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Schtasks/)

      Record & downloads
      Source record name
      CyberStrikeAI attacks against schools in Africa and Latin America
      Entry ID
      kaspersky-cyberstrikeai-schools-2026
      Catalog review
      November 5, 2026
      AI-role confidence
      high
      Category
      adversary-use-of-ai
      AI involvement confidence
      confirmed