Detection queries Reported campaignARTEX

ARTEX and Claude Code used against South Korean financial firms

A likely Chinese-speaking actor used the ARTEX agentic pentest suite and Claude Code against South Korean financial organizations, and asked Claude where to sell the stolen data.

What happened

Likely Chinese-speaking financially motivated actor used open-source Chinese agentic pentest suite ARTEX plus Claude Code against South Korean financial orgs. Open directories held Claude session histories, ARTEX configs, Claude memory. ARTEX used DeepSeek v4.1-flash via xcai.pro; also GLM-5.3 and Grok 4.6. Actor asked Claude where to sell Korean breach data. ARTEX later went closed-source.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Initial access is not established

    The supplied entry does not confirm the initial intrusion route.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · ARTEX and Claude Code assist operations

    The actor uses an agentic pentest suite and coding-agent tooling.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Agents support financial-sector attacks

    Open directories exposed sessions, configurations and model use tied to South Korean financial targets.

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Actor discusses selling breach data

    Claude session material includes questions about selling Korean breach data; identities remain unconfirmed.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: unknown (industry reports: loan inquiry service; employee mobile work-support system). Reported impact: Claude session material includes questions about selling Korean breach data; identities remain unconfirmed; reported targets include South Korean financial organizations (multiple banks per industry reports); using the named AI products does not by itself establish exposure.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Monitor for agentic pentest suites and exposed Claude session dirs; Jose Censys notes on IOCs

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

02ARTEX and Claude Code assist operationsProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

The actor uses an agentic pentest suite and coding-agent tooling.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
03Agents support financial-sector attacksWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

Open directories exposed sessions, configurations and model use tied to South Korean financial targets.

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
04Actor discusses selling breach dataProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

Claude session material includes questions about selling Korean breach data; identities remain unconfirmed.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

The discussion of selling breach data is visible in exposed operator sessions, not inherently in victim endpoint telemetry.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Offensive frameworks
ARTEX
Initial access
unknown (industry reports: loan inquiry service; employee mobile work-support system)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • Proxy IPs listed in CrowdStrike IOC table

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
South Korean financial organizations (multiple banks per industry reports)
Reported scale / exposure
Active late Sep–early Oct 2026; number of orgs unconfirmed
Target geography
South Korea

South Korea describes victim financial organizations. Chinese language concerns actor attribution; Hong Kong refers to infrastructure. Neither is counted as victim geography.

Reported attribution

CrowdStrike did not attribute the activity to a named adversary. It assessed with moderate confidence that the actor was likely a Chinese speaker and financially motivated.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unknown threat actor
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
CrowdStrike Intelligence
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • ARTEX operator infrastructure is not a victim-side ruleGUIDANCE

    security-detections-mcp searches for password spray, web shells, and the report's ATT&CK techniques (T1583.003, T1588.007, T1090) returned infrastructure, proxy, and identity rules. CrowdStrike describes the actor's own ARTEX and Claude Code servers, not a command, webshell, or cloud API on the South Korean financial organizations. Hunt exposed Claude session directories and ARTEX consoles, and review the loan-inquiry and mobile work-support services named in the industry reporting CrowdStrike cites.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-09
Last updated
2026-11-15

Updates

  • 2026-10-07 — CrowdStrike Intelligence

    CrowdStrike reports an unnamed, likely Chinese-speaking, financially motivated actor using ARTEX and Claude Code against South Korean financial organizations from late September to early October 2026. A resume prompt listing Maoming, Guangdong cannot be definitively tied to the actor.

  • 2026-11-15 — OpenAttacks

    Tagged ARTEX and backfilled actor name, detections, and timeline from the cited CrowdStrike report. Country stays Unknown because the report attributes language and a financial motive, not a country.

Linked tools

  • ARTEX — agentic-offensive-framework

Source defensive notes

Monitor for agentic pentest suites and exposed Claude session dirs; Jose Censys notes on IOCs

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

The supplied source explicitly describes generative-model tooling assisting the reported activity; this mapping does not establish additional autonomy or victim impact. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by CrowdStrike Intelligence · CrowdStrike

  1. CrowdStrike Oct 7 - Unknown threat actor uses ARTEX vs South Korean finance www.crowdstrike.com

CrowdStrike's report ties the South Korean finance activity to an unnamed actor. Separate reports of ARTEX use by other clusters should not be treated as attribution for this campaign.

Record & downloads
Source record name
ARTEX + Claude Code vs South Korean finance
Entry ID
crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10
Catalog review
November 4, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed