Not classified

Aoki infostealer targets Claude Code, ChatGPT, Codex, Cursor tokens

Aoki (aka Aokigahara) infostealer added AI credential theft in 2026. Targets: .claude.json, Claude desktop cookies, ChatGPT cookies, Codex config.toml/.env (github.com/openai/codex-cli), GitHub Copilot…

What happened

Aoki (aka Aokigahara) infostealer added AI credential theft in 2026. Targets: .claude.json, Claude desktop cookies, ChatGPT cookies, Codex config.toml/.env (github.com/openai/codex-cli), GitHub Copilot tokens (github.com/features/copilot), Cursor state.vscdb/storage.json (github.com/getcursor/cursor), Gemini CLI, JetBrains AI Assistant, Kiro, Windsurf, Codeium (github.com/Exafunction/codeium.vim), AWS credentials/SSO, Amazon Q, Git credentials, SSH keys. Cursor local state caches chat/code. Stolen keys allow acting under developer identity/quota, expose repos/cloud/CI-CD, bypass safeguards. Capable of LLMjacking. Earlier 2026 versions didn't target AI; capability recently added/expanding. Detection: monitor AI credential file access (.claude.json, .codex/auth.json, Cursor globalStorage), C2 domains (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf), API usage anomalies from unexpected geolocations.

Recent Aoki/Aokigahara infostealer builds steal AI coding assistant credentials, session files, and tokens

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Symantec Aoki AI targetingAdditional source: Check Point: Infostealer riding the AI Train

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Deploy infostealer

    Aoki/Aokigahara deployed (distribution method not disclosed)

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · AI credential harvesting

    Steals .claude.json, Claude/ChatGPT cookies, Codex config, Copilot/Cursor/Gemini/JetBrains/Kiro/Windsurf/Codeium tokens, AWS creds, Git creds, SSH keys; Cursor state caches chat/code

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Traditional targets

    Browsers, crypto wallets, password managers, messaging/gaming, VPN/FTP, email

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · C2 exfiltration

    Sends data to C2 (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf); no backdoor commands

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Credential abuse

    Stolen keys enable acting as developer, LLMjacking, accessing repos/cloud/CI-CD, resale

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Infostealer distribution (method not disclosed); likely traditional vectors. Reported impact: Sends data to C2 (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf); no backdoor commands; Stolen keys enable acting as developer, LLMjacking, accessing repos/cloud/CI-CD, resale; reported targets include Developers using AI coding assistants; scale not disclosed; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Rotate AI API keys after compromise; scope keys narrowly; monitor unusual API usage; endpoint protection; credential managers; monitor Aoki C2 domains; file integrity monitoring for AI credential files

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Infostealer distribution (method not disclosed); likely traditional vectors

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • Aoki/Aokigahara infostealer
  • AWS CLI/SSO
  • Git
  • SSH

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Developers using AI coding assistants; scale not disclosed
Reported scale / exposure
Capability added 2026, expanding; no victim count

Reported attribution

Unknown; no links to existing families; new stealer first seen earlier 2026

Source defensive notes

Rotate AI API keys after compromise; scope keys narrowly; monitor unusual API usage; endpoint protection; credential managers; monitor Aoki C2 domains; file integrity monitoring for AI credential files

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

Credential theft targeting AI development tools and cloud credentials Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • dobeqnesmot.cc
  • hjazfioe.surf

ips

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        3 sources

        Research by Symantec Threat Hunter Team, Check Point Research · Broadcom (Symantec), Check Point

        1. Aoki: Infostealer Targets AI Coding Assistant Credentials www.broadcom.com
        2. Symantec Aoki AI targeting www.security.com
        3. Check Point: Infostealer riding the AI Train research.checkpoint.com

        OS not specified; other targets suggest Windows; macOS/Linux not confirmed. Detection guidance: monitor AI credential file access, C2 communication (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf), API usage anomalies from unexpected locations, unauthorized reads of .claude.json, .codex/auth.json, Cursor globalStorage, .copilot/config.json, .gemini/config.json, .aws/credentials, SSH keys.

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Aoki infostealer targets Claude Code, ChatGPT, Codex, Cursor tokens
        Entry ID
        symantec-aoki-infostealer-ai-2026-10
        Catalog review
        November 4, 2026