Detection queries Not classified

VECERT Operation Ghost Campus - FOFA account farm harvesting OpenAI and DeepSeek keys

VECERT (case VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B, Medium, about Nov 8, 2026) describes Operation Ghost Campus. The operator ran a catch-all mail domain, melocc.cc, with mail, api, pop, imap, and smtp subdomains. A script…

What happened

VECERT (case VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B, Medium, about Nov 8, 2026) describes Operation Ghost Campus. The operator ran a catch-all mail domain, melocc.cc, with mail, api, pop, imap, and smtp subdomains. A script registered FOFA accounts, read the confirmation mail over POP or IMAP, and activated them within seconds. VECERT says it recovered fofa_accounts.csv with at least 1,438 accounts (examples fofaa4x3y145@melocc.cc and fofa6o4vg697@melocc.cc) plus passwords and JWTs. Rotating those free-tier tokens is described as producing tens of thousands of FOFA queries a day for exposed .env files, Docker configs, and Git repos. Hits are regex-parsed for OpenAI sk-proj keys and DeepSeek keys matching sk- followed by 32 hex characters. OpenAI keys are checked against api.openai.com and sorted into valid_no_balance (HTTP 429) or revoked (HTTP 401). DeepSeek balances are queried; the post names keys pulled from labibiyat.com and nyisu.com. The same control server, 134.175.71.194 (Tencent Cloud, Guangzhou), is described as hosting a GoTTY web terminal titled Pi – AI Coding Assistant (https://github.com/yudai/gotty), heartbeat bots that fake student reading time, and a scraper of 5,132 student records from the Fengxian campus of the Shanghai Publishing and Printing College, including campus-card balances and a QR payment-code module. VECERT says the operator is possibly in China and likely tied to Shanghai's academic community. Link keyhunter-llm-key-theft-2026-11, which also uses FOFA to hunt LLM keys.

A catch-all mail domain is used to farm FOFA accounts, search for exposed env files, and validate stolen OpenAI and DeepSeek keys. VECERT calls the automation an autonomous agent; that label is unverified.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Cyber Press coverage of Operation Ghost CampusAdditional source: Cyber Security News: fake FOFA accounts

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Private-research write-up with no government or vendor corroboration. The key-theft and validation steps are shown in the author's screenshots. The autonomous-agent label is not backed by agent internals.

  1. 01 · Farm FOFA accounts

    A script registers FOFA accounts on melocc.cc, reads the confirmation mail, and stores passwords and JWTs in fofa_accounts.csv.

    Hunt: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

    Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Search for exposed keys

    Rotated free-tier tokens query FOFA for .env files, Docker configs, and git repos.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Validate OpenAI and DeepSeek keys

    Regex hits are checked at api.openai.com or for DeepSeek balance and sorted into valid_no_balance or revoked.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Keys land in the GoTTY panel

    VECERT says working keys feed the Pi AI Coding Assistant terminal on 134.175.71.194.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Mass FOFA account registration through a private catch-all mail domain, then searches for exposed .env files and git repos. Reported impact: VECERT says working keys feed the Pi AI Coding Assistant terminal on 134.175.71.194; reported targets include Holders of exposed OpenAI and DeepSeek keys; VECERT also describes 5,132 student records at a Shanghai college campus; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Do not leave provider keys in .env files, Docker configs, or public git repos. Monitor api.openai.com for bursts of validation calls that return 429 or 401. Treat melocc.cc and the named control IP as suspicious. Rotate any key that appeared in a public env file.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Farm FOFA accountsCredential / session use outside baselineCustom schema · Draft

A script registers FOFA accounts on melocc.cc, reads the confirmation mail, and stores passwords and JWTs in fofa_accounts.csv.

What to look for

Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Identity / service authentication logs
  • Device, source-IP and session context
  • Resource access and token issuance audit

Coverage limit. Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline
id: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5
status: experimental
description: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a
  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - identity.login
      - identity.token.use
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
  2. Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
02Search for exposed keysSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Rotated free-tier tokens query FOFA for .env files, Docker configs, and git repos.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
03Validate OpenAI and DeepSeek keysSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Regex hits are checked at api.openai.com or for DeepSeek balance and sorted into valid_no_balance or revoked.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
04Keys land in the GoTTY panelUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

VECERT says working keys feed the Pi AI Coding Assistant terminal on 134.175.71.194.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Mass FOFA account registration through a private catch-all mail domain, then searches for exposed .env files and git repos

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • GoTTY web terminal (https://github.com/yudai/gotty), described as Pi – AI Coding Assistant
  • Stolen OpenAI and DeepSeek API keys

Other tooling

  • FOFA account farm on melocc.cc
  • fofa_accounts.csv

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Holders of exposed OpenAI and DeepSeek keys; VECERT also describes 5,132 student records at a Shanghai college campus
Reported scale / exposure
At least 1,438 FOFA accounts. 5,132 student records described. Control server 134.175.71.194.
Target geography
China · Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unnamed. VECERT (VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B) says the operator is possibly in China and likely tied to Shanghai's academic community. No government or vendor attribution.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed operator described by VECERT
Country
China
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
VECERT Threat Research and Intelligence
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • FOFA farming and provider-key validationGUIDANCE

    No Sigma, Splunk, or Elastic rule covers FOFA account farming, GoTTY, or OpenAI 429/401 key-validation bursts. On the defender side, alert when a repository or host serves a .env containing sk-proj or DeepSeek sk- keys, and treat outbound queries to fofa.info from build systems as suspicious. Mail IPs 156.251.234.242 and 156.233.234.242 are intentionally not indicators until the VECERT discrepancy is resolved.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-11-08
Last updated
2026-11-10

Updates

  • 2026-11-08 — VECERT

    VECERT publishes Operation Ghost Campus (VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B), including fofa_accounts.csv, melocc.cc, and control server 134.175.71.194

  • 2026-11-10 — Cyber Press

    Secondary coverage repeats the FOFA account farm and the OpenAI and DeepSeek key-validation steps

Source defensive notes

Do not leave provider keys in .env files, Docker configs, or public git repos. Monitor api.openai.com for bursts of validation calls that return 429 or 401. Treat melocc.cc and the named control IP as suspicious. Rotate any key that appeared in a public env file.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0021Establish Accounts

The operator mass-registers FOFA accounts through its own mail domain Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

FOFA queries are used to find exposed .env files and pull OpenAI and DeepSeek keys Source

AML.T0034Cost Harvesting

Validated keys are checked for remaining balance and described as fuel for the operator's own tools Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • melocc.cc
  • labibiyat.com
  • nyisu.com

ips

  • 134.175.71.194

hashes

    urls

      Sources & research credit

      3 sources

      Research by VECERT Threat Research and Intelligence · VECERT

      1. VECERT: Operation Ghost-Campus medium.com
      2. Cyber Press coverage of Operation Ghost Campus cyberpress.org
      3. Cyber Security News: fake FOFA accounts cybersecuritynews.com

      Control IP 134.175.71.194, melocc.cc, the 1,438-account count, example mailbox local-parts, labibiyat.com, nyisu.com, and the GoTTY panel name are from the VECERT Medium post. The mail-server IP is not listed. The same post gives 156.251.234.242 in the DNS section (mail, api, pop, imap, and smtp subdomains) and 156.233.234.242 in the infrastructure section (Cognetcloud, ASN 401701). Secondary write-ups disagree about which address is the Cognetcloud mail server, and the embedded screenshots were not independently re-resolved. Both addresses are omitted.

      Record & downloads
      Source record name
      VECERT Operation Ghost Campus - FOFA account farm harvesting OpenAI and DeepSeek keys
      Entry ID
      vecert-operation-ghost-campus-2026-11
      Catalog review
      November 12, 2026
      Category
      attacks-on-ai
      AI involvement confidence
      unverified