Detection queries Not classified

Malicious AGENTS.md hijacking coding agents via Downloads

Malicious AGENTS.md file dropped into ~/Downloads by website. When coding agent launches in Downloads directory, it reads and follows the malicious instructions. AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml…

What happened

Malicious AGENTS.md file dropped into ~/Downloads by website. When coding agent launches in Downloads directory, it reads and follows the malicious instructions. AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml and runs npm install function-color (MALFEX downloader). CLAUDE.md variant steals OAuth tokens. Attack leverages agent instruction file priority and common workflow of developers launching agents in Downloads after downloading code samples or projects.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Malicious instruction file dropped to Downloads

    Website drops AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md into ~/Downloads folder

    Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

    Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Developer launches agent in Downloads

    User starts coding agent in Downloads directory following common workflow for testing downloaded projects

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Agent reads malicious instruction file

    Agent discovers and loads AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md based on instruction file precedence

    Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

    Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Malicious instructions executed

    AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml and runs npm install function-color; CLAUDE.md variant steals OAuth token

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Malware installed or credentials stolen

    function-color MALFEX downloader installed or OAuth tokens exfiltrated

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: User visits malicious website that drops AGENTS.md into ~/Downloads. Reported impact: function-color MALFEX downloader installed or OAuth tokens exfiltrated; reported targets include Software developers using AI coding agents; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Review Downloads folder before launching agents; scan for unexpected .md instruction files; monitor ~/.codex/config.toml and other agent config modifications; detect npm install from unusual locations; restrict agent instruction file precedence; alert on OAuth token access from unexpected processes

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Malicious instruction file dropped to DownloadsUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft

Website drops AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md into ~/Downloads folder

What to look for

An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

Visibility: Application / agent audit records

Required logs

  • Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
  • Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
  • Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions

Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
  task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.input.ingest
      - agent.session.resume
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
  2. Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
03Agent reads malicious instruction fileUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft

Agent discovers and loads AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md based on instruction file precedence

What to look for

An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

Visibility: Application / agent audit records

Required logs

  • Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
  • Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
  • Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions

Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
  task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.input.ingest
      - agent.session.resume
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
  2. Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
04Malicious instructions executedUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml and runs npm install function-color; CLAUDE.md variant steals OAuth token

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
05Malware installed or credentials stolenSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

function-color MALFEX downloader installed or OAuth tokens exfiltrated

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
User visits malicious website that drops AGENTS.md into ~/Downloads

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Coding agents (Codex, Claude, others)
  • Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md)
  • ~/.codex/config.toml

Other tooling

  • function-color npm package (MALFEX downloader)
  • OAuth token theft

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Software developers using AI coding agents
Reported scale / exposure
Proof of concept demonstrating attack vector; actual deployment scale unknown
Target geography
Multiple regions

Multiple regions reflects global developer population using coding agents

Source defensive notes

Review Downloads folder before launching agents; scan for unexpected .md instruction files; monitor ~/.codex/config.toml and other agent config modifications; detect npm install from unusual locations; restrict agent instruction file precedence; alert on OAuth token access from unexpected processes

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0051.001Indirect

Malicious instruction file manipulates agent behavior by exploiting instruction file loading priority Source

AML.T0081Modify AI Agent Configuration

AGENTS.md contains malicious instructions that modify agent configuration and install malware Source

AML.T0053AI Agent Tool Invocation

Attack exfiltrates OAuth tokens via CLAUDE.md variant Source

AML.T0011.001Malicious Package

Malicious instructions modify agent configuration files for persistence Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Gal Weizman, Omer Samet · Forever Security

  1. Hijacking AI Agents via Downloads Folder forever.security

Relevant detection rules: - Monitor file creation in ~/Downloads directory for unexpected .md instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md) - Detect modifications to ~/.codex/config.toml and similar agent configuration files - Monitor npm install executions from non-standard directories (Downloads, temp folders) - Alert on OAuth token access from unexpected processes - Note: No direct Sigma rules for agent instruction file manipulation; requires custom file integrity monitoring for agent config directories and process monitoring for agent launches from untrusted paths.

Record & downloads
Source record name
Malicious AGENTS.md hijacking coding agents via Downloads
Entry ID
forever-agents-md-hijack-2026
Catalog review
November 4, 2026
AI-role confidence
high