Detection queries Scanner findingAgents & MCP

ink5725/snapshot-config-reader agent skill scanner finding

A skill that extracts config from PNG images triggered scanner flags. The snapshot showed zero downloads and an incomplete scan; the finding does not establish that the skill is malicious.

What happened

Agent skill SKILL.md instructs pulling 'config' from PNG trailer, EXIF, LSB. ClamAV Img.Packed.PngContainsDownloadCmd (high) on two PNGs; Nova DetectHiddenInstructions (low). 0 downloads; scan incomplete.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Scanner finding on a skill bundle; Jose explicitly not calling it malicious. Pattern of decode-from-image instructions.

  1. 01 · Skill bundle is scanned

    The finding concerns an agent skill with no observed downloads.

    Hunt: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

    Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · SKILL.md requests image extraction

    Instructions tell the agent to obtain configuration from PNG trailers, metadata or low bits.

    Hunt: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

    Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Scanners flag embedded instructions

    The partial scan detects suspicious image content with differing confidence levels.

    Hunt: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

    Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · No execution is established

    The record does not confirm a victim, a completed scan or successful skill execution.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: n/a (skill install / agent load path). Reported impact: 0 downloads at time of post.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

Agent skills

The scanner finding concerns an agent skill that retrieves instructions from image content.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm whether this specific bundle or the described extraction pattern is present.
  • The scan was incomplete, the snapshot reported zero downloads and maliciousness was not established.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Review the full skill bundle and decoded-image instructions before approving its use.

Whole-bundle skill scanning; treat decode-from-image steps as signals

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance LOLSkills
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Skill bundle is scannedSkill bundle provenance / reviewCustom schema · Draft

The finding concerns an agent skill with no observed downloads.

What to look for

A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes
  • Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history
  • Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed

Coverage limit. Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review
id: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26
status: experimental
description: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access
  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - skill.bundle.load
      - skill.bundle.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
  2. Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
02SKILL.md requests image extractionSkill bundle provenance / reviewCustom schema · Draft

Instructions tell the agent to obtain configuration from PNG trailers, metadata or low bits.

What to look for

A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes
  • Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history
  • Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed

Coverage limit. Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review
id: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26
status: experimental
description: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access
  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - skill.bundle.load
      - skill.bundle.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
  2. Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
03Scanners flag embedded instructionsSkill bundle provenance / reviewCustom schema · Draft

The partial scan detects suspicious image content with differing confidence levels.

What to look for

A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes
  • Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history
  • Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed

Coverage limit. Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review
id: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26
status: experimental
description: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access
  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - skill.bundle.load
      - skill.bundle.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("skill.bundle.load", "skill.bundle.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
  2. Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
n/a (skill install / agent load path)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Agent skill bundle

Other tooling

  • PNG steganography / trailer / EXIF / LSB

Targets and reported impact

Reported scale / exposure
0 downloads at time of post

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in ink5725/snapshot-config-reader skill finding. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Whole-bundle skill scanning; treat decode-from-image steps as signals

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0051.001Indirect

The flagged skill instructs an agent to recover instructions from image artifacts; actual execution is unconfirmed. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Jose Enrique Hernandez (LOLSkills feed) · MagicSword / LOLSkills

  1. lolskills.io

Published analysis: MagicSword

Record & downloads
Source record name
ink5725/snapshot-config-reader skill finding
Entry ID
lolskills-ink5725-snapshot-config-reader-2026-10
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
unverified