Langflow MCP-config RCE (GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2, GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45)
GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2 (CVE-2026-105697) and GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45: Authenticated Langflow users can achieve RCE by adding MCP server with Stdio transport. User-supplied command field passed directly to bash -c…
What happened
GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2 (CVE-2026-105697) and GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45: Authenticated Langflow users can achieve RCE by adding MCP server with Stdio transport. User-supplied command field passed directly to bash -c 'exec {command}' with zero validation, no allowlisting, no sandboxing. Env field allows arbitrary environment variable injection (LD_PRELOAD, PATH override). Command executes when server list fetched with action_count=true - happens automatically in UI MCP settings page. Affects <1.9.0 (GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2) and <1.10.3 (GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45). Default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true hands out token without credentials. Previdian honeypots recorded 1,423 exploitation attempts from 27 IPs (Belgium, China, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Tanzania, US, Vietnam) beginning Sep 19, 2026. Attackers first checked auto-login, then brute-forced credentials. Fixed in 1.9.0 (command allowlist) and 1.10.3 (full policy enforcement, removed bash wrapper). GitHub: github.com/langflow-ai/langflow.
Authenticated RCE via MCP Stdio server configuration allows arbitrary OS command execution on Langflow AI workflow platform
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Obtain authentication
Default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true provides token without credentials via GET /api/v1/auto_login; or brute-force credentials if auto-login disabled
Source for step 1 - 02 · Add malicious MCP server
POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name} with Stdio transport; command field contains arbitrary OS command (reverse shell, file operations, etc.); env field can inject LD_PRELOAD, PATH override
Source for step 2 - 03 · Trigger execution
Command executes automatically when GET /api/v2/mcp/servers?action_count=true (happens when anyone navigates to MCP settings page); re-executes every time list loaded; persistent backdoor
Source for step 3 - 04 · Remote code execution
User-supplied command wrapped in bash -c 'exec {command}' and executed; no validation, allowlisting, or sandboxing; runs with Langflow process privileges; full server compromise possible
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Authenticated user access (or LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true provides token without credentials); exploitation via POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name} or embedded flow configs. Reported impact: User-supplied command wrapped in bash -c 'exec {command}' and executed; no validation, allowlisting, or sandboxing; runs with Langflow process privileges; full server compromise possible; reported targets include Langflow installations; multiple internet-facing vulnerable instances found; 1,423 exploitation attempts against Previdian honeypots from 27 countries; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Upgrade to Langflow 1.10.3+; disable LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN; enforce strong unique passwords; review MCP server configurations; monitor /api/v2/mcp/servers/ API access; check for unexpected command/env entries; network segmentation; principle of least privilege
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Initial access
- Authenticated user access (or LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true provides token without credentials); exploitation via POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name} or embedded flow configs
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Langflow AI workflow platform
- Model Context Protocol (MCP) Stdio transport
Other tooling
- bash command execution
- Environment variable injection (LD_PRELOAD, NODE_OPTIONS, PYTHONPATH, BASH_ENV)
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Langflow installations; multiple internet-facing vulnerable instances found; 1,423 exploitation attempts against Previdian honeypots from 27 countries
- Reported scale / exposure
- 1,423 exploitation attempts against Previdian honeypots from 27 IPs (Sep 19-Oct 2026); 333 attempts on Oct 11 alone; first attempts Sep 19 (2+ weeks before CVE publication Oct 5); dramatic increase post-CVE
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Multiple attackers from 27 countries; financially motivated/opportunistic exploitation
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Multiple opportunistic attackers
- Country
- Multiple (27 countries)
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Previdian, VulnCheck
- Attribution confidence
- high
Detection rules
- Monitor MCP server API endpointsGUIDANCE
Monitor POST/PATCH requests to /api/v2/mcp/servers/ endpoints for suspicious command parameters; alert on bash -c execution patterns, environment variable injection (LD_PRELOAD, PATH overrides), and auto-login token generation from unexpected IPs
- File system monitoringGUIDANCE
Monitor Langflow process for execution of child processes via bash; alert on unexpected shell command execution from Langflow worker processes
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-09-19
- Last updated
- 2026-11-04
Updates
- 2026-09-19 — Previdian honeypots
First exploitation attempts observed, 2+ weeks before CVE publication
- 2026-10-05 — GitHub Security Advisory
CVE published
- 2026-10-11 — Previdian, The Hacker News
333 exploitation attempts on this day alone; public disclosure
Source defensive notes
Upgrade to Langflow 1.10.3+; disable LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN; enforce strong unique passwords; review MCP server configurations; monitor /api/v2/mcp/servers/ API access; check for unexpected command/env entries; network segmentation; principle of least privilege
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Exploitation of vulnerability in AI workflow platform (Langflow) via MCP server misconfiguration Source
Sources & research credit
4 sourcesResearch by Adam-Aghili, andifilhohub, Previdian · Langflow, Previdian
- GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2: Authenticated RCE via MCP Stdio transport github.com
- GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45: OS command injection RCE via MCP stdio github.com
- Langflow Critical Authenticated RCE Flaw Targeted thehackernews.com
- VulnCheck - Pwning the AI Stack www.vulncheck.com
Two GitHub Security Advisories (GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2 for <1.9.0, GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 for <1.10.3); Previdian observed exploitation 2+ weeks before public CVE; VulnCheck analysis of AI stack vulnerabilities. Detection: monitor Langflow API /api/v2/mcp/servers/ for suspicious commands, review MCP Stdio configs, check for bash -c execution, monitor env var injection patterns (LD_PRELOAD, PATH), alert on auto-login token requests from unexpected IPs.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Langflow MCP-config RCE (GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2, GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45)
- Entry ID
- langflow-mcp-rce-ghsa-2026
- Catalog review
- November 4, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed