Storm-3358 ARTEX autonomous agent bank intrusions (Southeast Asia)
Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 6, 2026) reports Storm-3358, Cambodia-based financially motivated actor, targeting Southeast Asian financial sector using ARTEX autonomous offensive agents. Censys…
What happened
Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 6, 2026) reports Storm-3358, Cambodia-based financially motivated actor, targeting Southeast Asian financial sector using ARTEX autonomous offensive agents. Censys fingerprinting (Silas Cutler) identifies exposed ARTEX control panels via console title starting ARTEX + Next.js signature, port 8787, open directories leaking attack kit configurations. Oct 2026 activity: ARTEX agents autonomously scanned targets, exploited anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF, used netcat/curl to pull WISP RAT, vshell, and AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks; deployed web shells; conducted brute-force and password-spraying attacks; performed lateral movement. C2 infrastructure: WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52. ARTEX control panel servers: 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35, 178.16.54.129 (Microsoft post hunting query lists 178.15.54.129 - note IP discrepancy). Storm-3358 attributed by Microsoft; vendor-asserted AI involvement. Tools: AdaptixC2 (github.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2), ARTEX fork (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX; original Autumn-27/ARTEX repository down).
Storm-3358 deploys ARTEX autonomous AI agents to automate intrusion lifecycle against Southeast Asian financial institutions, from initial reconnaissance through lateral movement and RAT deployment
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · ARTEX autonomous reconnaissance
ARTEX agents autonomously scan Southeast Asian financial institution networks for vulnerabilities
Source for step 1 - 02 · Exploit anonymous file upload and SSRF
Agents exploit anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF to gain initial foothold
Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Deploy WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2
netcat/curl used to pull WISP RAT, vshell, AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks to compromised hosts
Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Deploy web shells
Web shells deployed for persistent access to compromised web servers
Hunt: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.
Source for step 4 - 05 · Brute-force, spraying, lateral movement
Autonomous password brute-force and spraying attacks; lateral movement across financial institution networks
Source for step 5 - 06 · Maintain C2 and data access
WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52 maintain persistent access for financial data theft
Source for step 6
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Anonymous file upload exploitation, SSRF vulnerabilities. Reported impact: WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52 maintain persistent access for financial data theft; reported targets include Southeast Asian financial institutions; Oct 2026 active campaign; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Implement file upload restrictions and validation; patch SSRF vulnerabilities; monitor for ARTEX console fingerprints (title ARTEX + Next.js, port 8787); block known C2 IPs (199.19.95.66-68, 85.11.167.52, 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35); detect anomalous autonomous scanning patterns; monitor netcat/curl downloading RATs; implement web application firewalls; enable brute-force protection; segment networks to limit lateral movement
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
02Exploit anonymous file upload and SSRFWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft
Agents exploit anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF to gain initial foothold
What to look for
Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
- Server process and file events
- Outbound DNS / proxy records
Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- web.exploit_candidate
- web.upload
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
03Deploy WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2Unexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft
netcat/curl used to pull WISP RAT, vshell, AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks to compromised hosts
What to look for
A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Platform-specific process and file provenance
- Signer / hash and software inventory
- Per-process network and remote-session records
Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- process.unapproved.exec
- remote.session.start
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
04Deploy web shellsLinux web worker → shell / interpreterNative logs · Draft
Web shells deployed for persistent access to compromised web servers
What to look for
A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields)
- PHP / web access logs
- File changes to web roots and PHP configuration
Coverage limit. Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.
linux process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux web worker → shell / interpreter
id: 068e005a-876e-4ba3-a414-791f9a1c2330
status: experimental
description: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or
reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- /sh
- /bash
- /python
- /python3
- /curl
- /wget
ParentImage|endswith:
- /php-fpm
- /php-fpm8.2
- /apache2
- /httpd
- /nginx
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "python", "python3", "curl", "wget")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("php-fpm", "php-fpm8.2", "apache2", "httpd", "nginx")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/sh", "*/bash", "*/python", "*/python3", "*/curl", "*/wget")
ParentImage IN ("*/php-fpm", "*/php-fpm8.2", "*/apache2", "*/httpd", "*/nginx")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.
- Review auto_prepend_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI as operator
- Offensive frameworks
- ARTEX
- Initial access
- Anonymous file upload exploitation, SSRF vulnerabilities
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- ARTEX autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- DeepSeek and other LLM backends
Other tooling
- WISP RAT
- vshell
- AdaptixC2 C2 framework (https://github.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2)
- netcat
- curl
- Web shells
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Southeast Asian financial institutions; Oct 2026 active campaign
- Reported scale / exposure
- Active Oct 2026; multiple financial institutions compromised; Censys identified exposed ARTEX panels on port 8787 with leaked attack kit configurations
- Target geography
- Asia
Reported attribution
Storm-3358, Cambodia-based, financially motivated; attributed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Storm-3358
- Country
- Cambodia
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence
- Attribution confidence
- high
Detection rules
- Linux Webshell IndicatorsSIGMAView rule
Detects webshell process indicators on Linux; directly applicable to Storm-3358 web shell deployment
- Suspicious Reverse Shell Command LineSIGMAView rule
Detects netcat reverse shells and RAT download patterns used by ARTEX agents
- Suspicious C2 ActivitiesSIGMAView rule
Detects curl/wget downloading payloads and C2 command execution patterns
- ARTEX console fingerprintingGUIDANCE
Monitor for ARTEX control panel fingerprints: console title starting with ARTEX, Next.js framework signature, port 8787; scan for open directories exposing attack kit configurations; block known ARTEX IPs (91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35, 178.16.54.129); detect autonomous scanning patterns
- Password spraying and brute forceGUIDANCE
Block known C2 IPs: WISP RAT 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52; detect anomalous brute-force and password-spraying patterns; monitor lateral movement indicators
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-01
- Last updated
- 2026-11-06
Updates
- 2026-10-01 — Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Storm-3358 ARTEX campaign against Southeast Asian financial institutions begins; autonomous agents exploit file upload and SSRF vulnerabilities
- 2026-11-06 — Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Microsoft reports Storm-3358 ARTEX abuse expanding; Censys publishes fingerprinting methodology for exposed ARTEX control panels
Source defensive notes
Implement file upload restrictions and validation; patch SSRF vulnerabilities; monitor for ARTEX console fingerprints (title ARTEX + Next.js, port 8787); block known C2 IPs (199.19.95.66-68, 85.11.167.52, 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35); detect anomalous autonomous scanning patterns; monitor netcat/curl downloading RATs; implement web application firewalls; enable brute-force protection; segment networks to limit lateral movement
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Storm-3358 deploys ARTEX autonomous AI agents to conduct reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, and lateral movement without continuous operator input Source
ARTEX agents autonomously exploit file upload and SSRF vulnerabilities to gain initial access to financial institution networks Source
Adversaries use AI agents to automate post-exploitation activities including lateral movement and C2 deployment Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
199.19.95.66199.19.95.67199.19.95.6885.11.167.5291.92.240.23885.11.168.4531.77.229.35178.16.54.129178.15.54.129
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Censys (Silas Cutler) · Microsoft, Censys
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: ARTEX Abuse Expands as Cybercriminals Target Financial Sector www.microsoft.com
- Censys: ARTEX - Agentic Asbestos censys.com
Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source; Censys Agentic Asbestos analysis (Silas Cutler) provides ARTEX fingerprinting methodology; all IOCs verified from sources; note IP discrepancy between main text (178.16.54.129) and hunting query (178.15.54.129) in Microsoft post
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Storm-3358 ARTEX autonomous agent bank intrusions (Southeast Asia)
- Entry ID
- storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 10, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- vendor-asserted