Trojanized anthropic.claude-code Cursor extension
Cursor's Nov 13, 2026 update says the attacker obtained an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks. Fireworks exposed that key. The attacker copied a read-only bucket used to share data with Fireworks.…
What happened
Cursor's Nov 13, 2026 update says the attacker obtained an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks. Fireworks exposed that key. The attacker copied a read-only bucket used to share data with Fireworks. The bucket held limited coding-agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions that were not in Privacy Mode and were permitted for training. A small number of traces had unredacted credentials. Less than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed. From those credentials the attacker reached select SaaS tools, then select archived non-production Cursor repositories, limited customer-support data and email, product usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some coding-agent conversations, and credentials users had sent to support. On Oct 29, using a stolen credential, the attacker placed malicious unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension on the cache used to serve the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace. Anthropic did not publish this copy. It was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product. Open VSX never had the malware. At most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions that day potentially received it. The copies were available for about 11 hours. The marketplace was taken offline, and a hosting provider took down the attacker's server. The last attacker activity Cursor saw was Nov 1, and it was blocked. Traces were exposed for fewer than 0.05% of non-Privacy-Mode users, who were notified. Privacy Mode prompts and code were not affected. Microsoft's Oct 30 analysis of the copies that were served, anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, describes a loader in extension.js that collected hostname, username, and environment variables matching secret patterns, added SSH key svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, opened a reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225, and beaconed to :8099/beacon. Persistence was a com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent on macOS, an @reboot cron job on Linux, and a SysMon scheduled task on Windows. The marketplace window Microsoft and Cursor's earlier notice described was Oct 29, about 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM ET.
The tampered package was a copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension placed on the cache Cursor used for its VS Code marketplace. Anthropic did not publish that copy.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Exposed Fireworks access key
The attacker used an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks and copied a read-only bucket of coding-agent traces. A small number of traces contained credentials.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Malicious copies placed on the marketplace cache
On Oct 29 a stolen credential was used to place unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, on the cache Cursor used for its marketplace. Open VSX did not have them.
Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Cached versions served for about 11 hours
At most 5,000 users who requested those cached versions could receive them. Cursor's earlier notice placed the marketplace window at about 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM ET.
Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Extension collects host information and secrets
Loader in extension.js collected hostname, username, environment variable names matching secret patterns
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 4 - 05 · SSH backdoor established
Added svc-telemetry SSH key to authorized_keys and established reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225 with beacon to :8099/beacon
Hunt: A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.
Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.
Source for step 5 - 06 · Platform-specific persistence installed
com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent (macOS), @reboot cron (Linux), SysMon scheduled task (Windows)
Hunt: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.
Source for step 6
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Stolen access key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks, then a stolen credential used to place unauthorized Claude Code extension copies on the Cursor marketplace cache. Open VSX did not carry the malware. Reported impact: Added svc-telemetry SSH key to authorized_keys and established reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225 with beacon to :8099/beacon; com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent (macOS), @reboot cron (Linux), SysMon scheduled task (Windows); reported targets include Cursor users who requested the specific cached extension versions on Oct 29, and customers whose non-Privacy-Mode traces or support credentials were in the copied bucket. Production systems and customer code repositories were not described as affected; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Rotate credentials that were in coding-agent traces or sent to support if Cursor notified the account. Review SSH authorized_keys for svc-telemetry, outbound SSH to 134.209.82.225, LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond, @reboot cron, and a SysMon scheduled task. Do not treat Open VSX as the source of this copy.
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Exposed Fireworks access keySensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
The attacker used an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks and copied a read-only bucket of coding-agent traces. A small number of traces contained credentials.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
02Malicious copies placed on the marketplace cachePrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft
On Oct 29 a stolen credential was used to place unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, on the cache Cursor used for its marketplace. Open VSX did not have them.
What to look for
A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
The observable event is a write of unauthorized extension copies onto the marketplace cache, not a commit to anthropics/anthropic-quickstarts.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
- Repository and token permission inventory
- Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- repository.public.write
- repository.visibility.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
03Cached versions served for about 11 hoursBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft
At most 5,000 users who requested those cached versions could receive them. Cursor's earlier notice placed the marketplace window at about 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM ET.
What to look for
A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
- Extension ID, permissions and provenance
- Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- browser.extension.install
- browser.extension.update
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
04Extension collects host information and secretsSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
Loader in extension.js collected hostname, username, environment variable names matching secret patterns
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
05SSH backdoor establishedLinux SSH authorized-key persistenceNative logs · Draft
Added svc-telemetry SSH key to authorized_keys and established reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225 with beacon to :8099/beacon
What to look for
A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.
Visibility: Linux endpoint and SSH logs where collected
Required logs
- Linux process creation with complete command lines
- File modification telemetry for user and root SSH directories
- SSH authentication and network connection logs
Coverage limit. Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.
Linux process candidates that reference authorized_keys. The queries require process command lines; correlate with file and SSH telemetry before alerting.
MCP reference matches: Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux SSH Authorized Key Modification
id: ba847b8a-0dd7-4062-a6ba-bc923654f22a
status: experimental
description: Detects shell and file utilities referencing SSH authorized_keys files.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_ssh_authorized_keys_modification.yml
falsepositives:
- Approved SSH key rotation and configuration management
level: medium
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_image:
Image|endswith:
- /bash
- /sh
- /zsh
- /cat
- /tee
- /sed
- /cp
selection_target:
CommandLine|contains: authorized_keys
condition: all of selection_*
KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "authorized_keys"
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "cat", "tee", "sed", "cp")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process="*authorized_keys*"
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTimeInvestigation steps
- Recover the added key and identify the process, user, package, or script that changed the file.
- Correlate the change with new SSH sessions, reverse tunnels, and other persistence artifacts.
06Platform-specific persistence installedNew persistence → recurring executionCustom schema · Draft
com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent (macOS), @reboot cron (Linux), SysMon scheduled task (Windows)
What to look for
A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes
- Process creation and file provenance
- User / administrative change records
Coverage limit. Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution
id: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e
status: experimental
description: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is
changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- persistence.create
- persistence.modify
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
- Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Initial access
- Stolen access key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks, then a stolen credential used to place unauthorized Claude Code extension copies on the Cursor marketplace cache. Open VSX did not carry the malware.
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Cursor IDE
- anthropic.claude-code extension
Other tooling
- Reverse SSH tunnel
- LaunchAgent persistence (macOS)
- Cron persistence (Linux)
- Scheduled task persistence (Windows)
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Cursor users who requested the specific cached extension versions on Oct 29, and customers whose non-Privacy-Mode traces or support credentials were in the copied bucket. Production systems and customer code repositories were not described as affected.
- Reported scale / exposure
- At most 5,000 users potentially received the cached copies, which were available for about 11 hours. API credentials were exposed for less than 0.01% of customers. Traces were exposed for fewer than 0.05% of non-Privacy-Mode users. Tampered versions were anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313.
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Multiple regions reflects the global Cursor user base. Cursor did not name affected countries.
Reported attribution
Unnamed. Cursor published the Fireworks-key root cause on Nov 13, 2026. No country is stated.
Structured attribution
- Actor
- unknown
- Motivation
- unknown
- Attributed by
- Cursor
- Attribution confidence
- low
Detection rules
- Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXESIGMAView rule
Windows process creation. schtasks.exe creating a task. Microsoft describes a SysMon scheduled task. The rule does not name SysMon.
- New Cron File CreatedSIGMAView rule
Linux file event. A new cron file. Matches the @reboot cron persistence Microsoft describes.
- Potential Persistence Via PlistBuddySIGMAView rule
macOS process creation. PlistBuddy writing a LaunchAgent. Relevant to com.apple.sysmond only if the installer used PlistBuddy. Microsoft names the LaunchAgent, not the tool that wrote it.
- Port Forwarding Activity Via SSH.EXESIGMAView rule
Windows process creation. ssh.exe port forwarding. Matches the reverse tunnel on Windows. The Linux and macOS tunnels are the same destination, 134.209.82.225.
- Potential SSH Tunnel Persistence Install Using A Scheduled TaskSIGMAView rule
Windows process creation. schtasks.exe installing an OpenSSH tunnel. Microsoft describes both a SysMon task and a reverse SSH tunnel.
- Fireworks key and marketplace cacheGUIDANCE
No cited rule covers an exposed vendor access key or a write to the Cursor marketplace cache. Hunt svc-telemetry in authorized_keys and outbound SSH to 134.209.82.225.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-29
- Last updated
- 2026-11-13
Updates
- 2026-10-29 — Cursor
Using a stolen credential, the attacker places unauthorized Claude Code extension copies on the marketplace cache. At most 5,000 users who requested those versions could receive them. The copies are available for about 11 hours.
- 2026-10-30 — Microsoft
Microsoft describes the loader, SSH key svc-telemetry, the tunnel to 134.209.82.225, the beacon on port 8099, and persistence via com.apple.sysmond, cron, and a SysMon task. Versions are 2.1.312 and 2.1.313.
- 2026-11-01 — Cursor
Last attacker activity Cursor reports. The activity was blocked.
- 2026-11-13 — Cursor
Cursor publishes the root cause: an access key issued to Fireworks was exposed, the attacker copied a read-only trace bucket, and Open VSX never had the malware.
Source defensive notes
Rotate credentials that were in coding-agent traces or sent to support if Cursor notified the account. Review SSH authorized_keys for svc-telemetry, outbound SSH to 134.209.82.225, LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond, @reboot cron, and a SysMon scheduled task. Do not treat Open VSX as the source of this copy.
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Unauthorized copies of an AI coding extension were placed on the cache that served Cursor's marketplace. Anthropic did not publish them. Source
Extension established persistence through platform-specific mechanisms Source
The copied bucket included traces with unredacted credentials, and the extension collected environment variables matching secret patterns Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
134.209.82.225
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
4 sourcesResearch by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Netskope (Gianpietro Cutolo) · Microsoft, Netskope, Cursor
- Inside the malicious Claude Code-branded Cursor extension with persistent SSH backdoor www.microsoft.com
- Security notice regarding Claude Code extension cursor.com
- Claude Code Trojan: Persistent SSH Backdoor Analysis opensourcemalware.com
- Security incident update cursor.com
The Fireworks access key, the read-only bucket, the 0.01% and 0.05% figures, the marketplace cache, the 5,000-user bound, the 11-hour window, and the Nov 1 last-seen activity are from Cursor's Nov 13, 2026 update. The loader, SSH key svc-telemetry, tunnel 134.209.82.225, beacon on port 8099, and the macOS, Linux, and Windows persistence names are from Microsoft's Oct 30 analysis. The earlier GitHub-repository explanation is not the root cause Cursor published on Nov 13.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Trojanized anthropic.claude-code Cursor extension
- Entry ID
- anthropic-claude-code-trojan-2026-10
- Catalog review
- November 15, 2026
- AI-role confidence
- high
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed