Detection queries Qualified report

AIR Office Party, Anthropic document skills load an unchecked LD_PRELOAD library

Air Security (Omri Saxena and Or Nevo; article dated Nov 5, 2026) found the issue in May 2026 and reported it to Anthropic. The docx, pptx, and xlsx skills, used by Claude document features and by the…

What happened

Air Security (Omri Saxena and Or Nevo; article dated Nov 5, 2026) found the issue in May 2026 and reported it to Anthropic. The docx, pptx, and xlsx skills, used by Claude document features and by the Claude Code document-skills marketplace, convert documents with python scripts/office/soffice.py --headless --convert-to pdf. The docx skill renders every written document to PDF through that helper. The same helper is used by the pptx and xlsx skills. If the helper cannot open a Unix socket, including under a sandbox, seccomp, or EMFILE, it sets LD_PRELOAD to a path under the process temp directory, lo_socket_shim.so, and execs LibreOffice. The helper does not check who owns that file or what is in it. Whoever writes it first is loaded into the LibreOffice process. Air's proof of concept planted the library directly in a Claude Code sandbox temp directory, and a second proof used a companion skill that unpacked the .so into /tmp while the agent wrote marketing copy. The load is Linux-only. macOS ignores LD_PRELOAD, so the library is not loaded there. Air writes that Anthropic acknowledged the report and considers the behavior outside its security boundary because the helper runs in a sandbox. As of the Nov 5 article, scripts/office/soffice.py on the repository main branch was unchanged since July 17 and still loaded the file at that path. A check of the same file on Nov 15, 2026 still showed _SHIM_SO built from tempfile.gettempdir() joined with lo_socket_shim.so, an early return when that file exists, and env["LD_PRELOAD"] set to it.

The official Anthropic docx, pptx, and xlsx skills call scripts/office/soffice.py. If a Unix socket cannot be opened, that helper sets LD_PRELOAD to whatever file is already at the temp-directory path lo_socket_shim.so.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: skills/docx/scripts/office/soffice.py

How it happened

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Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Air Security published a proof of concept. The article does not describe in-the-wild exploitation. Anthropic acknowledged the report and said the helper only runs inside a sandbox, which Anthropic treats as outside its security boundary.

  1. 01 · Document skill calls soffice.py

    docx, pptx, and xlsx skills run scripts/office/soffice.py --headless --convert-to pdf. The docx skill does this for every document it writes.

    Hunt: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

    Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Failed socket sets LD_PRELOAD

    If the Unix socket cannot be opened, soffice.py sets LD_PRELOAD to tempfile.gettempdir()/lo_socket_shim.so with no ownership or content check.

    Hunt: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

    Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · First writer of the shim is loaded

    Air planted the library in a Claude Code sandbox temp directory, and also unpacked it from a companion skill. Linux loads it. macOS ignores LD_PRELOAD.

    Hunt: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

    Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

    Source for step 3

Why it matters

Reported entry point: A local writer places lo_socket_shim.so in the temp directory before the document skill runs soffice.py. Air demonstrated a direct plant and a companion skill. No remote exploitation is described. Reported impact: Air planted the library in a Claude Code sandbox temp directory, and also unpacked it from a companion skill. Linux loads it. macOS ignores LD_PRELOAD; reported targets include Users of the official Anthropic document skills on Linux, including Claude Code sandboxes where the socket open fails. No victim organizations are named; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Pin document skills and review scripts/office/soffice.py before enabling them. On Linux, alert when a process sets LD_PRELOAD to lo_socket_shim.so, and when a compiler writes that filename under /tmp before soffice.py runs. Do not treat an /etc/ld.so.preload file rule as coverage for this env-var path. macOS does not honor LD_PRELOAD for this load.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Document skill calls soffice.pySkill bundle provenance / reviewCustom schema · Draft

docx, pptx, and xlsx skills run scripts/office/soffice.py --headless --convert-to pdf. The docx skill does this for every document it writes.

What to look for

A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes
  • Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history
  • Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed

Coverage limit. Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review
id: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26
status: experimental
description: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access
  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - skill.bundle.load
      - skill.bundle.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
  2. Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
02Failed socket sets LD_PRELOADLinux fileless or anonymous-file executionNative logs · Draft

If the Unix socket cannot be opened, soffice.py sets LD_PRELOAD to tempfile.gettempdir()/lo_socket_shim.so with no ownership or content check.

What to look for

A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines
  • Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available
  • Network and persistence activity from the resulting process

Coverage limit. Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.

MCP reference matches: Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution
id: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66
status: experimental
description: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|contains:
      - /memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  selection_command:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where FolderPath has_any ("/memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process IN ("*memfd:*", "*/proc/self/fd/*", "*/proc/thread-self/fd/*")
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
  2. Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
03First writer of the shim is loadedLinux fileless or anonymous-file executionNative logs · Draft

Air planted the library in a Claude Code sandbox temp directory, and also unpacked it from a companion skill. Linux loads it. macOS ignores LD_PRELOAD.

What to look for

A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines
  • Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available
  • Network and persistence activity from the resulting process

Coverage limit. Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.

MCP reference matches: Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution
id: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66
status: experimental
description: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|contains:
      - /memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  selection_command:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where FolderPath has_any ("/memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process IN ("*memfd:*", "*/proc/self/fd/*", "*/proc/thread-self/fd/*")
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
  2. Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
A local writer places lo_socket_shim.so in the temp directory before the document skill runs soffice.py. Air demonstrated a direct plant and a companion skill. No remote exploitation is described.

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Anthropic skills repository, skills/docx, skills/pptx, and skills/xlsx (https://github.com/anthropics/skills)
  • Claude Code document-skills and Claude document features that call soffice.py

Other tooling

  • LD_PRELOAD of lo_socket_shim.so
  • LibreOffice via soffice.py

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Users of the official Anthropic document skills on Linux, including Claude Code sandboxes where the socket open fails. No victim organizations are named.
Reported scale / exposure
One helper shared by the docx, pptx, and xlsx skills. No exploitation count was published.

No target geography. The behavior is in published skill code.

Reported attribution

No threat actor. Air Security reported the behavior in the official skill. Anthropic's response, as quoted by Air, is that the helper is outside Anthropic's security boundary.

Structured attribution

Actor
unknown
Motivation
unknown
Attributed by
Air Security
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Unusual LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH Command Line ArgumentsELASTICView rule

    Linux. A command line that sets LD_PRELOAD. Matches soffice.py when the env assignment is visible on the command line. It does not match a library path that exists only inside the Python process.

  • Unusual Preload Environment Variable Process ExecutionELASTICView rule

    Linux. A process started with an unusual LD_PRELOAD or LD_LIBRARY_PATH. Matches the LibreOffice process the helper execs after setting the variable.

  • lo_socket_shim.so is not an ld.so.preload file editGUIDANCE

    Rules for writes to /etc/ld.so.preload describe a different technique and are not cited. Hunt for lo_socket_shim.so under the temp directory, and for a compiler writing that file before soffice.py. Sigma has no rule for the LD_PRELOAD environment variable.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-05
Last updated
2026-11-15

Updates

  • 2026-05 — Air Security

    Omri Saxena and Or Nevo find the unchecked shim and report it to Anthropic

  • 2026-07-17 — Air Security

    Air says scripts/office/soffice.py on main last changed on this date and still loads the temp-directory library

  • 2026-11-05 — Air Security

    Air publishes Office Party. Anthropic's stated position is that the sandboxed helper is outside its security boundary.

  • 2026-11-15 — https://github.com/anthropics/skills/blob/main/skills/docx/scripts/office/soffice.py

    The docx soffice.py on main still defines _SHIM_SO as tempfile.gettempdir()/lo_socket_shim.so and sets LD_PRELOAD to it

Source defensive notes

Pin document skills and review scripts/office/soffice.py before enabling them. On Linux, alert when a process sets LD_PRELOAD to lo_socket_shim.so, and when a compiler writes that filename under /tmp before soffice.py runs. Do not treat an /etc/ld.so.preload file rule as coverage for this env-var path. macOS does not honor LD_PRELOAD for this load.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0010.001AI Software

The load is in the official Anthropic document skills, not a third-party copy Source

AML.T0053AI Agent Tool Invocation

The docx skill invokes soffice.py as part of rendering a document the agent just wrote Source

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by Omri Saxena, Or Nevo · Air Security

  1. Office Party: Anthropic's Document Skills Load an Unchecked Shared Library www.air.security
  2. skills/docx/scripts/office/soffice.py github.com

The May 2026 discovery, the Nov 5, 2026 article date, Anthropic's sandbox response, and the July 17 unchanged claim are from Air Security. The Nov 15, 2026 file check is a read of https://github.com/anthropics/skills/blob/main/skills/docx/scripts/office/soffice.py. The pptx and xlsx helpers were not re-read on that date; Air says they share this helper.

Record & downloads
Source record name
AIR Office Party, Anthropic document skills load an unchecked LD_PRELOAD library
Entry ID
air-office-party-anthropic-skills-ld-preload-2026-11
Catalog review
November 15, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed