LLMjacking expands to DeepSeek
Within days of DeepSeek going viral, LLMjacking proxies running on stolen credentials added DeepSeek alongside OpenAI, AWS and Azure access.
What happened
Within days of DeepSeek virality, LLMjacking proxies added DeepSeek alongside OpenAI, AWS, Azure. Sysdig observed dozen+ proxy servers on stolen credentials; notes Microsoft lawsuit against actors abusing GenAI services (DALL-E abusive content).
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Original credential theft is undisclosed
The entry begins with already-stolen service credentials.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Proxy operators add service support
LLMjacking proxies add DeepSeek to other inference providers.
Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Stolen accounts provide inference access
Requests are routed through unauthorized service credentials.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 3 - 04 · AI access is resold or abused
The report describes more than a dozen proxy servers using stolen credentials.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported impact: The report describes more than a dozen proxy servers using stolen credentials.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The reported path uses stolen AI-service or cloud credentials to resell model access.
Conditions to check- Confirm the affected service and credential type in the source; consumer chat use alone is not the reported condition.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Inventory AI service keys, scope permissions, rotate exposed tokens and investigate anomalous usage.
Same as LLMjacking: key hygiene, Bedrock/OpenAI anomaly detection, proxy hunting
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
02Proxy operators add service supportProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft
LLMjacking proxies add DeepSeek to other inference providers.
What to look for
A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
Proxy configuration and model-routing changes require proxy-operator records; cloud key use is investigated at the following stage.
Visibility: Provider / operator records
Required logs
- Provider-owned account / request audit
- Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
- Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- model.request
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
03Stolen accounts provide inference accessUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
Requests are routed through unauthorized service credentials.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
04AI access is resold or abusedUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
The report describes more than a dozen proxy servers using stolen credentials.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI credential theft
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- DeepSeek
- OpenAI
- AWS
- Azure
Targets and reported impact
- Reported scale / exposure
- Cloud LLM abuse costs can exceed hundreds of thousands USD monthly (Sysdig)
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in LLMjacking expands to DeepSeek. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Same as LLMjacking: key hygiene, Bedrock/OpenAI anomaly detection, proxy hunting
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Stolen service credentials provide unauthorized inference access. Source
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Sysdig Threat Research Team · Sysdig
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- LLMjacking expands to DeepSeek
- Entry ID
- llmjacking-deepseek-sysdig-2025-02
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed