Adception fake Claude for Mac InstallFix malvertising
A Google ad for 'claude mac' leads to a fake Claude download page whose Copy button swaps the real install command for one that pipes an attacker URL into zsh.
What happened
Google ad for claude mac lists bing.com, Bing click-tracking redirects through compromised retailer to fake Claude download. Page shows real Anthropic install command; Copy button swaps clipboard to decode lake-90.com URL and pipe into zsh (InstallFix). Dual cloaking on referrer. Mate Research (Nadav Lorber) documents full attack chain - clipboard swap Copy button triggers base64 curl pipe to zsh, AES-CTR zsh stager, beacon to /api/metrics/run?event=pasted|stager, AMOS infostealer exfiltration to 152.42.143.45, root backdoor via LaunchDaemons com.apple.accountsd.helper and com.apple.metadata.mds.worker. Signed DMG served from claude-desktop.com as Claude.dmg with Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR; jsDelivr note points to anchorpost13.com. Google Ads campaign 24303764142 served via claude-desk-code.com, promotion-chatgpt.com, lake-90.com. PasteSwitch toolkit family, unattributed.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Search ad redirects
An ad for Claude on Mac redirects through tracking and a compromised retailer to a fake download page.
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Claude branding earns trust
The page displays a real-looking Anthropic installation command.
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Clipboard command is swapped
The Copy button substitutes a command that decodes a different download URL and pipes content to zsh.
Hunt: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Victim runs attacker content
Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content.
Hunt: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Malvertising + clipboard swap / paste into Terminal. Reported impact: Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content; reported targets include macOS users searching for Claude.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The source describes a fake Claude-for-Mac download that swaps the copied install command.
Conditions to check- The user must follow the malicious advertisement / download path and run the substituted command.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Use official download channels and inspect pasted install commands before running them in Terminal.
Check pasted commands; do not pipe remote scripts into shell
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Search ad redirectsLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
An ad for Claude on Mac redirects through tracking and a compromised retailer to a fake download page.
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02Claude branding earns trustLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
The page displays a real-looking Anthropic installation command.
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Use delivery provenance and the subsequent pasted command; Claude branding alone is not a detection signal.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Clipboard command is swappedmacOS download → shell executionNative logs · Draft
The Copy button substitutes a command that decodes a different download URL and pipes content to zsh.
What to look for
A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)
- Browser download and proxy records
- LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes
Coverage limit. Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.
Sigma
title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution
id: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918
status: experimental
description: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,
followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- /zsh
- /bash
- /sh
- /curl
CommandLine|contains:
- http
- base64
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "curl")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "base64"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/zsh", "*/bash", "*/sh", "*/curl")
CommandLine IN ("*http*", "*base64*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
- Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
04Victim runs attacker contentmacOS download → shell executionNative logs · Draft
Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content.
What to look for
A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)
- Browser download and proxy records
- LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes
Coverage limit. Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.
Sigma
title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution
id: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918
status: experimental
description: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,
followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- /zsh
- /bash
- /sh
- /curl
CommandLine|contains:
- http
- base64
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "curl")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "base64"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/zsh", "*/bash", "*/sh", "*/curl")
CommandLine IN ("*http*", "*base64*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
- Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI tool as lure
- Initial access
- Malvertising + clipboard swap / paste into Terminal
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Fake Claude download / InstallFix lure
Other tooling
- Google Ads campaign 24303764142
- Bing ck/a redirect
- zsh/curl pipe with base64 encoding
- AES-CTR zsh stager
- AMOS infostealer
- LaunchDaemons persistence (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker)
- Signed DMG (Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR)
- PasteSwitch toolkit
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- macOS users searching for Claude
Reported attribution
Push AcSig ClickFix toolkit family
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Push AcSig ClickFix toolkit family
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Push Security, Mate Security
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Clipboard Access Via OSAScriptSIGMAView rule
Detects clipboard manipulation via osascript on macOS
- Potential Persistence Via PlistBuddySIGMAView rule
Detects LaunchDaemon creation (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker)
- Credentials from Password Stores - KeychainSIGMAView rule
Detects AMOS infostealer credential harvesting from macOS Keychain
- Malicious Claude install redirect detectionGUIDANCE
Block domains claude-desktop.com, claude-desk-code.com, promotion-chatgpt.com, lake-90.com, anchorpost13.com; detect base64-encoded zsh pipes; monitor beacon traffic to /api/metrics/run?event=pasted|stager; block AMOS C2 152.42.143.45; flag Google Ads campaign 24303764142
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-09
- Last updated
- 2026-11-06
Updates
- 2026-10-09 — Push Security
Push Security reports Adception malvertising campaign; Google Ads for 'claude mac' redirect through Bing to fake Claude download; clipboard swap to base64 curl|zsh
- 2026-11-06 — Mate Security
Mate Research documents full attack chain: base64 curl pipe to zsh, AES-CTR stager, AMOS infostealer exfiltration to 152.42.143.45, LaunchDaemons persistence (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker), signed DMG (Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR), Google Ads campaign 24303764142
Source defensive notes
Check pasted commands; do not pipe remote scripts into shell
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
A fake Claude download impersonates a trusted AI vendor. Source
Google Ads malvertising campaign delivers AMOS via fake Claude installer Source
Clipboard swap technique delivers malicious payload via user paste action Source
AMOS infostealer establishes persistence via LaunchDaemons Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
claude-desktop.comanchorpost13.comclaude-desk-code.compromotion-chatgpt.comlake-90.com
ips
152.42.143.45
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Luke Jennings · Push Security
- Push Security: Adception Malvertising - Another Search Engine's Search Results pushsecurity.com
- Mate Research: Fake Claude Code Ads are Installing AMOS on Macs mate.security
Push Security initial disclosure (Oct 9); Mate Research comprehensive analysis adds AMOS payload details, LaunchDaemons persistence, signed DMG distribution, Google Ads campaign ID, full IOC set
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Adception fake Claude Mac InstallFix
- Entry ID
- adception-claude-mac-2026-10
- Catalog review
- November 10, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed