Detection queries Reported campaignBrowser extensions

Malicious Chrome extensions steal ChatGPT and DeepSeek chats

Chrome extensions posing as AITOPIA stole ChatGPT and DeepSeek conversations and browsing URLs. The related cluster reportedly affected over 900,000 users.

What happened

AITOPIA-impersonating Chrome extensions stole ChatGPT and DeepSeek conversation content plus browsing URLs. Reported impact over 900,000 users for related malicious AI-themed extensions in the campaign cluster.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Impersonating extension is installed

    A Chrome Web Store extension presents itself as an AI assistant product.

    Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

    Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Extension accesses AI conversations

    The malicious extension reads ChatGPT and DeepSeek chat content.

    Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

    Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Chats and browsing URLs are collected

    The reported behavior includes conversation and browser activity theft.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Conversation content is stolen

    The campaign affects a large population of extension users.

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Victims install malicious Chrome Web Store extensions. Reported impact: The campaign affects a large population of extension users.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

ChatGPTDeepSeekAI browser extensions

The reported Chrome extension cluster steals ChatGPT / DeepSeek conversations and browsing data.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm an affected extension is installed and can access those conversations; use of the chat service alone is insufficient.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Review extension IDs, publisher and conversation / browsing permissions, and remove confirmed malicious extensions.

Extension allowlists; review ChatGPT/DeepSeek sessions after removal

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Impersonating extension is installedBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft

A Chrome Web Store extension presents itself as an AI assistant product.

What to look for

A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
  • Extension ID, permissions and provenance
  • Browser / proxy / DLP evidence

Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - browser.extension.install
      - browser.extension.update
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
  2. Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
02Extension accesses AI conversationsBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft

The malicious extension reads ChatGPT and DeepSeek chat content.

What to look for

A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
  • Extension ID, permissions and provenance
  • Browser / proxy / DLP evidence

Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - browser.extension.install
      - browser.extension.update
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
  2. Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
03Chats and browsing URLs are collectedSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

The reported behavior includes conversation and browser activity theft.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Collect extension/application access evidence for conversations and URLs; generic file-write telemetry does not demonstrate these reads.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
04Conversation content is stolenSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

The campaign affects a large population of extension users.

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
Victims install malicious Chrome Web Store extensions

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Fake AI productivity Chrome extensions

Targets and reported impact

Reported scale / exposure
900,000+ users cited for related extension cluster

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Malicious Chrome extensions steal ChatGPT and DeepSeek chats. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Extension allowlists; review ChatGPT/DeepSeek sessions after removal

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0085Data from AI Services

Malicious extensions collect conversation content from AI services. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by OX Security · OX Security

  1. ox.security
Record & downloads
Source record name
Malicious Chrome extensions steal ChatGPT and DeepSeek chats
Entry ID
ox-security-chrome-ext-chatgpt-deepseek-2025
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed