Detection queries Not classifiedARTEX

Storm-3358 ARTEX autonomous agent bank intrusions (Southeast Asia)

Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 6, 2026) reports Storm-3358, Cambodia-based financially motivated actor, targeting Southeast Asian financial sector using ARTEX autonomous offensive agents. Censys…

What happened

Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 6, 2026) reports Storm-3358, Cambodia-based financially motivated actor, targeting Southeast Asian financial sector using ARTEX autonomous offensive agents. Censys fingerprinting (Silas Cutler) identifies exposed ARTEX control panels via console title starting ARTEX + Next.js signature, port 8787, open directories leaking attack kit configurations. Oct 2026 activity: ARTEX agents autonomously scanned targets, exploited anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF, used netcat/curl to pull WISP RAT, vshell, and AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks; deployed web shells; conducted brute-force and password-spraying attacks; performed lateral movement. C2 infrastructure: WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52. ARTEX control panel servers: 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35, 178.16.54.129 (Microsoft post hunting query lists 178.15.54.129 - note IP discrepancy). Storm-3358 attributed by Microsoft; vendor-asserted AI involvement. Tools: AdaptixC2 (github.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2), ARTEX fork (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX; original Autumn-27/ARTEX repository down).

Storm-3358 deploys ARTEX autonomous AI agents to automate intrusion lifecycle against Southeast Asian financial institutions, from initial reconnaissance through lateral movement and RAT deployment

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Censys: ARTEX - Agentic Asbestos

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · ARTEX autonomous reconnaissance

    ARTEX agents autonomously scan Southeast Asian financial institution networks for vulnerabilities

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Exploit anonymous file upload and SSRF

    Agents exploit anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF to gain initial foothold

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Deploy WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2

    netcat/curl used to pull WISP RAT, vshell, AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks to compromised hosts

    Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

    A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Deploy web shells

    Web shells deployed for persistent access to compromised web servers

    Hunt: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.

    Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Brute-force, spraying, lateral movement

    Autonomous password brute-force and spraying attacks; lateral movement across financial institution networks

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Maintain C2 and data access

    WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52 maintain persistent access for financial data theft

    Source for step 6

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Anonymous file upload exploitation, SSRF vulnerabilities. Reported impact: WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52 maintain persistent access for financial data theft; reported targets include Southeast Asian financial institutions; Oct 2026 active campaign; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Implement file upload restrictions and validation; patch SSRF vulnerabilities; monitor for ARTEX console fingerprints (title ARTEX + Next.js, port 8787); block known C2 IPs (199.19.95.66-68, 85.11.167.52, 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35); detect anomalous autonomous scanning patterns; monitor netcat/curl downloading RATs; implement web application firewalls; enable brute-force protection; segment networks to limit lateral movement

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

02Exploit anonymous file upload and SSRFWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

Agents exploit anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF to gain initial foothold

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
03Deploy WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2Unexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft

netcat/curl used to pull WISP RAT, vshell, AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks to compromised hosts

What to look for

A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific process and file provenance
  • Signer / hash and software inventory
  • Per-process network and remote-session records

Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - process.unapproved.exec
      - remote.session.start
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
  2. Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
04Deploy web shellsLinux web worker → shell / interpreterNative logs · Draft

Web shells deployed for persistent access to compromised web servers

What to look for

A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields)
  • PHP / web access logs
  • File changes to web roots and PHP configuration

Coverage limit. Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.

linux process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux web worker → shell / interpreter
id: 068e005a-876e-4ba3-a414-791f9a1c2330
status: experimental
description: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or
  reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - /sh
      - /bash
      - /python
      - /python3
      - /curl
      - /wget
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - /php-fpm
      - /php-fpm8.2
      - /apache2
      - /httpd
      - /nginx
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "python", "python3", "curl", "wget")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("php-fpm", "php-fpm8.2", "apache2", "httpd", "nginx")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/sh", "*/bash", "*/python", "*/python3", "*/curl", "*/wget")
ParentImage IN ("*/php-fpm", "*/php-fpm8.2", "*/apache2", "*/httpd", "*/nginx")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.
  2. Review auto_prepend_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Offensive frameworks
ARTEX
Initial access
Anonymous file upload exploitation, SSRF vulnerabilities

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • ARTEX autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
  • DeepSeek and other LLM backends

Other tooling

  • WISP RAT
  • vshell
  • AdaptixC2 C2 framework (https://github.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2)
  • netcat
  • curl
  • Web shells

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Southeast Asian financial institutions; Oct 2026 active campaign
Reported scale / exposure
Active Oct 2026; multiple financial institutions compromised; Censys identified exposed ARTEX panels on port 8787 with leaked attack kit configurations
Target geography
Asia

Reported attribution

Storm-3358, Cambodia-based, financially motivated; attributed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence

Structured attribution

Actor
Storm-3358
Country
Cambodia
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • Linux Webshell IndicatorsSIGMAView rule

    Detects webshell process indicators on Linux; directly applicable to Storm-3358 web shell deployment

  • Suspicious Reverse Shell Command LineSIGMAView rule

    Detects netcat reverse shells and RAT download patterns used by ARTEX agents

  • Suspicious C2 ActivitiesSIGMAView rule

    Detects curl/wget downloading payloads and C2 command execution patterns

  • ARTEX console fingerprintingGUIDANCE

    Monitor for ARTEX control panel fingerprints: console title starting with ARTEX, Next.js framework signature, port 8787; scan for open directories exposing attack kit configurations; block known ARTEX IPs (91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35, 178.16.54.129); detect autonomous scanning patterns

  • Password spraying and brute forceGUIDANCE

    Block known C2 IPs: WISP RAT 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52; detect anomalous brute-force and password-spraying patterns; monitor lateral movement indicators

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-10-01
Last updated
2026-11-06

Updates

  • 2026-10-01 — Microsoft Threat Intelligence

    Storm-3358 ARTEX campaign against Southeast Asian financial institutions begins; autonomous agents exploit file upload and SSRF vulnerabilities

  • 2026-11-06 — Microsoft Threat Intelligence

    Microsoft reports Storm-3358 ARTEX abuse expanding; Censys publishes fingerprinting methodology for exposed ARTEX control panels

Source defensive notes

Implement file upload restrictions and validation; patch SSRF vulnerabilities; monitor for ARTEX console fingerprints (title ARTEX + Next.js, port 8787); block known C2 IPs (199.19.95.66-68, 85.11.167.52, 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35); detect anomalous autonomous scanning patterns; monitor netcat/curl downloading RATs; implement web application firewalls; enable brute-force protection; segment networks to limit lateral movement

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing Application

Storm-3358 deploys ARTEX autonomous AI agents to conduct reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, and lateral movement without continuous operator input Source

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

ARTEX agents autonomously exploit file upload and SSRF vulnerabilities to gain initial access to financial institution networks Source

AML.T0016Obtain Capabilities

Adversaries use AI agents to automate post-exploitation activities including lateral movement and C2 deployment Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

    • 199.19.95.66
    • 199.19.95.67
    • 199.19.95.68
    • 85.11.167.52
    • 91.92.240.238
    • 85.11.168.45
    • 31.77.229.35
    • 178.16.54.129
    • 178.15.54.129

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        2 sources

        Research by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Censys (Silas Cutler) · Microsoft, Censys

        1. Microsoft Threat Intelligence: ARTEX Abuse Expands as Cybercriminals Target Financial Sector www.microsoft.com
        2. Censys: ARTEX - Agentic Asbestos censys.com

        Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source; Censys Agentic Asbestos analysis (Silas Cutler) provides ARTEX fingerprinting methodology; all IOCs verified from sources; note IP discrepancy between main text (178.16.54.129) and hunting query (178.15.54.129) in Microsoft post

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Storm-3358 ARTEX autonomous agent bank intrusions (Southeast Asia)
        Entry ID
        storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11
        Catalog review
        November 10, 2026
        Category
        adversary-use-of-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        vendor-asserted