Kaspersky Citrus ransomware uses LLM-written PowerShell and batch scripts
Kaspersky GERT (Stanislav Larinsky, Vladislav Vlasov, Boris Trefilov; Securelist, Nov 11, 2026) documents Citrus, a Russian-speaking ransomware group that hits Russian companies. Initial access is…
What happened
Kaspersky GERT (Stanislav Larinsky, Vladislav Vlasov, Boris Trefilov; Securelist, Nov 11, 2026) documents Citrus, a Russian-speaking ransomware group that hits Russian companies. Initial access is credentials stolen from contractors' staff, used on corporate VPNs or exposed RDP. During execution the crew runs Windows commands and full PowerShell and batch scripts Kaspersky assesses as LLM-generated because the commands carry comments attackers rarely write, including a disable-admin-account example with verify-result comments, a threaded session-enumeration script, and an edited ransomware GPO deploy script. Privilege escalation includes attempts to exploit CVE-2026-54121 Certighost against AD CS, which created machine accounts named GHOST plus 8 letters (examples GHOSTAUFTAFGS, GHOSTCZYQVAZS, GHOSTIVPRLDZA), with cdc pointing at 91.210.109.118. They also use Impacket atexec and 1C-Shell on 1C:Enterprise. Credential and discovery tools include mimikatz, a modified peeping-tom keylogger at C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\jhost.exe, Snaffler, fscan, ADRecon, and SharpHound. Tunnels are Xray VLESS plus REALITY disguised as mirror.yandex.ru and yastatic.net, plus silent AnyDesk. Before encryption they run steal_tgs.ps1 to collect Telegram tdata. Sn00py ransomware (Go, RSA-2048 and ChaCha20) appends .citrus and drops CITRUS_README.txt. It is pushed by a malicious Kaspersky GPO from KasperskyGPO_Deploy_64.exe SFX archives and Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1. Scheduled tasks include Java rpchost agent, KasperskyAgentInstallTask, and Sysvc. Kaspersky notes TTP overlap with Toy Ghouls and no shared infrastructure. Tools: Snaffler https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler, fscan https://github.com/shadow1ng/fscan, Xray https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core, ADRecon https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon, Impacket https://github.com/fortra/impacket.
During the intrusion the crew ran PowerShell and batch scripts that Kaspersky judges were written by an LLM, based on step-by-step explanatory comments. No prompts or API traces were recovered.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Contractor credentials
Stolen contractor staff credentials are used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 1 - 02 · LLM-commented scripts
PowerShell and batch scripts with step-by-step comments disable accounts, enumerate sessions, and edit the GPO deploy script.
Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Certighost and credential tools
CVE-2026-54121 creates GHOST machine accounts. mimikatz, SharpHound, Snaffler, fscan, and a keylogger collect credentials.
Hunt: A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.
Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.
Source for step 3 - 04 · GPO deploys Sn00py
A fake Kaspersky GPO scheduled task runs the SFX and encrypts files to .citrus after steal_tgs.ps1.
Hunt: A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.
A file-write burst is not proof of ransomware; in-process interpreters may not spawn a separate executable.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Contractor staff credentials used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP. Reported impact: A fake Kaspersky GPO scheduled task runs the SFX and encrypts files to .citrus after steal_tgs.ps1; reported targets include Russian companies; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Do not reuse contractor VPN credentials. Monitor AD for machine accounts named GHOST plus 8 letters and for CVE-2026-54121 certificate requests pointing at 91.210.109.118. Block the published hashes. Alert on schtasks names KasperskyAgentInstallTask, Sysvc, and Java rpchost agent, and on Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1.
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Contractor credentialsSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
Stolen contractor staff credentials are used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
02LLM-commented scriptsSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft
PowerShell and batch scripts with step-by-step comments disable accounts, enumerate sessions, and edit the GPO deploy script.
What to look for
A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
- PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
- Download / network and installer events
Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \wscript.exe
- \cscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- -enc
- http
- FromBase64String
- "javascript:"
- "vbscript:"
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
03Certighost and credential toolsWindows credential dumping with system utilitiesNative logs · Draft
CVE-2026-54121 creates GHOST machine accounts. mimikatz, SharpHound, Snaffler, fscan, and a keylogger collect credentials.
What to look for
A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.
Visibility: Windows process and process-access telemetry where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation with complete command lines
- Process-access telemetry for LSASS
- Authentication and lateral-movement logs
Coverage limit. Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.
Windows rundll32/comsvcs MiniDump command candidates. Correlate with process-access telemetry and confirm the target PID belongs to LSASS.
MCP reference matches: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL (SigmaHQ), Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Process Dump Via Comsvcs DLL
id: 1c658574-7d21-4fc8-b272-d6b1508d0aad
status: experimental
description: Detects rundll32 invoking the comsvcs MiniDump export.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml
falsepositives:
- Authorized diagnostics or incident-response collection
level: high
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
selection_command:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- comsvcs.dll
- MiniDump
condition: all of selection_*
KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "comsvcs.dll" and ProcessCommandLine contains "MiniDump"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\rundll32.exe" CommandLine="*comsvcs.dll*" CommandLine="*MiniDump*"
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine ProcessGuid
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Recover the dump path, process ancestry, account, and initiating remote session or scheduled task.
- Correlate the event with new logons, DCSync, ticket creation, and credential use from other hosts.
04GPO deploys Sn00pyCollection / encryption behaviorCustom schema · Draft
A fake Kaspersky GPO scheduled task runs the SFX and encrypts files to .citrus after steal_tgs.ps1.
What to look for
A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-operation rates and process attribution
- Ransomware / DLP behavior alerts
- Canary files and recovery / backup audit
Coverage limit. A file-write burst is not proof of ransomware; in-process interpreters may not spawn a separate executable.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Collection / encryption behavior
id: 0b1098da-0957-4f77-a2a4-e89a5a2e1a36
status: experimental
description: A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is
followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- file.bulk.modify
- data.export
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("file.bulk.modify", "data.export")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("file.bulk.modify", "data.export")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Correlate file bursts, extension changes and outbound transfer to the same process and identity.
- Validate against bulk backup / archiving activity and preserve the research-only qualification of a PoC.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- LLM-generated malware
- Additional role
- AI as operator
- Initial access
- Contractor staff credentials used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- LLM-written PowerShell and batch scripts (model not named; no prompts recovered)
Other tooling
- mimikatz
- Snaffler (https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler)
- fscan (https://github.com/shadow1ng/fscan)
- Xray (https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core)
- ADRecon (https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon)
- Impacket (https://github.com/fortra/impacket)
- SharpHound
- AnyDesk
- Sn00py ransomware
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Russian companies
- Reported scale / exposure
- Newly documented group. Hashes and two IPs published. No victim count.
- Target geography
- Russia
Reported attribution
Citrus, Russian-speaking, financially motivated. Kaspersky notes TTP overlap with Toy Ghouls and no shared infrastructure.
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Citrus
- Country
- Russia
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Kaspersky GERT / Securelist
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- HackTool - Mimikatz ExecutionSIGMAView rule
Windows process creation. Mimikatz command lines. Kaspersky lists mimikatz among Citrus credential tools.
- Detect SharpHound UsageSPLUNKView rule
Windows endpoint. SharpHound collection, which Kaspersky lists in the discovery toolset.
- Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Silent InstallationSIGMAView rule
Windows process creation. Silent AnyDesk install, which matches the remote-access step.
- Windows Scheduled Task Created in a Group Policy ObjectSPLUNKView rule
Windows. Scheduled task creation inside a GPO. Citrus deploys Sn00py with Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1 and tasks KasperskyAgentInstallTask and Sysvc.
- Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or ServiceELASTICView rule
Windows. GPO scheduled-task or service changes, the deployment path for KasperskyGPO_Deploy_64.exe.
- Citrus-specific markersGUIDANCE
Also hunt machine accounts matching GHOST plus 8 letters, cdc 91.210.109.118, jhost.exe under C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java, steal_tgs.ps1, .citrus files, CITRUS_README.txt, and the six published MD5s. No rule names Certighost or Sn00py.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-11-11
- Last updated
- 2026-11-11
Updates
- 2026-11-11 — Kaspersky Securelist
Securelist publishes Citrus TTPs, LLM-commented scripts, Certighost machine accounts, Sn00py hashes, and the Kaspersky-GPO deployment names
Source defensive notes
Do not reuse contractor VPN credentials. Monitor AD for machine accounts named GHOST plus 8 letters and for CVE-2026-54121 certificate requests pointing at 91.210.109.118. Block the published hashes. Alert on schtasks names KasperskyAgentInstallTask, Sysvc, and Java rpchost agent, and on Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1.
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Kaspersky assesses the PowerShell and batch scripts were generated by an LLM from their explanatory comments Source
Initial access used contractor credentials on VPN or RDP Source
Sn00py encryption with the .citrus extension and CITRUS_README.txt is the ransomware impact Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
91.210.109.11891.210.108.180
hashes
17b29b6c9de80402a45e321bbe1168fa9eee984b187423c46c10a63d080da15dd631627131b90d576d77f4bf530e1abee251df2d0b7c3682965efb4d2009a2f47107fb029e7c63523e3aca5fc8e56b38cf903e4a1629aa0582fd0363b5786676
urls
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Stanislav Larinsky, Vladislav Vlasov, Boris Trefilov · Kaspersky GERT / Securelist
- Securelist: Citrus Ransomware - VLESS for traffic, Sn00py for encryption, and LLMs lending a hand securelist.com
- Kaspersky press release: Citrus ransomware and AI-generated scripts www.kaspersky.de
Hashes, IPs, task names, file paths, GHOST account examples, and the LLM-comment judgment are from the Securelist article. MD5s: Sn00py 17b29b6c9de80402a45e321bbe1168fa and build_64.exe 9eee984b187423c46c10a63d080da15d; Xray d631627131b90d576d77f4bf530e1abe; keylogger e251df2d0b7c3682965efb4d2009a2f4; Meterpreter stager 7107fb029e7c63523e3aca5fc8e56b38; fscan cf903e4a1629aa0582fd0363b5786676. IPs 91.210.109.118 and 91.210.108.180.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Kaspersky Citrus ransomware uses LLM-written PowerShell and batch scripts
- Entry ID
- kaspersky-citrus-ransomware-llm-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 12, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- vendor-asserted