Not classified

n0n ransomware with OpenCode - 154 models including abliterated

n0n ransomware operator exposed staging server at 185.157.161.148 with 1,719 files including 829 scripts, 5 C++ encryptor sources, and OpenCode AI coding agent environment. OpenCode configured with 154…

What happened

n0n ransomware operator exposed staging server at 185.157.161.148 with 1,719 files including 829 scripts, 5 C++ encryptor sources, and OpenCode AI coding agent environment. OpenCode configured with 154 model entries across 7 providers (Gemini, Mistral, Nemotron, Llama, Claude, GPT-5.x, Grok, Kimi, GLM, DeepSeek, MiniMax, Qwen) including uncensored and abliterated models (safety training removed) plus self-hosted model. Agent wrote and debugged hundreds of attack scripts; gateway spending $7,216 by Oct 22, 2026. Entry via credential stuffing (305 FortiGate SSL-VPN), exposed AWS keys, weak RDP/WinRM, compromised hosting portals. Hijacked Cisco Firepower Management Center to switch all policies to BLOCK. Human-directed operation supported by AI; no fully autonomous attack system. 93 listed victims, $283.7M total ransom demands.

Ransomware operator uses OpenCode coding agent with 154 model entries including abliterated models to write and debug hundreds of attack scripts; $7,216 AI spend

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Credential-only initial access

    Credential stuffing against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN devices; exposed AWS keys; weak RDP/WinRM credentials; compromised hosting management portals; no vulnerability exploitation

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · OpenCode with 154 models

    Configured OpenCode coding agent with 154 model entries across 7 providers: Gemini, Mistral, Nemotron, Llama, Claude, GPT-5.x, Grok, Kimi, GLM, DeepSeek, MiniMax, Qwen; includes abliterated (safety training removed) and uncensored models plus self-hosted model; $7,216 gateway spending

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · AI-generated attack scripts

    OpenCode wrote and debugged hundreds of attack scripts; human-directed operation with AI support; agent kept encryption keys in memory file

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Cisco FMC policy manipulation

    Hijacked Cisco Firepower Management Center instances; switched all access policies to BLOCK; claimed widespread service disruption

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Encryption and extortion

    Deployed n0n ransomware (5 C++ encryptor versions); stole and encrypted files; deleted data and backups; extortion; 93 victims listed with $283.7M total ransom demands

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Credential-only access: credential stuffing campaign against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN devices, exposed AWS keys, weak RDP/WinRM credentials, compromised hosting management portals; no vulnerability exploitation found. Reported impact: Hijacked Cisco Firepower Management Center instances; switched all access policies to BLOCK; claimed widespread service disruption; Deployed n0n ransomware (5 C++ encryptor versions); stole and encrypted files; deleted data and backups; extortion; 93 victims listed with $283.7M total ransom demands; reported targets include 23 organizations across 14 countries; 93 listed victims as of Oct 19, 2026; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Strong credential policies; MFA for VPN/RDP/WinRM; AWS key rotation and monitoring; hosting portal security; Cisco FMC access control; monitor OpenCode/AI coding agent usage; gateway spending anomalies; exposed file servers

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Initial access
Credential-only access: credential stuffing campaign against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN devices, exposed AWS keys, weak RDP/WinRM credentials, compromised hosting management portals; no vulnerability exploitation found

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • OpenCode (open-source AI coding agent)
  • Gemini
  • Mistral
  • Nemotron
  • Llama
  • Claude
  • GPT-5.x
  • Grok
  • Kimi
  • GLM
  • DeepSeek
  • MiniMax
  • Qwen
  • Abliterated models (safety training removed)
  • Uncensored models
  • Self-hosted model

Other tooling

  • n0n ransomware encryptor (5 C++ versions)
  • Credential stuffing tools
  • Cisco Firepower Management Center (hijacked for policy manipulation)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
23 organizations across 14 countries; 93 listed victims as of Oct 19, 2026
Reported scale / exposure
Exposed workspace with 1,719 files (829 scripts, 5 encryptor sources); 154 model entries across 7 providers; $7,216 in AI gateway spending by Oct 22; 93 victims listed with $283.7M total ransom demands; 23 intrusion attempts across 14 countries
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

n0n ransomware group; operations Sep 17 - Oct 22, 2026

Source defensive notes

Strong credential policies; MFA for VPN/RDP/WinRM; AWS key rotation and monitoring; hosting portal security; Cisco FMC access control; monitor OpenCode/AI coding agent usage; gateway spending anomalies; exposed file servers

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

Operator uses OpenCode AI coding agent with 154 models to generate and debug attack scripts, demonstrating attacker use of AI for offensive operations Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

    • 185.157.161.148

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        1 source

        Research by SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) · SOCRadar

        1. n0n Ransomware: Inside an AI-Assisted Extortion Operation socradar.io

        SOCRadar STRU discovered exposed staging server in Sweden on port 8877; snapshots Sep 25-26, 2026; first documented criminal use of abliterated models; human-directed operation, not fully autonomous; SOCRadar access to blog post may be restricted (403 observed)

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        n0n ransomware with OpenCode - 154 models including abliterated
        Entry ID
        socradar-n0n-ransomware-ai-2026-10
        Catalog review
        November 4, 2026