Not classified

GTIG LLMJacking - UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS monetize cloud models

Multiple threat clusters (UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS) hijack enterprise access to LLMs across AWS Bedrock, Azure, GCP. Initial access via exposed cloud identity tokens (IAM, Service Account…

What happened

Multiple threat clusters (UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS) hijack enterprise access to LLMs across AWS Bedrock, Azure, GCP. Initial access via exposed cloud identity tokens (IAM, Service Account keys, GitHub PATs, session tokens), stolen LLM API keys from public GitHub, exploited web app vulnerabilities, LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (/key/regenerate endpoint rebind). UNC6993 used session hijacking page masquerading as app portal to steal JSON payloads with active access tokens. Threat actors enable LLM services, create API keys, provision GPUs, subscribe Pay-As-You-Go, deploy LiteLLM/new-api/gcli2api gateways, host Manus agent framework with SearXNG metasearch. Monetize via LLM Mixers (Jet Night at jet-night.com $60/month unlimited, ai-relay on lookalike domains, newapi.pro). Stealthy credential validation sweeps with max_tokens=1. Fraudulent charges $100K in single day, cumulative $1M per org. Division of labor between initial access and downstream monetization. Fireworks AI (Nov 9, 2026) reports Oct 23 third-party cloud provider hosting Fireworks R&D breached; Oct 24 attacker entered via provider, ran unauthorized workload; reached account/billing data and, for some customers, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights. Fireworks attributes to financially motivated LLMjacking group selling access to illicit routing gateways; GTIG/Mandiant report referenced; Unit 42 forensics. Notion, a Fireworks customer, published a downstream notice: Fireworks told Notion on Nov 2 that a small dataset of Notion AI synthetic test data was accessed; Notion disconnected and deleted Fireworks data by the morning of Nov 3; on Nov 6 Fireworks said customer data may have been accessed; on Nov 8 Fireworks confirmed the final dataset; on Nov 9 Notion contacted affected customers. The exposed data is Notion AI Insights chat transcripts for under 1 percent of workspaces, mostly unattributable (no user or workspace labels, and no tool-call results). No other Notion features were affected. Notion told affected customers to treat the transcripts as exposed and to rotate secrets pasted into Notion AI. On Nov 11 Notion revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages.

Threat actors hijack enterprise LLM access, generate $100K-$1M USD fraudulent charges, monetize via LLM Mixers (illicit routing gateways), deploy agentic workloads with Manus framework

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident UpdateAdditional source: Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security IncidentAdditional source: Security incident involving a third-party AI vendor

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Compromised cloud identity and LLM API keys

    Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page for LLM portal JSON payloads; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vuln; compromised IAM with federation tokens; exposed LLM API keys harvested from public GitHub; stealthy validation sweeps with max_tokens=1

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Privilege escalation and persistence

    Enumerated cloud services/repos/data stores; cloned codebases for secrets; queried data warehouse metadata; exploited LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (/key/regenerate rebind) to elevate Virtual Keys to PROXY_ADMIN; created unauthorized IAM/service accounts; injected SSH keys; attached admin policies; created backdoor accounts disguised as billing utilities

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · LLM resource hijacking

    Enabled managed generative platforms; created additional API keys; subscribed Pay-As-You-Go; selected premium models; launched high-volume inference; 'burn and rotate' short-lived service accounts; provisioned GPU instances; requested quota increases; deployed LiteLLM gateways; hosted Manus agent framework with SearXNG metasearch and sandbox execution

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · LLM Mixer resale

    UNC6993 deployed new-api and gcli2api to aggregate stolen keys and balance loads; Jet Night (jet-night.com) $60/month unlimited token plan powered by stolen keys, passed ~$1M costs to victim; ai-relay on lookalike domains siphons access to newapi.pro resale ecosystem; D1337-KAIROS persona with Node.js proxy bundles; division of labor between access and monetization operators

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Fraudulent billing

    UNC6993 accumulated $100K+ charges quickly; cumulative charges at orgs reaching $1M; one actor 800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (Opus 75% of calls), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours; token usage profile resembles resold coding-agent traffic with prompt caching; $100K+ estimated usage at list price for two documented cases

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page masquerading as LLM portal; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vulnerability exploitation; compromised IAM credentials with cloud federation tokens; harvested exposed LLM API keys from public GitHub; LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (user ID rebind vulnerability in /key/regenerate endpoint). Reported impact: UNC6993 deployed new-api and gcli2api to aggregate stolen keys and balance loads; Jet Night (jet-night.com) $60/month unlimited token plan powered by stolen keys, passed ~$1M costs to victim; ai-relay on lookalike domains siphons access to newapi.pro resale ecosystem; D1337-KAIROS persona with Node.js proxy bundles; division of labor between access and monetization operators; UNC6993 accumulated $100K+ charges quickly; cumulative charges at orgs reaching $1M; one actor 800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (Opus 75% of calls), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours; token usage profile resembles resold coding-agent traffic with prompt caching; $100K+ estimated usage at list price for two documented cases; reported targets include Organizations in North America, South America, Asia Pacific across financial services, retail, technology, transportation sectors; Fireworks AI customers (account/billing data, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights for some customers); Notion workspaces using Fireworks for Notion AI Insights (under 1 percent, chat transcripts); applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

IAM least privilege; centralized secrets management; code monitoring for API keys; routine config audits; rate limiting via Cloud Armor; network allow listing; budget alerts and API quotas; phishing-resistant MFA; shadow LLM discovery; granular API key scopes; validation sweep monitoring (max_tokens=1); vulnerability/ML supply chain patching; gateway patch management (LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217); sandboxed execution; vetted model repositories; graph-based exposure modeling

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3 Additional source 4
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI infrastructure as C2
Additional role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page masquerading as LLM portal; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vulnerability exploitation; compromised IAM credentials with cloud federation tokens; harvested exposed LLM API keys from public GitHub; LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (user ID rebind vulnerability in /key/regenerate endpoint)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • AWS Bedrock
  • Azure Cognitive Services
  • GCP Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform
  • LiteLLM gateway
  • new-api (centralized model hub and gateway)
  • gcli2api (API proxy tool)
  • Manus agent framework
  • SearXNG metasearch
  • agent-infra/sandbox execution environments

Other tooling

  • Jet Night reseller (jet-night.com)
  • D1337-KAIROS persona
  • ai-relay custom proxy infrastructure
  • newapi.pro resale ecosystem
  • Node.js proxy bundles
  • Burn and rotate service account strategy

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Organizations in North America, South America, Asia Pacific across financial services, retail, technology, transportation sectors; Fireworks AI customers (account/billing data, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights for some customers); Notion workspaces using Fireworks for Notion AI Insights (under 1 percent, chat transcripts)
Reported scale / exposure
Multiple incidents in 2026; fraudulent charges exceeding $100K USD in single day; cumulative charges at some orgs reaching $1M USD; Jet Night passed nearly $1M in token costs to victim org; one actor made ~800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (90% success), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours (1M+ success); 500K+ LLM API calls in <8 hours; Jet Night offers unlimited tokens $60/month (typical market $100-$250/month)
Target geography
North America · South America · Asia

Reported attribution

UNC6993 (Mandiant); Jet Night operators; D1337-KAIROS persona; multiple financially motivated threat clusters operating globally; division of labor between initial access operators and LLM Mixer monetization operators

Structured attribution

Actor
UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS
Country
Global
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Google Threat Intelligence Group, Fireworks AI
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • Cloud LLM resource abuse monitoringGUIDANCE

    Implement budget alerts and API quotas; monitor for validation sweeps (max_tokens=1); detect rapid GPU provisioning; alert on Pay-As-You-Go subscriptions from service accounts; monitor LiteLLM/new-api/gcli2api gateway deployments; detect Manus agent framework and SearXNG installations; flag burn-and-rotate service account patterns; monitor Jet Night, ai-relay, newapi.pro resale infrastructure connections

  • Third-party cloud provider securityGUIDANCE

    For Fireworks AI incident: audit third-party cloud provider access; implement least-privilege for R&D environments; monitor unauthorized workload execution; detect account/billing data access anomalies; alert on secrets, datasets, model weight access; implement cloud provider security controls. Notion downstream notice has no endpoint or CloudTrail pattern: the exposed objects are Notion AI Insights chat transcripts held by the vendor. Affected customers should treat those transcripts as exposed and rotate secrets pasted into Notion AI.

Activity timeline

Last updated
2026-11-11

Updates

  • 2026-11-02 — Google Threat Intelligence Group

    GTIG reports UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS LLMjacking campaigns; fraudulent charges $100K-$1M per org; LLM Mixer resale via jet-night.com, ai-relay, newapi.pro

  • 2026-10-24 — Fireworks AI

    Fireworks AI third-party cloud provider breached Oct 23; attacker entered Oct 24, ran unauthorized workload; accessed account/billing data, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights

  • 2026-11-09 — Fireworks AI

    Fireworks AI attributes to financially motivated LLMjacking group selling illicit routing gateway access; GTIG/Mandiant report referenced; Unit 42 forensics

  • 2026-11-02 — Notion

    Fireworks notified Notion that a small dataset was accessed. Notion found only Notion AI synthetic test data, with no customer data in that first set.

  • 2026-11-03 — Notion

    Notion disconnected from Fireworks, deleted data held there, and stopped communication with Fireworks.

  • 2026-11-06 — Notion

    Fireworks told Notion that malicious actors may have accessed customer data. Notion opened a second investigation.

  • 2026-11-08 — Notion

    Fireworks confirmed the final impacted dataset to Notion.

  • 2026-11-09 — Notion

    Notion contacted affected customers. The dataset is Notion AI Insights chat transcripts for under 1 percent of workspaces, mostly unattributable, with no tool-call results and no other Notion features affected.

  • 2026-11-11 — Notion

    Notion revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages during the investigation.

Source defensive notes

IAM least privilege; centralized secrets management; code monitoring for API keys; routine config audits; rate limiting via Cloud Armor; network allow listing; budget alerts and API quotas; phishing-resistant MFA; shadow LLM discovery; granular API key scopes; validation sweep monitoring (max_tokens=1); vulnerability/ML supply chain patching; gateway patch management (LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217); sandboxed execution; vetted model repositories; graph-based exposure modeling

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0000Search Open Technical Databases

Threat actors compromise cloud compute credentials and hijack enterprise access to AWS Bedrock, Azure Cognitive Services, and GCP Gemini to fraudulently monetize through illicit gateways and LLM Mixers Source

AML.T0034Cost Harvesting

Fireworks AI third-party cloud provider breach resulted in unauthorized workload execution and customer data access Source

AML.T0025Exfiltration via Cyber Means

Attackers exfiltrated account/billing data, secrets, datasets, and partly trained model weights from Fireworks AI Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • jet-night.com
  • newapi.pro

ips

  • 23.106.46.239
  • 38.246.114.118
  • 104.243.32.50
  • 31.57.201.201

hashes

    urls

      Sources & research credit

      4 sources

      Research by Christopher Romano, Codi Starks, Garrett Mahoney, John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, K Singh, Mathew Potaczek, Mike Lombardi, Rik Dolfing · Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG)

      1. The Rise of LLMJacking - How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources cloud.google.com
      2. Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident Update fireworks.ai
      3. Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident fireworks.ai
      4. Security incident involving a third-party AI vendor www.notion.com

      GTIG (Google Threat Intelligence Group) responded to multiple 2026 incidents; building on previous underground LLM credential market reporting; observed division of labor between access and monetization; LLM Mixers as illicit routing gateways; 'burn and rotate' service account strategy; Jet Night advertised outages on Telegram likely due to revoked stolen keys

      Record & downloads
      Source record name
      GTIG LLMJacking - UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS monetize cloud models
      Entry ID
      gtig-llmjacking-unc6993-2026-11
      Catalog review
      November 4, 2026
      Category
      adversary-use-of-ai
      AI involvement confidence
      confirmed