Detection queries Not classified

Snyk analysis - covert and lookalike malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub

Snyk Security Research (Marco Milanta, Marc Fischer, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Nov 6, 2026) documents malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub platforms. callicrate/skills/agents-md bundles UPX-packed…

What happened

Snyk Security Research (Marco Milanta, Marc Fischer, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Nov 6, 2026) documents malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub platforms. callicrate/skills/agents-md bundles UPX-packed Rust binary, detaches with FAST_VALIDATE_WORKER=1 environment variable, appends remote text to ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md for persistence after skill removal. ClawHub campaigns: vinhbui3004/audio-upload-aioz-stream and video-upload-aioz-stream exfiltrate to api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou; gloryjack/tushare-pro via tussahre.pro; neutronstar238/md-to-ppt runs npx slidew. Additional malicious skills: andy825lay-tech/github-automation-pro (obfuscated JavaScript), liuyanfeng1234/v19-trust-manifesto (agent enrollment as curl diagnostic utility). Unattributed campaigns; confirmed malicious behavior. Multiple attack vectors: packed binaries, remote CLAUDE.md modification, typosquatted domains, obfuscated JavaScript, fake diagnostic utilities.

Multiple campaigns deliver covert backdoors via malicious AI skills on skills.sh and ClawHub platforms, targeting AI agent environments for credential theft and persistence

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Publish malicious skills

    Attackers publish covert malicious skills on skills.sh and ClawHub platforms with lookalike or utility names

    Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

    Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · User installs malicious skill

    Developer installs malicious skill from skills.sh or ClawHub platform

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Deploy UPX-packed binary or obfuscated JS

    Skill deploys UPX-packed Rust binary, obfuscated JavaScript, or npx-based payload

    Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

    A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Modify ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md

    Remote text appended to CLAUDE.md for persistence after skill removal

    Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

    Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Exfiltrate credentials

    Credentials and data exfiltrated to attacker domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro)

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Users install malicious skills from skills.sh or ClawHub platforms. Reported impact: Credentials and data exfiltrated to attacker domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro); reported targets include AI developers using skills.sh and ClawHub platforms; Claude AI users; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Verify skill publisher authenticity before installation; scan for UPX-packed binaries in skill packages; monitor ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md for unauthorized modifications; block suspicious domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro); audit skills for obfuscated JavaScript; detect FAST_VALIDATE_WORKER=1 environment variable usage; review npx commands in skill execution; restrict skill permissions to minimum required; implement skill sandboxing where possible

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Publish malicious skillsPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft

Attackers publish covert malicious skills on skills.sh and ClawHub platforms with lookalike or utility names

What to look for

A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
  • Repository and token permission inventory
  • Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records

Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - repository.public.write
      - repository.visibility.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
  2. Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
02User installs malicious skillUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

Developer installs malicious skill from skills.sh or ClawHub platform

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
03Deploy UPX-packed binary or obfuscated JSUnexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft

Skill deploys UPX-packed Rust binary, obfuscated JavaScript, or npx-based payload

What to look for

A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific process and file provenance
  • Signer / hash and software inventory
  • Per-process network and remote-session records

Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - process.unapproved.exec
      - remote.session.start
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
  2. Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
04Modify ~/.claude/CLAUDE.mdUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft

Remote text appended to CLAUDE.md for persistence after skill removal

What to look for

An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

Visibility: Application / agent audit records

Required logs

  • Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
  • Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
  • Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions

Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
  task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.input.ingest
      - agent.session.resume
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
  2. Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
05Exfiltrate credentialsSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

Credentials and data exfiltrated to attacker domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro)

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Additional role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Users install malicious skills from skills.sh or ClawHub platforms

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Claude AI
  • skills.sh platform
  • ClawHub platform

Other tooling

  • UPX packer
  • Rust binaries
  • Node.js/npx
  • Obfuscated JavaScript

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
AI developers using skills.sh and ClawHub platforms; Claude AI users
Reported scale / exposure
Multiple malicious skills identified Nov 2026 across skills.sh and ClawHub
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unattributed campaigns; multiple distinct actors targeting AI skill platforms

Structured attribution

Actor
Unattributed campaigns
Country
Unknown
Motivation
cybercrime
Attributed by
Snyk
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Skill supply-chain monitoringGUIDANCE

    Monitor ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md for unauthorized modifications; scan skill packages for UPX-packed binaries; detect FAST_VALIDATE_WORKER=1 environment variable usage; block domains api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou and tussahre.pro; audit npx commands (npx slidew); flag obfuscated JavaScript in skills; verify skill publisher authenticity; detect detached processes from skill installations

  • Related malicious skill campaignsGUIDANCE

    Cross-reference with malicious-openclaw-skills-2026 catalog entry; monitor for similar patterns across AI skill platforms; detect fake diagnostic utilities claiming curl functionality; alert on agent enrollment via non-standard mechanisms

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-09-01
Last updated
2026-11-06

Updates

  • 2026-11-06 — Snyk

    Snyk publishes analysis of covert and lookalike malicious skills on skills.sh and ClawHub; callicrate/skills/agents-md UPX-packed binary modifies CLAUDE.md; ClawHub campaigns exfiltrate to api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou and tussahre.pro; obfuscated JavaScript and fake diagnostic utilities identified

Source defensive notes

Verify skill publisher authenticity before installation; scan for UPX-packed binaries in skill packages; monitor ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md for unauthorized modifications; block suspicious domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro); audit skills for obfuscated JavaScript; detect FAST_VALIDATE_WORKER=1 environment variable usage; review npx commands in skill execution; restrict skill permissions to minimum required; implement skill sandboxing where possible

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0010AI Supply Chain Compromise

Supply chain attack via malicious skills on skills.sh and ClawHub platforms Source

AML.T0011User Execution

Skills propagate through AI skill distribution platforms targeting developer environments Source

AML.T0051LLM Prompt Injection

Remote text appended to ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md persists instructions after skill removal Source

AML.T0083Credentials from AI Agent Configuration

Malicious skills target AI credential theft and environment compromise Source

AML.T0081Modify AI Agent Configuration

Skills establish persistence through CLAUDE.md modification and agent enrollment mechanisms Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou
  • tussahre.pro

ips

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        1 source

        Research by Marco Milanta, Marc Fischer, Luca Beurer-Kellner · Snyk Security Research

        1. Snyk: Skill Analysis - Covert and Lookalike Malicious Skills research.snyk.io

        Snyk Security Research blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source; all indicators (skill names, domains, techniques) verified from Snyk analysis; multiple unattributed campaigns with distinct TTPs; links to malicious-openclaw-skills-2026 catalog entry for broader context

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Snyk analysis - covert and lookalike malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub
        Entry ID
        snyk-covert-lookalike-skills-2026-11
        Catalog review
        November 10, 2026
        Category
        attacks-on-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed