Detection queries Reported campaignBrowser extensions

Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers

Compromised or malicious AI- and VPN-themed Chrome extensions pushed info-stealers through updates, reportedly affecting about 2.6 million users.

What happened

Compromised or malicious Chrome AI/VPN-themed extensions delivered info-stealing malware via malicious updates; campaign reportedly affected on the order of 2.6 million users.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · AI-themed browser extension is installed

    A malicious or compromised extension reaches Chrome users.

    Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

    Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · AI features frame the product

    AI or VPN functionality provides the installation pretext.

    Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

    Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Malicious extension update runs

    A poisoned update delivers the information-stealing component.

    Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

    Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · User information is exposed

    The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Chrome extension install / poisoned update. Reported impact: The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

AI browser extensions

The reported delivery path uses malicious or compromised AI- and VPN-themed Chrome extensions.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm the affected extension IDs / versions and update history against the source.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Inventory browser extensions and audit unexpected updates, publisher changes and broad permissions.

Extension inventory and allowlisting; detect unexpected update publishers

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01AI-themed browser extension is installedBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft

A malicious or compromised extension reaches Chrome users.

What to look for

A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
  • Extension ID, permissions and provenance
  • Browser / proxy / DLP evidence

Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - browser.extension.install
      - browser.extension.update
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
  2. Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
02AI features frame the productBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft

AI or VPN functionality provides the installation pretext.

What to look for

A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

Review extension ID, update origin and permission changes; advertised AI or VPN functionality alone is not a signal.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
  • Extension ID, permissions and provenance
  • Browser / proxy / DLP evidence

Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - browser.extension.install
      - browser.extension.update
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
  2. Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
03Malicious extension update runsBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft

A poisoned update delivers the information-stealing component.

What to look for

A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
  • Extension ID, permissions and provenance
  • Browser / proxy / DLP evidence

Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - browser.extension.install
      - browser.extension.update
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
  2. Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
04User information is exposedSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
Chrome extension install / poisoned update

Targets and reported impact

Reported scale / exposure
~2.6 million users cited

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers (broad campaign). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Extension inventory and allowlisting; detect unexpected update publishers

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Malwarebytes · Malwarebytes

  1. malwarebytes.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers (broad campaign)
Entry ID
malwarebytes-chrome-ai-extensions-2025-01
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed