testmetest worm hijacks 42 GitHub repos with Claude/Gemini startup hooks
42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md) and 12.9-13.7 MB…
What happened
42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md) and 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers decoding to same CI-publisher payload. Campaign uses compiled native addon (addon.node) that XORs .napi_cache with 0x96 to decrypt JavaScript payload. Addon checks for CI/container/sandbox environment and CPU/RAM limits, skipping execution in automated scanners. Payload collects credentials, poisons repos and CI, propagates via npm. GitHub account CementBeetleSteeple hosts repositories; SafeDep identifies as Shai-Hulud-descendant Miasma-family. Shellpanel artifacts in hijacked owner cluster link to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation. Socket (Kush Pandya, Nov 6, 2026) reports RubyGems strutil-core 1.0.1 (account jamnajiea); extconf.rb downloads Bun, runs worm at install; steals .claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json, cloud/CI credentials to paleasbest[.]top; plants workspace-tools MCP server, SessionStart hooks, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .vscode/tasks.json; signed-commit-message backdoor (marker msync-3f7a); wiper if stolen GitHub token revoked. SHA-256 3b3f6e1bde0b28b015030a81a6d805b5b5306dc3f021e1102123971cfd83acc0; related PyPI pystr-codec. Thomas Roccia (Nov 9, 2026) documents hijacked repos with forged backdated commits: toray/XiamiSDK-lib, widget-lib, Rainbow-lib, QiniuSDK-lib, torayUtils-lib; ejaaduipitara/djp-devops, whatsapp-bot, content-service; ConcordiaDev/theme_saimaniq; madolee/da; Imanilom/baraja-coffe; claudiohernanbesada/xenios.api. CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED block instructs agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start.
Worm plants execution hooks for AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini, Copilot, Aider, etc.) in hijacked repositories; steals credentials and propagates through package registries
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Account/repository hijacking
Hijacked 11 legitimate GitHub owners and 42 repositories via credential theft from earlier infections; exposed npm credentials; linked to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 Shellpanel exploitation
Hunt: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
Source for step 1 - 02 · AI assistant execution hooks
Armed repositories with .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md files; added 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; all decode to same CI-publisher payload
Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Malicious npm packages
Published event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest; binding.gyp command expansion executes index.js during install; later versions use compiled native addon
Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Scanner evasion via native addon
Compiled addon.node checks CI/container/sandbox env vars (GITHUB_ACTIONS, CI, VERCEL, etc.), /proc/1/cgroup for docker/kubepod, RAM <1.5GB, CPU=1, TracerPid; returns without running if detected; skips automated scanners
Source for step 4 - 05 · Runtime decryption
Addon reads /proc/self/maps for own folder, opens .napi_cache, XORs every byte with 0x96; drops result in /tmp, chmod 0600, forks detached process with node; decrypts Bun bootstrap and credential stealer
Hunt: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.
Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.
Source for step 5 - 06 · Credential collection and propagation
Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 6 - 07 · Encrypted data exfiltration
Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes
Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Source for step 7
Dashed edges show a repeated decision loop.
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Account hijacks via GitHub/npm credential theft from earlier worm infections; exposed npm credentials; forged commit timelines and short-lived publishing branches; cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation (Shellpanel workflows in same hijacked cluster). Reported impact: Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing; Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes; reported targets include 42 GitHub repositories from 11 legitimate owners; AI development, npm package consumers; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Monitor GitHub repositories for unexpected .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md/instructions.md files; native addon scrutiny; large dotfiles in packages; npm install hook abuse; GitHub Actions secret access; CI environment variable monitoring
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Account/repository hijackingCredential / session use outside baselineCustom schema · Draft
Hijacked 11 legitimate GitHub owners and 42 repositories via credential theft from earlier infections; exposed npm credentials; linked to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 Shellpanel exploitation
What to look for
Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Identity / service authentication logs
- Device, source-IP and session context
- Resource access and token issuance audit
Coverage limit. Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline
id: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5
status: experimental
description: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a
successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- identity.login
- identity.token.use
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
- Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
02AI assistant execution hooksPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft
Armed repositories with .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md files; added 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; all decode to same CI-publisher payload
What to look for
A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
- Repository and token permission inventory
- Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- repository.public.write
- repository.visibility.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
03Malicious npm packagesDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft
Published event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest; binding.gyp command expansion executes index.js during install; later versions use compiled native addon
What to look for
A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Package-manager and CI job logs
- Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
- Runner process trees, secret access and egress
Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- package.install
- ci.workflow.change
- package.lifecycle.exec
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
05Runtime decryptionLinux fileless or anonymous-file executionNative logs · Draft
Addon reads /proc/self/maps for own folder, opens .napi_cache, XORs every byte with 0x96; drops result in /tmp, chmod 0600, forks detached process with node; decrypts Bun bootstrap and credential stealer
What to look for
A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.
Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected
Required logs
- Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines
- Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available
- Network and persistence activity from the resulting process
Coverage limit. Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.
Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.
MCP reference matches: Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution
id: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66
status: experimental
description: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml
falsepositives:
- Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files
level: medium
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_image:
Image|contains:
- /memfd:
- /proc/self/fd/
- /proc/thread-self/fd/
selection_command:
CommandLine|contains:
- memfd:
- /proc/self/fd/
- /proc/thread-self/fd/
condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where FolderPath has_any ("/memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process IN ("*memfd:*", "*/proc/self/fd/*", "*/proc/thread-self/fd/*")
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTimeInvestigation steps
- Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
- Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
06Credential collection and propagationSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
07Encrypted data exfiltrationSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft
Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes
What to look for
Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Sensitive resource access / DLP records
- Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
- Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- data.export
- agent.external.send
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Additional role
- AI credential theft
- Initial access
- Account hijacks via GitHub/npm credential theft from earlier worm infections; exposed npm credentials; forged commit timelines and short-lived publishing branches; cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation (Shellpanel workflows in same hijacked cluster)
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Claude Code
- Cursor
- Codex
- Gemini
- GitHub Copilot
- Aider
- Continue
- Windsurf
- Cline
Other tooling
- npm binding.gyp command expansion
- Bun 1.2.18 runtime
- Native Node addon with XOR 0x96 encryption
- Caesar transformation and AES-128-GCM
- GitHub Actions for CI publishing
- npm trusted publishing
- RubyGems strutil-core 1.0.1 (account jamnajiea)
- PyPI pystr-codec
- workspace-tools MCP server
- SessionStart hooks
- Signed-commit-message backdoor (msync-3f7a marker)
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- 42 GitHub repositories from 11 legitimate owners; AI development, npm package consumers
- Reported scale / exposure
- 42 armed repositories; 11 hijacked legitimate owners; multiple malicious npm packages (event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest); polymorphic wrappers 12.9-13.7 MB; discovered Oct 21-26, 2026
Reported attribution
GitHub account CementBeetleSteeple; SafeDep identifies as Miasma-family, Shai-Hulud-descendant payload; not established that original Miasma operators responsible; linked to Shellpanel cPanel exploitation (CVE-2026-41940)
Structured attribution
- Actor
- CementBeetleSteeple (GitHub account); Miasma-family, Shai-Hulud-descendant
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- cybercrime
- Attributed by
- JFrog Security Research, SafeDep, Socket
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Curl or Wget Spawned via Node.jsELASTICView rule
Detects Bun download during npm install (Node.js spawning curl/wget)
- Package Runtime Secret File Access Followed by IMDS RequestELASTICView rule
Detects credential file access (.claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json) during package installation
- Shai-Hulud Workflow File Creation or ModificationSPLUNKView rule
Detects Shai-Hulud family GitHub workflow modifications and git hook persistence
- Worm artifact detectionGUIDANCE
Monitor strutil-core RubyGem (account jamnajiea), pystr-codec PyPI; alert on paleasbest[.]top exfiltration; detect workspace-tools MCP server installation; monitor CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks; flag msync-3f7a signed-commit markers
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-21
- Last updated
- 2026-11-09
Updates
- 2026-10-26 — JFrog Security Research
JFrog documents 42 hijacked GitHub repositories with testmetest worm; native addon camouflage; 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; CLAUDE.md/.cursorrules execution hooks
- 2026-11-06 — Socket
Socket reports strutil-core 1.0.1 RubyGem (account jamnajiea); extconf.rb downloads Bun, runs worm at install; steals .claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json; plants workspace-tools MCP server; msync-3f7a signed-commit backdoor; related PyPI pystr-codec
- 2026-11-09 — Thomas Roccia
Roccia documents hijacked repos with forged backdated commits (toray, ejaaduipitara, ConcordiaDev, madolee, Imanilom, claudiohernanbesada); CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks instruct agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start
Source defensive notes
Monitor GitHub repositories for unexpected .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md/instructions.md files; native addon scrutiny; large dotfiles in packages; npm install hook abuse; GitHub Actions secret access; CI environment variable monitoring
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Supply chain attack targeting AI coding assistant users via hijacked GitHub repositories and malicious npm packages Source
Worm propagates through package registries (npm, RubyGems, PyPI) and version control (GitHub), specifically targeting AI development environments Source
CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks inject hidden instructions telling agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start Source
Worm steals AI coding assistant credentials (.claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json) and cloud/CI credentials Source
Plants workspace-tools MCP server and SessionStart hooks for persistent AI agent manipulation Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
paleasbest.top
ips
hashes
3b3f6e1bde0b28b015030a81a6d805b5b5306dc3f021e1102123971cfd83acc0
urls
https://github.com/CementBeetleSteeplehttps://github.com/toray/XiamiSDK-libhttps://github.com/toray/widget-libhttps://github.com/toray/Rainbow-libhttps://github.com/toray/QiniuSDK-libhttps://github.com/toray/torayUtils-libhttps://github.com/ejaaduipitara/djp-devopshttps://github.com/ejaaduipitara/whatsapp-bothttps://github.com/ejaaduipitara/content-servicehttps://github.com/ConcordiaDev/theme_saimaniqhttps://github.com/madolee/dahttps://github.com/Imanilom/baraja-coffehttps://github.com/claudiohernanbesada/xenios.api
Sources & research credit
3 sourcesResearch by Guy Korolevski, Yair Benamou · JFrog Security Research
- Beyond testmetest: Native Addon Camouflage and 42 Armed GitHub Repositories research.jfrog.com
- Socket: Shai-Hulud Descendant - Malicious Ruby Gem socket.dev
- Thomas Roccia: Hijacked repos with backdated commits and CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks x.com
SafeDep first documented npm package side Oct 22; JFrog complementary GitHub infrastructure investigation; campaign shifted to native addon camouflage to evade scanners; addon environment checks skip CI/containers/sandboxes with <1.5GB RAM or 1 CPU
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- testmetest worm hijacks 42 GitHub repos with Claude/Gemini startup hooks
- Entry ID
- jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10
- Catalog review
- November 4, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed