Detection queries Not classifiedARTEX

S-RM ARTEX in the wild - incident response host artifacts and TTPs

S-RM incident response analysis (Nov 6, 2026) documents real-world ARTEX deployment artifacts and TTPs from multiple IR engagements. Initial access via vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured upload…

What happened

S-RM incident response analysis (Nov 6, 2026) documents real-world ARTEX deployment artifacts and TTPs from multiple IR engagements. Initial access via vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured upload endpoints; rapid credential harvesting and reuse; autonomous agents pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations within a single day. One case featured MSP supply-chain pivot; another deployed card skimmers on compromised e-commerce sites. Attackers demonstrated persistent re-entry capability after initial containment, shifting to Tor and VPS infrastructure after IP blocking. Forensic artifacts: /opt/artex/data/task/<task>/i<id>/ directory structure; compromised files and accounts tagged with i<id> markers; SQL injection signatures ARTEX' UNION SELECT 1-- and ARTEX'/**/AND/**/2>1--; HTTP User-Agent norma/0.4; ARTEX web console self-signed certificate (O=ARTEX, C=CN) displaying Autonomous pentest console branding; GitHub branches named artex-wtest-*; fake emails @example.invalid. Actor unnamed; attributed by S-RM incident response; confirmed AI involvement from recovered agent task logs and autonomous pivot patterns. Sophos X-Ops (Nov 10, 2026) separately reports activity at a small number of customers consistent with ARTEX or other AI-assisted tooling: webshell and SQL Server command execution, credential theft, lateral movement, rapid command bursts, and structured markers. Windows host markers are temporary files named i[variant]_. such as i12345_b2.ps1, paths beginning artx especially under C:\Windows\Temp, and command markers MARKER123 or ARTX123. Cloud markers are a service principal credential or role added by an application, and application sign-ins with a scripted user agent. Sophos file detections are Troj/Bckdr-SDA for a trojanized ARTEX Docker image (see badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11), Troj/Loader-TU, Linux/Agent-KD, and ATK/Artex-A, ATK/Artex-B, and ATK/Artex-C. Published firewall and endpoint IPS signatures are 2313266, 2313265, 2313264, 2313263, 2313261, 2313259, 2313258, and 2313257. Sophos cites Microsoft's Storm-0940 attribution for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup case only; that name is not applied to the S-RM engagements.

Adversaries deploy ARTEX autonomous agents for full intrusion lifecycle automation, from initial compromise through identity/cloud/code/firewall pivots in under 24 hours, with documented MSP supply-chain pivots and persistent re-entry after containment

Read the original sourceAdditional source: ARTEX: Attackers apply agentic AI

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Exploit vulnerable web plugins

    ARTEX agents exploit vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured file upload endpoints for initial access

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Credential harvesting and reuse

    Rapid credential harvesting from compromised hosts; credentials reused for lateral movement

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Identity/cloud/code/firewall pivot in <24h

    Autonomous agents pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations within single day

    Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

    Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · MSP supply-chain pivot (one case)

    In one engagement, ARTEX agents pivoted through compromised MSP to reach additional customer environments

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Card skimmer deployment (one case)

    In e-commerce compromise, agents deployed card skimmer malware to capture payment data

    Hunt: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.

    A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Persistent re-entry after containment

    Attackers demonstrated re-entry capability after initial containment, shifting to Tor/VPS infrastructure after IP blocking

    Hunt: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.

    Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.

    Source for step 6

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Vulnerable web plugins, misconfigured file upload endpoints. Reported impact: In e-commerce compromise, agents deployed card skimmer malware to capture payment data; reported targets include Multiple organizations across sectors including e-commerce, MSPs; S-RM IR engagements 2026; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Patch vulnerable web plugins promptly; restrict and validate file uploads; implement strict authentication for admin interfaces; monitor for ARTEX forensic indicators (/opt/artex/ directories, i<id> file/account tagging, SQL markers, norma/0.4 UA, self-signed ARTEX certs); block Tor egress where not required; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; rotate credentials after suspected compromise; monitor for artex-wtest- GitHub branch patterns; scrutinize @example.invalid emails in logs; deploy EDR to detect autonomous pivot behaviors; implement MSP supply-chain security controls

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Exploit vulnerable web pluginsWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

ARTEX agents exploit vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured file upload endpoints for initial access

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
02Credential harvesting and reuseSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Rapid credential harvesting from compromised hosts; credentials reused for lateral movement

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
03Identity/cloud/code/firewall pivot in <24hUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft

Autonomous agents pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations within single day

What to look for

A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Cloud control-plane and identity audit
  • AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
  • Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory

Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - cloud.credential.use
      - cloud.role.change
      - model.invoke
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
  2. Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
05Card skimmer deployment (one case)Out-of-band payment verificationCustom schema · Draft

In e-commerce compromise, agents deployed card skimmer malware to capture payment data

What to look for

A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit
  • Meeting and communication metadata
  • Independent callback / dual-approval records

Coverage limit. A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Out-of-band payment verification
id: 813e417f-8751-4479-ad17-0f3d146ff036
status: experimental
description: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or
  an override of normal payment approval.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - payment.beneficiary.change
      - payment.approval.override
      - payment.transfer
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
  2. Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
06Persistent re-entry after containmentNew persistence → recurring executionCustom schema · Draft

Attackers demonstrated re-entry capability after initial containment, shifting to Tor/VPS infrastructure after IP blocking

What to look for

A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes
  • Process creation and file provenance
  • User / administrative change records

Coverage limit. Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution
id: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e
status: experimental
description: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is
  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - persistence.create
      - persistence.modify
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
  2. Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Offensive frameworks
ARTEX
Initial access
Vulnerable web plugins, misconfigured file upload endpoints

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • ARTEX autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
  • LLM backends for agent decision-making

Other tooling

  • SQL injection tools
  • Credential harvesting utilities
  • Card skimmer malware
  • Tor network
  • VPS infrastructure

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Multiple organizations across sectors including e-commerce, MSPs; S-RM IR engagements 2026
Reported scale / exposure
Multiple IR engagements 2026; identity/cloud/code/firewall compromise in under 24 hours; MSP supply-chain pivot in one case; card skimmer deployment in another; persistent re-entry after containment
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unnamed actors; attributed by S-RM incident response teams; multiple distinct but tactically similar ARTEX deployments

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed ARTEX operators
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
S-RM, Sophos X-Ops
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Potential IIS Web Shell File CreationELASTICView rule

    Windows. ASPX web shell writes under IIS paths. Matches the Sophos report of webshell execution on customer hosts.

  • Suspicious Process By Web Server ProcessSIGMAView rule

    Windows. Shells spawned by w3wp.exe and other web server processes.

  • Windows Sqlservr Spawning ShellSPLUNKView rule

    Windows. sqlservr.exe spawning cmd.exe or PowerShell, matching Sophos SQL Server command execution.

  • SQL Injection with Long URLsSPLUNKView rule

    Detects SQL injection patterns including ARTEX UNION SELECT and comment-based injection markers

  • Suspicious C2 ActivitiesSIGMAView rule

    Detects Tor usage, curl/wget C2 patterns, and credential reuse behaviors

  • ARTEX forensic artifact detectionGUIDANCE

    Linux: monitor for /opt/artex/data/task/<task>/i<id>/ directory structures; alert on files and accounts tagged with i<id> patterns; flag HTTP User-Agent norma/0.4; scan for self-signed certificates with O=ARTEX, C=CN; monitor for Autonomous pentest console branding; detect GitHub branches named artex-wtest-*; alert on @example.invalid emails. Windows (Sophos): files named i[variant]_. such as i12345_b2.ps1, paths beginning artx under C:\Windows\Temp, and command markers MARKER123 or ARTX123. Cloud: service principal credential or role added by an application, and application sign-ins with a scripted user agent. Sophos file names Troj/Bckdr-SDA, Troj/Loader-TU, Linux/Agent-KD, ATK/Artex-A/B/C and IPS 2313266, 2313265, 2313264, 2313263, 2313261, 2313259, 2313258, 2313257 are vendor signatures, not public Sigma or Elastic rules.

  • Rapid lateral movement detectionGUIDANCE

    Detect identity system pivots within 24-hour window; alert on cloud resource access from newly compromised credentials; monitor code repository access anomalies; flag firewall configuration changes from suspicious sources; detect MSP credential usage across multiple customer tenants; implement EDR behavioral detection for autonomous pivot patterns

  • Card skimmer and payment fraud detectionGUIDANCE

    Scan e-commerce sites for injected JavaScript card skimmers; monitor payment form modifications; detect exfiltration of payment data; alert on suspicious checkout flow changes

Activity timeline

Last updated
2026-11-10

Updates

  • 2026-11-06 — S-RM

    S-RM publishes incident response analysis documenting ARTEX deployment artifacts, TTPs, and forensic indicators from multiple IR engagements; identity/cloud/code/firewall pivots in <24h; MSP supply-chain compromise; card skimmer deployment; persistent re-entry after containment

  • 2026-11-10 — Sophos X-Ops

    Sophos publishes Windows host markers (i[variant]_. files, artx paths under C:\Windows\Temp, MARKER123/ARTX123), cloud service-principal markers, file detections including Troj/Bckdr-SDA, and IPS signatures 2313266, 2313265, 2313264, 2313263, 2313261, 2313259, 2313258, and 2313257. Customer activity is described as consistent with ARTEX or other AI-assisted tooling. Storm-0940 is cited only for Microsoft's ConnectWise attribution.

Source defensive notes

Patch vulnerable web plugins promptly; restrict and validate file uploads; implement strict authentication for admin interfaces; monitor for ARTEX forensic indicators (/opt/artex/ directories, i<id> file/account tagging, SQL markers, norma/0.4 UA, self-signed ARTEX certs); block Tor egress where not required; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; rotate credentials after suspected compromise; monitor for artex-wtest- GitHub branch patterns; scrutinize @example.invalid emails in logs; deploy EDR to detect autonomous pivot behaviors; implement MSP supply-chain security controls

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing Application

ARTEX agents autonomously conduct full intrusion lifecycle from initial compromise through multi-system pivots without continuous operator guidance Source

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

AI agents exploit vulnerable web plugins and file upload misconfigurations for initial access Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

Agents autonomously harvest and reuse credentials, pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations in under 24 hours Source

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by S-RM · S-RM

  1. S-RM: ARTEX in the Wild - Lessons from Responding to Agentic AI Attacks www.s-rminform.com
  2. ARTEX: Attackers apply agentic AI www.sophos.com

S-RM blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source documenting IR artifacts from multiple ARTEX engagements; all forensic indicators (file paths, SQL markers, UA strings, certificate details, GitHub patterns) verified from S-RM analysis; unnamed adversaries due to ongoing investigations. Sophos X-Ops (Nov 10, 2026) adds Windows host markers and the listed IPS IDs. 2313260 and 2313262 are not in the published signature table, so they are omitted. Sophos describes the customer activity as consistent with ARTEX or other AI-assisted tooling, which is vendor-asserted and does not replace the S-RM task-log evidence. Storm-0940 is Microsoft's attribution for ConnectWise, cited by Sophos, and is not used as the actor for the S-RM cases.

Record & downloads
Source record name
S-RM ARTEX in the wild - incident response host artifacts and TTPs
Entry ID
srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11
Catalog review
November 12, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed