Rilide and Vidar stealers spread via fake Sora, Gemini and Midjourney
Fake AI ads and a malicious extension delivered the Rilide stealer for Facebook credentials, and a fake Midjourney installer delivered Vidar to steal browser data, wallets and keystrokes.
What happened
Fake Sora/Gemini ads and a Google Translate extension delivered Rilide stealer targeting Facebook credentials; fake Midjourney installer delivered Vidar stealer (browsers, wallets, keystrokes).
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · AI ads or downloads attract users
Fake Sora, Gemini and Midjourney offers lead to an installer or extension.
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 1 - 02 · AI branding disguises the lure
The advertised product provides the reason to install.
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Rilide or Vidar is delivered
The report describes separate extension and installer payload branches.
Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Credentials and personal data are stolen
Targets include Facebook accounts, browser information and wallets.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Malicious ads / fake AI installers / malicious extension. Reported impact: Targets include Facebook accounts, browser information and wallets.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
AI-branded advertising and a malicious extension are the lure and delivery path in this account.
Conditions to check- The source describes fake Sora / Gemini / Midjourney promotions and separate stealer deliveries.
- A legitimate AI service account or browser installation does not establish infection.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Verify installers and extension provenance through official vendor channels before approval.
Avoid ad-driven AI downloads; extension allowlists
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01AI ads or downloads attract usersLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
Fake Sora, Gemini and Midjourney offers lead to an installer or extension.
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02AI branding disguises the lureLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
The advertised product provides the reason to install.
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Correlate the advertising pretext with extension or installer provenance rather than matching AI branding alone.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Rilide or Vidar is deliveredBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft
The report describes separate extension and installer payload branches.
What to look for
A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Treat the extension and standalone installer as separate branches; extension allowlisting is a browser control.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
- Extension ID, permissions and provenance
- Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- browser.extension.install
- browser.extension.update
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
04Credentials and personal data are stolenSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
Targets include Facebook accounts, browser information and wallets.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI tool as lure
- Initial access
- Malicious ads / fake AI installers / malicious extension
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Fake Sora
- Gemini
- Midjourney branded lures
Other tooling
- Rilide
- Vidar
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in Rilide/Vidar via fake Sora/Gemini/Midjourney AI tools. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Avoid ad-driven AI downloads; extension allowlists
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by ESET · ESET
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Rilide/Vidar via fake Sora/Gemini/Midjourney AI tools
- Entry ID
- eset-rilide-vidar-fake-ai-2024
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed