Carbonato botnet deploys Hermes agent to hunt AI keys on Docker hosts
Oct 28, 2026: Carbonato botnet scans for exposed Docker daemons (TCP 2375/2376, unauthenticated or weak credentials). On compromise, deploys privileged container running Ubuntu with: (1) Hermes autonomous…
What happened
Oct 28, 2026: Carbonato botnet scans for exposed Docker daemons (TCP 2375/2376, unauthenticated or weak credentials). On compromise, deploys privileged container running Ubuntu with: (1) Hermes autonomous agent (Python-based LLM agent framework); (2) scanning modules for AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, OpenAI/Anthropic API keys, HuggingFace tokens, Docker secrets, Kubernetes service accounts; (3) XMRig crypto miner (secondary payload). Hermes agent autonomously navigates filesystem, reads environment variables, parses .env files, queries Docker secrets API, extracts credentials from running containers, and exfiltrates findings to hxxps://carbonato-collect[.]net/api/ingest. Agent continues running indefinitely, adapting search patterns based on discovered infrastructure. ThreatDown tracked 3,200+ compromised Docker hosts Oct-Nov 2026; hosts in cloud providers (AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean) and on-premise. Median dwell time 18 days before detection. Detection: monitor Docker daemon exposure (Shodan queries docker 2375/2376), review privileged container deployments, alert on Hermes agent indicators (Python LLM agent process, hermes CLI usage), check for carbonato-collect[.]net egress, monitor API key/token file access patterns from containers.
Carbonato botnet installs Hermes autonomous agent (github.com/Hermes-Autonomous-Intelligence/hermes) on compromised Docker hosts to autonomously hunt for AI API keys and credentials
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Scan for exposed Docker
Botnet scans internet for exposed Docker daemons on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) and 2376 (TLS); brute-forces weak credentials or exploits no-auth configs
Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Deploy malicious container
Creates privileged Docker container with host filesystem mounts; runs Ubuntu image with Hermes agent, scanning tools, and XMRig miner; container gains host-level access
Hunt: A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.
Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Autonomous credential hunting
Hermes agent autonomously navigates filesystem, reads env vars, parses .env files, queries Docker secrets, extracts credentials from running containers; adapts search patterns based on discovered infrastructure; targets AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Anthropic, HuggingFace keys
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Exfiltrate and mine
Hermes POSTs credentials to hxxps://carbonato-collect[.]net/api/ingest; XMRig mines Monero using host CPU; agent maintains persistence and continues hunting indefinitely; median 18-day dwell time
Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Internet-exposed Docker daemon on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) or 2376 (TLS but weak/no auth); credential brute-force or default credentials. Reported impact: Hermes POSTs credentials to hxxps://carbonato-collect[.]net/api/ingest; XMRig mines Monero using host CPU; agent maintains persistence and continues hunting indefinitely; median 18-day dwell time; reported targets include 3,200+ compromised Docker hosts across AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, on-premise; AI/ML development environments, CI/CD pipelines, cloud-native infrastructure; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Never expose Docker daemon to internet; require TLS with client cert authentication; use Docker socket firewall rules; implement least-privilege container policies; disable privileged containers where possible; monitor container resource usage; rotate API keys regularly; use secret management solutions (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager); network segmentation; Docker security scanning
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Scan for exposed DockerWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft
Botnet scans internet for exposed Docker daemons on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) and 2376 (TLS); brute-forces weak credentials or exploits no-auth configs
What to look for
Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
Use internet-facing Docker/API request logs for the scan, then require daemon or host activity before treating it as exploitation.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
- Server process and file events
- Outbound DNS / proxy records
Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- web.exploit_candidate
- web.upload
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
02Deploy malicious containerPrivileged container or pod with host accessNative logs · Draft
Creates privileged Docker container with host filesystem mounts; runs Ubuntu image with Hermes agent, scanning tools, and XMRig miner; container gains host-level access
What to look for
A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.
Visibility: Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected
Required logs
- Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events
- Container runtime process and mount telemetry
- Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions
Coverage limit. Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.
Kubernetes audit candidates for privileged pods or hostPath volumes. The KQL and SPL examples need the respective Kubernetes audit sources and local field extraction.
MCP reference matches: Privileged Container Deployed (SigmaHQ), Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Privileged Kubernetes Pod or Host Mount
id: 5a3e19f4-3f1f-46e9-974f-4985b4692d30
status: experimental
description: Detects pod creation requests containing privileged containers or hostPath volumes.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml
falsepositives:
- Approved infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads
level: high
logsource:
category: application
product: kubernetes
service: audit
detection:
selection_create:
verb: create
objectRef.resource: pods
selection_privileged:
requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged: true
selection_hostpath:
requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path|startswith: /
condition: selection_create and 1 of selection_privileged, selection_hostpath
KQL
AzureDiagnostics
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where Category in ("kube-audit", "kube-audit-admin")
| where log_s has '"verb":"create"' and log_s has '"resource":"pods"'
| where log_s has '"privileged":true' or log_s has '"hostPath"'
| project TimeGenerated, Resource, ResourceGroup, SubscriptionId, log_s
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="kube:apiserver-audit" verb=create objectRef.resource=pods
(requestObject.spec.containers{}.securityContext.privileged=true
OR requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path="*")
| table _time user.username sourceIPs{} objectRef.namespace objectRef.name
requestObject.spec.containers{}.image requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.
- Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials.
03Autonomous credential huntingSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
Hermes agent autonomously navigates filesystem, reads env vars, parses .env files, queries Docker secrets, extracts credentials from running containers; adapts search patterns based on discovered infrastructure; targets AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Anthropic, HuggingFace keys
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
04Exfiltrate and mineSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft
Hermes POSTs credentials to hxxps://carbonato-collect[.]net/api/ingest; XMRig mines Monero using host CPU; agent maintains persistence and continues hunting indefinitely; median 18-day dwell time
What to look for
Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
This hunt covers the reported credential transfer. Mining needs separate process/network telemetry and is not implied by the exfiltration query.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Sensitive resource access / DLP records
- Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
- Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- data.export
- agent.external.send
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI as operator
- Additional role
- AI credential theft
- Initial access
- Internet-exposed Docker daemon on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) or 2376 (TLS but weak/no auth); credential brute-force or default credentials
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Hermes autonomous agent framework
- OpenAI API (targeted)
- Anthropic Claude API (targeted)
- HuggingFace (targeted)
Other tooling
- Docker container escape
- XMRig cryptocurrency miner
- carbonato-collect[.]net C2
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- 3,200+ compromised Docker hosts across AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, on-premise; AI/ML development environments, CI/CD pipelines, cloud-native infrastructure
- Reported scale / exposure
- 3,200+ compromised Docker hosts (Oct-Nov 2026); median dwell time 18 days; credential theft + crypto mining dual-purpose operation
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Unknown actor; Carbonato botnet infrastructure; financially motivated (crypto mining + credential monetization)
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Carbonato botnet operators
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- ThreatDown Labs
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Docker daemon exposure monitoringGUIDANCE
Monitor for exposed Docker daemons on TCP 2375/2376; alert on unauthorized privileged container deployments with host filesystem mounts
- Hermes agent detectionGUIDANCE
Monitor for Hermes Python processes, autonomous-agent activity, API calls to DeepSeek from Docker containers; alert on carbonato-collect[.]net egress
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-01
- Last updated
- 2026-11-04
Updates
- 2026-10-28 — ThreatDown Labs
3,200+ compromised Docker hosts discovered; Hermes agent deployment for autonomous credential hunting; median 18-day dwell time
Source defensive notes
Never expose Docker daemon to internet; require TLS with client cert authentication; use Docker socket firewall rules; implement least-privilege container policies; disable privileged containers where possible; monitor container resource usage; rotate API keys regularly; use secret management solutions (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager); network segmentation; Docker security scanning
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Attacker deploys autonomous AI agent (Hermes) to hunt for AI service credentials on compromised infrastructure Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
carbonato-collect.net
ips
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by ThreatDown Labs · ThreatDown (formerly Malwarebytes)
- ThreatDown: Carbonato Botnet Spreads Via Exposed Docker Hosts www.threatdown.com
- Hermes - Autonomous AI Agent Framework github.com
ThreatDown Labs analysis; Hermes agent GitHub github.com/Hermes-Autonomous-Intelligence/hermes. Carbonato represents evolution of botnet TTPs: combining traditional crypto mining with autonomous AI agents for credential harvesting. Detection: look for Hermes agent Python process (hermes, autonomous-agent, llm-agent), monitor Docker privileged containers with network egress to unknown domains, check for carbonato-collect[.]net, alert on Docker API calls from unexpected sources, review container mounts accessing host credentials.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Carbonato botnet deploys Hermes agent to hunt AI keys on Docker hosts
- Entry ID
- carbonato-botnet-hermes-2026-10
- Catalog review
- November 4, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed