Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers
Compromised or malicious AI- and VPN-themed Chrome extensions pushed info-stealers through updates, reportedly affecting about 2.6 million users.
What happened
Compromised or malicious Chrome AI/VPN-themed extensions delivered info-stealing malware via malicious updates; campaign reportedly affected on the order of 2.6 million users.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · AI-themed browser extension is installed
A malicious or compromised extension reaches Chrome users.
Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Source for step 1 - 02 · AI features frame the product
AI or VPN functionality provides the installation pretext.
Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Malicious extension update runs
A poisoned update delivers the information-stealing component.
Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Source for step 3 - 04 · User information is exposed
The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Chrome extension install / poisoned update. Reported impact: The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The reported delivery path uses malicious or compromised AI- and VPN-themed Chrome extensions.
Conditions to check- Confirm the affected extension IDs / versions and update history against the source.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Inventory browser extensions and audit unexpected updates, publisher changes and broad permissions.
Extension inventory and allowlisting; detect unexpected update publishers
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01AI-themed browser extension is installedBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft
A malicious or compromised extension reaches Chrome users.
What to look for
A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
- Extension ID, permissions and provenance
- Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- browser.extension.install
- browser.extension.update
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
02AI features frame the productBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft
AI or VPN functionality provides the installation pretext.
What to look for
A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Review extension ID, update origin and permission changes; advertised AI or VPN functionality alone is not a signal.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
- Extension ID, permissions and provenance
- Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- browser.extension.install
- browser.extension.update
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
03Malicious extension update runsBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft
A poisoned update delivers the information-stealing component.
What to look for
A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
- Extension ID, permissions and provenance
- Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- browser.extension.install
- browser.extension.update
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
04User information is exposedSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI tool as lure
- Initial access
- Chrome extension install / poisoned update
Targets and reported impact
- Reported scale / exposure
- ~2.6 million users cited
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers (broad campaign). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Extension inventory and allowlisting; detect unexpected update publishers
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Malwarebytes · Malwarebytes
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers (broad campaign)
- Entry ID
- malwarebytes-chrome-ai-extensions-2025-01
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed