Detection queries Not classifiedARTEX

Check Point and CERT-EU exposed ARTEX operator consoles leak campaign data

Check Point (Nov 5, 2026) and CERT-EU (Nov 5, 2026) document exposed ARTEX operator control panels leaking database dumps containing operator prompts, model selection (primarily DeepSeek Flash and Kimi),…

What happened

Check Point (Nov 5, 2026) and CERT-EU (Nov 5, 2026) document exposed ARTEX operator control panels leaking database dumps containing operator prompts, model selection (primarily DeepSeek Flash and Kimi), autonomous agent decision steps, and campaign targets. Three campaign fleets identified: (1) iOS signing shops - steal .p12 certificates and passwords, check against Apple revocation/expiry lists; (2) Crypto payment sites - drain USDT, swap deposit addresses; overwrite S3 buckets serving iOS IPA landing pages (supply chain); (3) Honor of Kings account tokens from stolen-account resale servers. Access methods: hardcoded admin passwords in JavaScript bundles, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR vulnerabilities. Operator who hit Claude Opus guardrails switched to Chinese LLM models. Version-tag infrastructure clusters: sco-fix2 (38.11.173.0/24, 38.11.221.0/24, 198.200.59.85-89, AS54600 PEG TECH); dev-db-resilience-20261031 (103.122.245.x, AS152918 Liberally Network, Thailand); 0.3.15-pro.* (192.236.172.197, 198.44.123.66, 204.44.66.81, 104.168.112.237, AS36352 HostPapa). Custom framework PZZ referenced. CERT-EU reports ARTEX activity vs EU institutions; original Autumn-27 ARTEX repository down. Chinese-prompting actors, financially motivated; attributed by Check Point; confirmed AI involvement from leaked operator consoles.

Financially motivated operators use ARTEX autonomous agents for automated intrusions; exposed control panels leak operator prompts, model choices, agent decision steps, and target data

Read the original sourceAdditional source: CERT-EU: From Penetration Testing to Cyber Threat - Beware of ARTEX

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Deploy ARTEX operator console

    Financially motivated operators deploy ARTEX consoles for campaign orchestration

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · iOS signing shop campaign

    Steal .p12 certificates and passwords; check Apple revocation/expiry

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Crypto payment site campaign

    Drain USDT, swap deposit addresses; overwrite S3 buckets serving iOS IPA (supply chain)

    Hunt: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.

    A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Honor of Kings account theft

    Steal account tokens from compromised stolen-account resale servers

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · ARTEX console exposure

    Hardcoded passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR expose operator consoles and databases

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Hardcoded admin passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR. Reported impact: Drain USDT, swap deposit addresses; overwrite S3 buckets serving iOS IPA (supply chain); Steal account tokens from compromised stolen-account resale servers; reported targets include iOS signing shops, cryptocurrency payment sites, Honor of Kings account resale servers, EU institutions (CERT-EU report); applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Secure ARTEX deployments against unauthorized access (remove hardcoded passwords, authenticate APIs); patch command injection, SSTI, IDOR vulnerabilities; rotate compromised credentials; monitor for iOS .p12 theft; protect cryptocurrency deposit address integrity; secure S3 buckets serving app distributions; implement behavioral detection for autonomous agent patterns; block known ARTEX infrastructure IPs; detect Chinese-language prompting in logs

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Deploy ARTEX operator consoleUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

Financially motivated operators deploy ARTEX consoles for campaign orchestration

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
02iOS signing shop campaignSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Steal .p12 certificates and passwords; check Apple revocation/expiry

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
03Crypto payment site campaignOut-of-band payment verificationCustom schema · Draft

Drain USDT, swap deposit addresses; overwrite S3 buckets serving iOS IPA (supply chain)

What to look for

A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit
  • Meeting and communication metadata
  • Independent callback / dual-approval records

Coverage limit. A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Out-of-band payment verification
id: 813e417f-8751-4479-ad17-0f3d146ff036
status: experimental
description: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or
  an override of normal payment approval.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - payment.beneficiary.change
      - payment.approval.override
      - payment.transfer
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
  2. Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
04Honor of Kings account theftSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Steal account tokens from compromised stolen-account resale servers

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
05ARTEX console exposureWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

Hardcoded passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR expose operator consoles and databases

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Offensive frameworks
ARTEX
Initial access
Hardcoded admin passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • ARTEX autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
  • DeepSeek Flash (primary)
  • Kimi (Chinese LLM)
  • Claude Opus (hit guardrails, operator switched)
  • Custom framework PZZ

Other tooling

  • iOS .p12 certificate theft
  • USDT cryptocurrency draining
  • S3 bucket overwrite for supply chain
  • Honor of Kings account token theft

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
iOS signing shops, cryptocurrency payment sites, Honor of Kings account resale servers, EU institutions (CERT-EU report)
Reported scale / exposure
Three major campaign fleets (iOS signing, crypto payment, game accounts); multiple exposed ARTEX panels with leaked operator databases; infrastructure across AS54600 PEG TECH, AS152918 Liberally Network Thailand, AS36352 HostPapa
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Chinese-prompting financially motivated operators; attributed by Check Point; confirmed from leaked operator console databases

Structured attribution

Actor
Chinese-prompting financially motivated operators
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Check Point
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Detect New Open S3 BucketsSPLUNKView rule

    Detects S3 bucket operations including overwrites used in iOS IPA supply chain attacks

  • ARTEX console security monitoringGUIDANCE

    Scan for exposed ARTEX control panels via hardcoded admin passwords in JS bundles; detect unauthenticated ARTEX APIs; patch command injection, SSTI, IDOR in ARTEX deployments; monitor for Chinese-language prompting in agent logs; detect iOS .p12 certificate theft; alert on cryptocurrency deposit address swaps; monitor S3 bucket integrity for iOS IPA distributions; flag Honor of Kings token theft patterns; block known ARTEX infrastructure (AS54600, AS152918, AS36352)

  • ARTEX infrastructure detectionGUIDANCE

    Monitor version-tag clusters: sco-fix2, dev-db-resilience-20261031, 0.3.15-pro.*; detect custom framework PZZ references; alert on DeepSeek Flash and Kimi model usage in offensive contexts; detect operator model switching after guardrail triggers

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-09-01
Last updated
2026-11-05

Updates

  • 2026-11-05 — Check Point

    Check Point publishes analysis of exposed ARTEX operator consoles revealing three campaign fleets (iOS signing, crypto payment, game accounts); operator prompts, model choices, agent steps leaked

  • 2026-11-05 — CERT-EU

    CERT-EU warns of ARTEX activity vs EU institutions; original Autumn-27 ARTEX repository down

Source defensive notes

Secure ARTEX deployments against unauthorized access (remove hardcoded passwords, authenticate APIs); patch command injection, SSTI, IDOR vulnerabilities; rotate compromised credentials; monitor for iOS .p12 theft; protect cryptocurrency deposit address integrity; secure S3 buckets serving app distributions; implement behavioral detection for autonomous agent patterns; block known ARTEX infrastructure IPs; detect Chinese-language prompting in logs

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016Obtain Capabilities

Exposed ARTEX operator consoles reveal autonomous agent decision-making process and campaign orchestration Source

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

AI agents autonomously exploit hardcoded passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR Source

AML.T0010AI Supply Chain Compromise

S3 bucket overwrite campaign represents AI-driven supply chain attack Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

    • 38.11.173.0/24
    • 38.11.221.0/24
    • 198.200.59.85
    • 198.200.59.86
    • 198.200.59.87
    • 198.200.59.88
    • 198.200.59.89
    • 103.122.245.0/24
    • 192.236.172.197
    • 198.44.123.66
    • 204.44.66.81
    • 104.168.112.237

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        2 sources

        Research by Check Point Research, CERT-EU · Check Point, CERT-EU

        1. Check Point: Hacking on Autopilot - Inside ARTEX Cybercrime Campaigns research.checkpoint.com
        2. CERT-EU: From Penetration Testing to Cyber Threat - Beware of ARTEX cert.europa.eu

        Check Point blog (Nov 5, 2026) primary source with detailed campaign analysis and infrastructure; CERT-EU blog (Nov 5, 2026) reports ARTEX vs EU institutions; all IOCs (IPs, ASNs, version tags) verified from Check Point; links to other ARTEX entries: microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11, crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10, badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11, storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11, srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Check Point and CERT-EU exposed ARTEX operator consoles leak campaign data
        Entry ID
        checkpoint-artex-operator-consoles-2026-11
        Catalog review
        November 10, 2026
        Category
        adversary-use-of-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed